Counterinsurgency
Selected Research, Commentary and Congressional Testimony
Heads We Win — The Cognitive Side of Counterinsurgency (COIN) — 2007
Current U.S. counterinsurgency operations must move beyond the use of force and seek out and invest in ways to “fight smarter” against an enemy that is quick to adapt, transform, and regenerate.
On "Other War": Lessons from Five Decades of RAND Counterinsurgency Research — 2006
The challenges posed by insurgency and instability have proved difficult to surmount. This difficulty may embolden future opponents to embrace insurgency in combating the United States. Both the current and future conduct of the war on terror demand that the United States improve its ability to conduct counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. This study makes recommendations for improving COIN based on RAND’s decades-long study of it.
Pacification in Algeria, 1956-1958 — 2006
Originally published in 1963 and featuring a new foreword by Bruce Hoffman, this account of the author's successful command in the Algerian war for independence presents a striking parallel to present-day counterinsurgency operations.
Force Requirements in Stability Operations — Oct. 27, 2006
In this 1995 article, James Quinlivan investigates the numbers required for stability operations, both for entire countries and individual cities, and explores the implications of those numbers for deployment, rotation, readiness, and personnel retention.
Iraq and Beyond — Spring 2006
The Spring 2006 Issue of RAND Review focuses on Iraq, outlining numerous lessons learned but not yet fully applied. Topics include sustaining U.S. forces, promoting reenlistments, and rebuilding Iraqi security institutions.
Combating Al Qaeda and the Militant Islamic Threat — Feb. 16, 2006
[T]he attention of the U.S. military and intelligence community is directed almost uniformly towards hunting down militant leaders or protecting U.S. forces - not toward understanding the enemy we now face. This is a monumental failing not only because decapitation strategies have rarely worked in countering mass mobilization terrorist or insurgent campaigns, but also because al Qaeda's ability to continue this struggle is ineluctably predicated on its capacity to attract new recruits and replenish its resources.
War and Escalation in South Asia — 2006
Highlights key factors in South Asia imperiling U.S. interests, and suggests how and where the U.S. military might play an expanded, influential role. It suggests steps the military might take to better advance and defend U.S. interests in the area.
In Iraq's Prisons, Try a Little Tenderness — Aug. 25, 2005
When Americans talk about "the lessons of Vietnam," they usually mean failed policies and programs that shouldn't be repeated. But there were some successes in the Vietnam War, including an initiative to win the allegiance of captured and defecting Vietcong and North Vietnamese fighters by treating them generously and reshaping their attitudes. This idea — that harsh treatment of prisoners can be less effective than showing compassion — now deserves a test in Iraq, write Scott Gerwehr and Nina Hachigian.
Gauging Counterinsurgency — Aug. 9, 2005
Many Americans wonder why the world's most powerful military force, which toppled Saddam Hussein quickly and without suffering heavy casualties, is unable to stop insurgents from staging an average of 70 attacks a day across Iraq, writes Nora Bensahel.
Our Way or the Highway — Jan. 15, 2005
By now, just about everyone has heard U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's response to a soldier's question about the need for more armored vehicles to protect U.S. troops from insurgent attacks along Iraq's dangerous highways. But there is a more fundamental question: Why are the highway attacks still succeeding?, writes James T. Quinlivan.
Nation-Building Returns to Favour — Aug. 11, 2004
Serious and still mounting losses in Iraq and Afghanistan have led official Washington to recognise, if not acknowledge, serious shortfalls in America's recent nation-building efforts. A decade ago, far more modest setbacks in Somalia triggered calls for America not just to withdraw but also to abandon the whole concept of nation-building. The current reaction is quite the opposite. Both Republicans and Democrats have come to recognise the inevitability of nation-building missions and are pressing for improvements in the way the US conducts such operations. In response, the Defence and State departments, the White House, Congress and the US Army have all launched initiatives to strengthen America's performance in the field, writes James Dobbins.
Lessons from the Past for Iraq's Future — Jul. 23, 2004
Iraq's new government and its American and coalition allies are faced with the challenge of simultaneously fighting the insurgency raging across the country on both the military and political levels. They can get good advice on how to do this by studying the views of Sir Gerald Templer, the architect of Britain's victory in the Malayan insurgency during the 1950s, writes Bruce Hoffman.
Fighting the Insurgency — Jun. 8, 2004
As fighting intensifies in Iraq leading up to the June 30 transition to limited self-governance, pressure grows on the United States to restore security — and on insurgent forces to make Iraqis even less secure. Insurgents have proven to be masters of creative strategies and tactics against the more powerful U.S. forces. It is time now for the American military to catch up, writes Bruce Hoffman.
Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq — 2004
This analysis describes in counterinsurgency terms where the United States has gone wrong in Iraq; what unique challenges the conflict presents to coalition military forces; and what light both shed on future counterinsurgency planning, operations, and requirements.
Colombian Labyrinth: The Synergy of Drugs and Insurgency and Its Implications for Regional Stability — 2001
Colombian Labyrinth examines the sources of instability in the country; the objectives, strategy, strengths, and weaknesses of the government, guerrillas, and paramilitaries and the balances among them; and the effects of the current U.S. assistance program. Possible scenarios and futures for Colombia are laid out, with implications for both the United States and neighboring countries.
Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements — 2001
This report assesses post-Cold War trends in external support for insurgent movements. It describes the frequency that states, diasporas, refugees, and other non-state actors back guerrilla movements. It also assesses the motivations of these actors and which types of support matter most. This book concludes by assessing the implications for analysts of insurgent movements.
The Urbanization of Insurgency: The Potential Challenge to U.S. Army Operations — 1994
Evaluates the effects of urbanization and population growth on the conduct of insurgency/counterinsurgency operations and assesses the U.S.'s ability to effectively support foreign nations' counterinsurgency activities.
From the Sierra to the Cities : The Urban Campaign of the Shining Path — 1992
The current insurgency in Peru is an expression of a larger, historically based conflict between the traditional societies of the sierra and the modern, Spanish-speaking culture of the coastal plain. This dichotomy, which began with the Spanish conquest, has played a powerful role in shaping modern Peruvian history, ensuring that even under central government, Peru has remained culturally divided.
A Strategic Framework for Countering Terrorism and Insurgency — 1992
The strategies and tactics used by governments to counter terrorism and insurgency vary widely, from highly visible declarations of states of siege, for example, to less visible measures such as covert operations. In the absence of a national plan, the individual application of selected tactics and policies can do more harm than good. Governments must develop a plan that acknowledges all the elements of a counterterrorism or counterinsurgency campaign.
American Counterinsurgency Doctrine and El Salvador: The Frustrations of Reform and the Illusions of Nation Building — 1991
This report assesses the political and social dimensions of American counterinsurgency policy in El Salvador. It attempts to explain why low-intensity-conflict doctrine has not produced the desired results and to reassess that doctrine's future utility. The author's appraisal of U.S. involvement in El Salvador leads him to conclude that there is a vast disparity between U.S. objectives and achievements there.
Defense Policy and Low-Intensity Conflict: The Development of Britain's "Small Wars" Doctrine During the 1950s — 1991
This report examines the planning and conduct of three counterinsurgency campaigns waged by Great Britain in Malaya, Kenya, and Cyprus during the 1950s.
Lessons for Contemporary Counterinsurgencies: The Rhodesian Experience — 1991
Examines the counterinsurgency campaign waged by Rhodesia between 1965 and 1980. Analyzes the lessons learned from the Rhodesian conflict and to assess the relevance of these lessons both to United States low-intensity-conflict training and doctrine and to the insurgencies occurring at this time in Central America.
Urbanization and Insurgency—The Turkish Case, 1976-1980 — 1991
One of the likely changes that will affect future low-intensity conflict is the vast urbanization process that is occurring in many Third World countries. This Note analyzes the relationship between explosive population growth in and around cities and armed extremism through a case study of the urban terrorism campaign that erupted in Turkey between 1976 and 1980.
The Army's Role in Counterinsurgency and Insurgency — 1990
Assesses the challenges faced by the U.S. Army in counterinsurgency. Argues that the Army should develop a dedicated cadre of COIN experts, and help create a joint COIN training institute. Only dated by the then-current belief in reluctance to commit actual U.S. combat forces to counterinsurgency.
The Shining Path and the Future of Peru — 1990
This report examines the threat to Peruvian stability posed by the guerrilla group Sendero Luminoso (the Shining Path), and the degree to which this problem has been compounded by economic and political crisis. The author discusses the Shining Path, its origins, organization, the nature of its support, the movement's governing doctrine and theory of victory, and the character of its rural and urban campaigns.
Countering Terrorism and Insurgency: The Experience of Great Britain, 1945-Present — 1989
Government Responses to Armed Insurgency in Southeast Asia: A Comparative Examination of Failures and Successes and Their Likely Implications for the Future — 1985
A brief comparison of COIN techniques and their results in Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Burma. Concludes that COIN efforts that do not incorporate serious political-economic efforts, co-equal with military efforts, are destined to result in stalemate at best.
The Chieu Hoi Program in South Vietnam — 1973
This report sums up the results of earlier research on the defection of VC/NVA personnel and describes the organization and operation of the Chieu Hoi Program, which became one of the most cost-effective programs in the pacification effort.
Bureaucracy Does Its Thing: Institutional Constraints on U.S.-GVN Performance in Vietnam — 1972
An analysis of the impact of institutional factors on the U.S./GVN response in Vietnam. Essentially both governments attempted to handle an atypical conflict situation by means of institutions designed for other purposes. Such constraints as institutional inertia—the inherent reluctance of organizations to change operational methods except slowly and incrementally—influenced not only the decisions made but what was actually done in the field.
The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect: Organization of a Successful Counterinsurgency Effort — 1972
Case study of the Malayan counterinsurgency experience from 1948 to 1960, focusing on the policy and strategy of the British and Malayan governments. The manner in which the United Kingdom and the Government of Malaya, learning from their mistakes, gradually evolved a mixed civil, police, military, and psychological counterinsurgency strategy against the Communist threat offers lessons of wide applicability.
Border Security in South Vietnam — 1971
This summary report is concerned specifically with infiltration of personnel across the land borders of South Vietnam. Three border security programs are discussed: enhanced border surveillance and two manned systems--a strong-point system and a barrier system (strong-points plus barrier).
Soldiers, Guerrillas, and Politics in Colombia — 1971
An assessment of the impact of prolonged insurgency and counterinsurgency operations on a professional military. Suggests that professionalism in the military, far from making it nonpartisan, drives militaries toward political intervention in response to the problems of counterinsurgency. Also provides analysis of the particular responses of the Colombian military.
Rebellion and Authority: An Analytic Essay on Insurgent Conflicts — 1970
Economic reasoning applied to an analysis of rebellion and authority yields some new conclusions about both. Fundamentally, the struggle for popular support is not exclusively or primarily a "political" contest as these terms are usually understood. People act rationally, calculate costs and benefits, and choose sides accordingly.
The Unchangeable War — 1970
The Army's entire repertoire of warfare was designed for conventional war in Europe. In Vietnam, the Army simply performed its repertoire even though it was frequently irrelevant to the situation. This report explores these issues.
The Enclave: Some U.S. Military Efforts in Ly Tin District, Quang Tin Province, 1966-1968 — 1970
A personal account of some American tactical operations in central Vietnam from June 1966 through June 1968, which draws implications about the effectiveness of enclave deployment.
Conversations with NVA and VC Soldier: A Study of Enemy Motivation and Morale — 1969
Comments on the Wolf-Leites Manuscript: "Rebellion and Authority" — 1968
Comments on preferences in cost/benefit analysis of insurgency. Makes the point that preference distribution among the population can potentially have major consequences in terms of “tipping points” for insurgency.
Item Analysis of the HES (Hamlet Evaluation System) — 1968
Insurgent Organization and Operations: A Case Study of the Viet Cong in the Delta, 1964-1966 — 1967
A detailed examination of insurgent organization and operations in the Mekong Delta province of Dinh Tuong. Describes the interrelation of the political, military, and support infrastructure elements of insurgent organization. Also provides analysis of insurgent defensive, offensive, and logistic operations. A very fine-grained analysis, including appendixes on the history and organization of three specific insurgent battalions, as well as insurgent military intelligence, communication, and training.
Viet Cong Recruitment: Why and How Men Join — 1966
Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: New Myths and Old Realities — 1965
A brief overview of the counterinsurgency paradigm discussed in more detail in Rebellion and Authority (Leites and Wolf, 1970). Makes recommendations on the value of rewards for information and defection, the virtue of amnesty programs, the possibilities of food control, and the possible paradox of development actually increasing insurgent capabilities even as it decreases support for insurgents.
Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Algeria — 1964
Counterinsurgency: A Symposium, April 16-20, 1962 — 1962
A report on the Symposium on Counterinsurgency held at RAND's Washington Office during the week of 16 April 1962. Its purpose was to bring together those with first-hand experience of counterinsurgency for discussions that might lead to fresh insights and a detailed body of expert knowledge. This new release of this important report, which includes a new foreword by Stephen T. Hosmer, remains relevant to present-day counterinsurgency operations
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