Figure 2.1--Trends in Total Fertility Rate in Russia and Other Countries of Western and Eastern Europe, 1880-1990
The paper introduces period and cohort analyses of Russian fertility trends in 1979-1993. Though the tempo of cohort fertility reflects shifts in the timing of births, the results of cohort analysis show that the female post-war cohorts have stabilized towards the two-child family. The findings of the present research help to identify the historical point that Russia's fertility transition has reached. The fertility trends analyzed in the present paper also help to identify the position of the Russian population relative to the second demographic transition of other European countries.
Russia has entered the stage of negative population change. The era of postwar population growth, determined predominantly by natural increase, has come to an end. The first postwar decade saw a high natural increase, whereas during the second one its rapid decline was observed. The subsequent two decades brought a period of stability. But by the late 1980s, this gave way to a steep fall in births and, thus, in natural increase.
The mass media has increasingly overflowed with alarming articles on population issues. Based on non-professional interpretation of available vital statistics, they are calling "to save Russia from depopulation." Such assertions ring of nationalism in today's political context. The whole spectrum of conservative forces ("red," "brown," "green," etc.) would not miss an opportunity to manipulate population data to contribute to the atmosphere of anti-democratic, anti-reform, and anti-West sentiments.
As a result, the general public has been completely misled about population issues. Rank-and-file citizens are inclined to draw a direct link between the current economic slump and a demographic crisis. Indeed, the rate of increase in the cost of living exceeds that of income, and under such economic conditions it is not surprising that some view giving birth to a child an irrational or irresponsible act.
The present-day developments in Russia have much in common with those observed in France and Germany many years ago, namely in the 1930s. The Great Depression was accompanied by a demographic depression, and public opinion was largely molded by an impressive comparison of numbers of "coffins" ("crosses") to numbers of baby cradles.[2] The approaches then pursued in population data interpretation played a role in supporting the patriotic sentiments of those years, which developed an increasingly nationalistic and national-socialist tone. Ordinary people are always inclined to associate setbacks in population dynamics with those in the economy, and with some reason. In all places and at all times, famine, war, and revolution have tended to bring about a postponement of marriages, a fall in births, and a rise in deaths.
In the twentieth century, Russia has suffered a series of social cataclysms. The demographic crises which have followed have had disastrous implications. They occurred in 1915-1921, 1928-1934, and 1941-1947. According to our lowest estimate, these three crises lasting 6 years each and 7 years apart have accounted for a loss of 38 million people, including losses due to the deficit in births, excess of deaths, and emigration. Thus, Russia was destined to accumulate an enormous experience living in crisis and to reproduce the resulting population decline effect in generations born a half century later.
Yet the history of a population, as much as a historical process itself, tends to be formed not only by a history of catastrophes (event history), but also by a history of evolution (history of long-run and short-run trends). One or another demographic situation appears to evolve from long-term population dynamics, as well as to be shaped by more immediate changes in the social environment. It is not surprising, then, that a dual approach to interpreting demographic change exists. An instructive example can be easily offered by Russia, where both the general public and scholars display an ambiguous approach to assessing the general impact of current trends in births and population dynamics.
What rank-and-file people are much more likely to miss when interpreting the historical developments is an evolutionary component of social dynamics, for they tend to consider them in terms of critical events of their own lives or those of their family. The way they would see things concerning their present and past everyday life is mostly affected by the current settings they live in, or by the foggy idealistic notions they happen to share of the past times. Such a manner of seeing things can be described as an aberration of two types, one resulting from short-sightedness and the other from far-sightedness, or believing that "yesterday was better because today is worse." Meanwhile, a researcher, versus an ordinary citizen, has at his disposal systematically processed information and is expected to resist such temptations.
The experience of investigating Russia's population history makes it clear that, however deep social crises have tended to be, they could never deprive the population dynamics of its major evolution-related component. Consistent with universal laws of social and demographic modernization, crucial patterns of mortality and fertility change have forced their way through the chaos of irregular fluctuations of rates and unequal demographic contributions of different generations. Moreover, none of the crises observed in Russia has succeeded in exerting a decisive influence on the course of the demographic transition, which would have meant a turnaround in an overall transitional trend. Whatever the case, the crises could not but affect the pace of the demographic modernization by making it either slower or faster, and eventually make Russia's particular pattern of demographic change far more pronounced.
Whether the current demographic crisis is an exception, only the future can tell. Its first stages, which Russia is in, cannot show much and cannot be of great help, if any, in forecasting future trends. In such rapidly changing settings, projections are not easy to do. Nevertheless, there is a need, and some evidence is available in this regard, to identify the historical point within the transition that Russian fertility had reached when the recent socioeconomic and political turmoil broke out. This is all the more important, for Russia is experiencing not only a phase of crisis; it can be also seen as a positive stage of in-depth reconsideration of the history of the country, of coming to know the core patterns of its culture, and seeking answers to vital questions of human existence.
The pre-transitional (until the end of the nineteenth century) level of Russian fertility was very high. It was higher than that found in the rest of eastern Europe, even though they had a similar nuptiality pattern, which differed from that of western European countries with their late marriage.[4] The Russian nuptiality model was characterized by marriage at an early age and by the overall prevalence of marriage. The mean age at first marriage was around 20 for women, and the proportion of marriages at 20 and younger ages accounted for more than 50 percent of the total. By age 30, more than 90 percent of women had married at least once, with only 5 percent never married. In addition, though Orthodox Russia didn't have divorce, high mortality made remarriages quite common among widowed persons, accounting for 8-11 percent of the total number of marriages among women and for 14-17 percent among men.[5]
Lack of widespread fertility control in combination with the overall high nuptiality level were responsible for the average Russian woman giving birth to 7 or more children during her reproductive life. Total fertility rates in Russian European regions (except the Northern Caucasus) varied between 5.9 and 8.7.[6]
The fertility decline in Russia started at the very beginning of the twentieth century and involved cohorts born after 1870. Geographically, the transition began in the central and northwestern European regions and later spread to the East and the South of the country. By that time, all European countries except Bulgaria, Romania, Portugal, and Albania had already started their fertility decline. In countries like France, the decline had already been under way for a century.
Figure 2.1 illustrates Russia's TFR trend against the background of the European countries[7] and clearly shows that, in the initial stage of the transition, Russia tended to exceed the limits of the statistical range of the European transition. It is also apparent that Russia's convergence towards the rest of Europe was very rapid and took no more than 50 years (by the beginning of the 1950s).
Figure 2.1--Trends in Total Fertility Rate in Russia and Other Countries of Western and Eastern Europe, 1880-1990
Figure 2.2--Trends in Total Fertility Rate in Terms of Comparable Time Schedule in Russia and Other Countries of Western and Eastern Europe During the Demographic Transition
The faster an illiterate Russian peasant grew into an urban educated resident, the more rapidly did his demographic profile change. It was as early as the nineteenth century, and even earlier according to A. Vishnevsky,[8] that the need and inevitability of modernization of the Russian society, then lagging behind the civilized European countries, was evident. Is it surprising, then, that long accumulated latent energy for change burst out so intensively? The attempts "to construct communism" in Russia can be regarded as one of the extreme and most aggressive forms of state-driven modernization of a traditional society. In this vein, the social cataclysms of Russian history can be seen as inherent to the chosen path to modernization. As regards population history, catastrophes repeatedly broke the regular pattern of population change. In the area of fertility they did so by bringing about shifts in the timing of family formation.
Prior to the First World War the fertility decline evolved very slowly. That war, and the subsequent Civil war, with their famine and ravages, brought the first acceleration in the change process. A second increase in the tempo of change taking place in the 1920-1930s resulted in an internationally unprecedented drop in fertility (see Figure 2.1). Its causes are well known. The major ones are rooted in the period of intensive industrialization with accompanying massive exodus to cities, a crisis in the country's agriculture, and famine. Then the Second World War came and yet another famine broke out in 1946-47. Though in the 1950s there was a short respite, there was no return to the prewar fertility level.
It can be suggested that the mechanism of fertility decline operating at the family level was that the family repeatedly delayed child-bearing and had less than the intended number of children because of persistent stress conditions. To unfavorable factors affecting fertility can be added the poor social conditions suffered by many generations. The probability of becoming an orphan or being reared in a one-parent family (by a widow, for example) was virtually constantly high for cohorts born between 1885 and the early 1920s.[9]
The inevitable result of this "stress"-originating fertility control was the rapid spread of induced abortion. A whole abortion-related culture and abortion-providing industry, both legal and illegal, emerged in Russia. Alternating revisions of the legislation concerning induced abortion (1920--legalization, 1936--prohibition, 1955--legalization) testified to conflicting pressures regarding this issue. Although the government fought against abortion for many years, abortion had been widely accepted among the population. (For more on abortion, see paper by Popov in this volume.)
We still lack reliable time series on transitional completed cohort fertility in Russia.[10] The data we have are estimates and relate to the population of the USSR as a whole. They must be treated with caution as they have been reconstructed on the basis of data obtained through special surveys of women conducted during 1960-1985 and, therefore, represent the fertility intent of survivors at the moment of the survey.[11] The completed fertility of cohorts born in 1940-1944 and later was estimated as the actual number of children born plus the expected number of additional children reported in the surveys. We estimated completed fertility of the birth cohorts of 1912-1960 on the basis of pertinent data from the 1979 and 1989 censuses and of the national vital statistics for recent years (Figure 2.3).
Figure 2.3--Completed Fertility of Birth Cohorts, 1890-1960, in the USSR and Russia
SOURCES: Data for the USSR, Andreev E.M., Darskii, L.E., Kharkova, T.L., 1993, p. 81. Data for Russia, (1) Andeev, A., Monnier, A., 1994, pp. 870-871; (2) Estimates based on the 1979 and 1989 Census Data and Vital Statistics for 1989-1993.
There is considerable difficulty in identifying Russia as a low-fertility country of the Western European type. The fact that Russia shares many fertility patterns with the rest of Europe cannot be of much help in this regard. What does matter are the distinguishing features of the Russian fertility decline. They made their appearance over the transition period and in a postwar trend as well, though recent visible changes in fertility are not significant compared to past developments.
In its general features, the postwar period of Russian fertility history fortunately escaped the dramatic developments of previous decades. However, the postwar compensating increase in births was not so substantial as to create a "baby-boom," as was the case in most Western countries during the 1950s and 1960s.
Throughout the 1960s fertility declined rapidly, partly due to another, and possibly last, wave of massive relocation to urban areas. Then it began to slow down and eventually a stable situation was reached. In the 1980s Russia saw a notable surge in the total fertility rate (TFR). That was rather a result of governmental interventions through implementation of a series of social policy measures borrowed from the experience of the other Eastern European countries, which had embarked on pronatalist policies ten years earlier (to be discussed below). But by the late 1980s in Russia, similar to the rest of Eastern Europe, a sharp drop in fertility rates replaced their rise. From 1988 up to now a practically linear fall in TFR has been occurring.
Russia's postwar TFR trend is shown in Figures 2.4.1-2.4.6 against the background of the other industrialized countries, geographically classified in accordance with criteria adopted by the Council of Europe. The general conclusion that may be drawn from this comparison is that the closer the countries are geographically, the more they appear to have common change patterns. In this vein, non-European countries of Anglo-Saxon culture such as the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand have fertility trends most dissimilar to Russia (Figure 2.4.5). Next are the countries of western and northern Europe. Comparing further, more similarity is found in Russia's and southern European nations' TFR trends. As the analysis is extended to the countries of eastern Europe, the similarities increase. Finally, all the European republics of the former USSR display a striking simultaneity in TFR change. Viewing these trends together can make the distinguishing pattern specific to Russia visible (Figure 2.4.6). It can be readily documented that in the postwar period in the republics of the former USSR, fertility has been characterized by a gradual trend toward a uniform low level, with Russia tending to occupy the middle level. Moldova is the only exception, where a fertility decline started later and where, naturally, higher TFR levels occur.
Figure 2.4--Postwar Trends in Total Period Fertility Rate in Russia Against the Background of Different Groups of Countries, 1945-1993
Figure 2.5--Trends in Completed Fertility in Russia Against the Background of the Different Groups of European Countries, Birth Cohorts of 1940-1960
Figure 2.6--Trends in Mean Age of Mother and Total Fertility Rate in Russia, 1959-1993
Thus, the picture of short-run changes in fertility dynamics in the postwar European countries looks rather complicated. The convergence of different groups of European countries was possible only in cross-overs of "group" fluctuating trends representing phases specific to these different groupings of countries. The rank of Russia among the European countries during the 1960s and the 1970s was determined by opposite trends within the other countries rather than by changes in Russian fertility. In the 1980s, the former USSR government's pronatalist policy strongly affected the fertility patterns there. It led to the emergence of a new fluctuating fertility trend in Europe associated with the ex-Soviet republics.
The Timing of Fertility: Evidence from Russia
The specifics of Russia's fertility trend are not restricted to patterns of change in summary indices of fertility. Far more crucial differences can be found in age patterns of childbearing. Age-specific patterns of fertility have been shown in comparative studies to vary from one country to another, and the level of fertility is not necessarily associated with the concentration of births within a given age range.[12]
At present, the eastern European countries including Russia generally display the early-peak type of age pattern in which the maximum fertility occurs in age group 20-24. The countries of western, northern, and even southern Europe (except Yugoslavia) have their fertility peak in the 25-29 age group.
The notable divergence of countries as regards the above-mentioned patterns has increased since the mid-1960s. That period revealed a strong "aging" tendency in Western fertility due to fertility reductions at younger ages, including the 20-24 age group. In the mid-1970s this was supported by an increase in fertility rates for age groups 30-34 and 35-39. Nothing similar was observed in the eastern European countries.
Evidence available from Russia shows that in the 1960s-1980s fertility at younger ages increasingly prevailed. The mean age of childbearing mothers became younger and younger, falling from 28.1 in 1960 to 25.7 in 1980 (Figure 2.6). By 1991, fertility at ages 15-19 exceeded that in the 40-44, 35-39, and 30-34 age groups and approached the rate at ages 25-29 (Figure 2.7).
This strong tendency towards fertility at younger ages is associated with the similar process found in nuptiality patterns. By 1980, compared to 1960, the mean age of women at marriage in Russia fell by 3.5 years, from 26.2 to 22.7. This differentiates Russia considerably from the Western countries, where the 1970s were a turning point in the evolution of marriage age patterns as the age at first marriage began to increase rapidly.[13]
Figure 2.7--Trends in Age-Specific Fertility Rates and Total Fertility Rate in Russia, 1958-1993
1 - All Areas; 2 - Urban Areas; 3 - Rural Areas
Figure 2.8--Percentage of Non-Marital Births Among Live Births, 1959-1993
In contrast, by the end of the 1980s, a "second demographic transition" (a term introduced by Van de Kaa to summarize the above described trends[15]) was still in its infancy in Eastern Europe, if it was present at all. Russia was no exception. Estimates of the probability of premarital conception resulting in legitimate birth were obtained by processing information from birth certificates and provide some evidence on the pattern of forced marriages in Russia. Premarital conception was assumed to have occurred if the interval between marriage and date of child's birth was less than 8 months. According to many authors conducting studies in different regions, the proportion of premarital conceptions accounted for 30-40 percent of total marital births of the first order, and 50-60 percent and over at adolescent (under 20) ages. One of the major implications of the wide prevalence of forced marriages is a high divorce rate. In this respect, Russia finds itself among the leading countries, with only the United States and the Baltic states ahead.
Yet another feature of Russian fertility patterns that calls for closer attention is the interval between successive births, or the timing of births. As studies have revealed, a slow decline in the TFR during the 1970s was accompanied not only by a shift to younger ages in nuptiality and fertility and a decrease in the probability of higher-order births, but also by a reduction in the intervals between births. In low-fertility settings, shifts in timing of first, second, and third births may considerably affect the overall level of TFR. The interval reductions mean that children of the same order are born by women of different cohorts: some of them according to a normally expected "schedule," while others are born somewhat earlier, or ahead of "schedule." The outcome is an abnormally high number of the births and a high TFR.
The early age patterns of marriage characteristic of Russia and the shortening of birth intervals contributed to the emergence of births of second and higher orders occurring at ever younger ages. Another factor responsible for shifts in birth timing during the 1970s is Russia's family planning model. Abortion was prevalent, as was little awareness by the population about effective contraceptive devices and a lack of availability of contraceptives. There was virtually no domestic contraception industry, and imports from other countries were negligible. According to the estimate made by A. Avdeev and I. Troitskaya, for the 1970s the life-time abortion rate was 4.0-4.5 per woman in Russia.[16], [17] However, such a fertility control strategy is really birth limitation rather than family planning as, in fact, attempts are made only to regulate the number of children born and not the spacing of their conceptions. Whether deliberately or not, Russian women apparently achieve the desired number of children in young ages as fast as possible by reducing the birth intervals, with the unplanned pregnancies resulting in induced abortions.
In sum, the combination of low fertility, an extremely large contribution by younger mothers to the total number of births, and short intervals between successive births were characteristic of Russian fertility patterns in the late 1970s. In such a fertility setting, period rates and, in particular, the TFR can never be stable. Even a little change in external conditions might lead to an unpredictable response from young families, causing fluctuations in the total fertility level. The bulk of evidence in this respect is provided by the developments of the 1980s.
The sharp fluctuations in period fertility rates that we have been witnessing in Russia during the last decade cannot but intrigue the scholar, especially given the fact that the absolute majority of Russian families has finally and irreversibly decided to opt for a small nuclear family with two children. Figure 2.9 illustrates how cohorts, one after another, were shifting to the universal two-child family model: all cohorts of Russian women born after the war were reluctant to either remain childless or have more than three children. Numerous sociological surveys conducted in Russia confirm the stability in reproductive intentions of modern families. Under these conditions, fluctuations in period fertility indices may, in fact, reflect the results of adjustments that parents are tending to introduce in their timing of births, rather than a radical revision of their plans concerning the number of children they would like to have. Hence, the growth and subsequent fall of TFR during the 1980-1990s appears to be, in a sense, a peculiar artifact that results from the underlying distribution of women by the number of children already born and intervals between births. To address this issue, we have to introduce into our analysis of distribution of births by order, as well as distribution of women by parity as calculated from the 1979 and the 1989 censuses (in which the relevant question was included for the first time).
Figure 2.9--Distribution of Women by Number of Children Born by Age 50 in Different Birth Cohorts in Russia (estimates for birth cohorts of 1945 and 1955)
Figures 2.10.1 and 2.10.2 show changes in the TFR and total fertility rates for each birth order. First births have gradually increased since 1982, reaching their maximum in 1988, while third births started to increase somewhat earlier--in 1981, with a peak in 1987. The shape of the TFR curve is clearly influenced by the irregular trend in the second-birth total fertility rate. Note also, that there was a slight increase in the frequency of births of the fourth, fifth, and sixth orders during 1986-1987. The picture becomes all the more clear as we estimate period parity-progression ratios, appearing to confirm the impression given by our previous analysis that the probabilities of second and third births (a1 and a2) grew in the mid-1980s, reaching their highest level in 1987 (Figure 2.11).
Figure 2. 10.1--Trends in Total Fertility Rate and Order-Specific Total Fertility Rate in Russia, 1979-1993, 1st-4th Birth Orders
Figure 2.10.2--Trends in Total Fertility Rate and Order-Specific Total Fertility Rate in Russia, 1979-1993, 5th-10th Birth Orders
Figure 2.11--Trends in Period Parity Progression Ratios in Russia, 1979-1993, 2nd-6th Birth Orders
Figure 2.12--Trends in Mean Age of Mother at Childbearing For All and 1st-5th Birth Orders in Russia, 1979-1993
Figure 2.13--Trends in Standard Deviation of Mean Age of Mother at Childbearing For All and 1st-5th Birth Orders in Russia, 1979-1993
The major methodological problem arising here is that, to calculate parity-specific fertility rates, one has to estimate the distribution of women by the number of children already born for each calendar year under study. We attempted to tackle this problem by applying the survival ratio method to the distribution of mothers by age and by the number of children ever born derived from the 1979 and the 1989 censuses. We also used annual distributions of births by mother's age and order of birth, as well as the Goskomstat estimates of the magnitude of changes in each cohort's size due to intercensal mortality. To reduce the magnitude of error, we based our analysis on the average of two annual distributions of mothers obtained by the "forward" method--from 1979 to 1989, and the "reverse" method--from 1989 to 1979. The accuracy of our estimation seems satisfactory.[18]
Total age-specific fertility rates for each birth order, calculated for 1979-1993 in the usual way, and the parity-specific fertility rates, estimated on the basis of the distribution of women by the number of children already born from the 1979 and 1989 censuses, are shown in Figure 2.14. This confirms our assumption made earlier that total first-birth fertility rates, as well as second-birth rates obtained in the conventional way, appear to have been inflated for the mid-1980s and, conversely, deflated for the beginning of the 1990s. The difference in intensity of second births recorded between 1983 and 1987 looks less substantial. Generally speaking, however, our calculations intended to help interpret the period indices have introduced nothing new in our substantive conclusions. The intensity of fertility of the first three orders has, indeed, grown significantly during the 1980s, while its drop in the early 1990s was not less significant.
Figure 2.14--Trends in Conventional Total Fertility Rate and Parity-Specific Total Fertility Rate for 1st-3rd Birth Orders in Russia, 1979-1993
The cumulative average number of children born in female cohorts by different ages is presented in Figure 2.15. Two stages of evolving cohort fertility can be easily distinguished. The declining fertility trend continued with cohorts of women born in the 1920s, 1930s, and in the first half of the 1940s. Whereas women born in 1909-1913 gave birth to 3 children during their reproductive life, those born in the early 1920s had about 2.3 children, and the 1945 cohort had 1.8 children. For women born around 1945, the peak of reproductive activity occurred in the second half of the 1960s.
Figure 2.15--Cumulative Fertility at Each Age For Different Birth Cohorts in Russia, 1979-1993
The cumulative frequency for birth orders 1-5 in cohorts of women born between 1937 and 1975 observed during the period 1979-1993 are shown in Figures 2.16-2.20. The cumulative frequency of births of the n+1 order relates to mothers with at least n children.
Figure 2.16--Cumulated Frequency of First Births at Each Age for Different Birth Cohorts in Russia, 1979-1993
Figure 2.17--Cumulated Frequency of Second Births at Each Age for Different Birth Cohorts in Russia, 1979-1993
Figure 2.18--Cumulated Frequency of Third Births at Each Age for Different Birth Cohorts in Russia, 1979-1993
Figure 2.19--Cumulated Frequency of Fourth Births at Each Age for Different Birth Cohorts in Russia, 1979-1993
Figure 2.20--Cumulated Frequency of Fifth Births at Each Age for Different Birth Cohorts in Russia, 1979-1993
Figure 2.17, illustrating the second birth pattern, is of interest also. First, it clearly shows the increasing probability of second births in all the cohorts born after 1945, up to 1962. It is even so for the most recent cohorts, born during the first half of the 1970s: they gave birth to their second child by a specified age more frequently than those born 10 years earlier. Secondly, the magnitude of the increase in the proportion of women who had their second child at a younger age is really phenomenal. By age 25, 18 percent of women of first parity in the 1955 cohort had a second birth while in the 1965 cohort the corresponding figure was 24 percent. The probability of a third birth increased during the 1980s as well, particularly in the second half of the 1980s for mothers 30 years and over. For younger mothers, the growth of third birth fertility was not that appreciable, and, for women at ages below 24, the probability of a third birth was tending to decrease (Figure 2.18).
Figures 2.19 and 2.20 show a steady downward trend in fertility of fourth and fifth birth orders. The population policy of the 1980s did not bring about an increase in the probability of having a large family--it only served to accelerate the timing of the first through third child. Instead, cohorts, one after another, gave birth to children of higher orders less and less frequently, confirming the observation that a two-child family had become the universal and most desired family model for the Russian population.
The results of our cohort analysis seem to leave no doubt that the post-war cohorts of Russian women have displayed a stabilizing and even upturning trend in fertility in conformity with the two-child-family size, reaching a high of 1.8-1.9 children per woman.
The incentive effect of the pronatalist measures introduced during the 1980s in Russia was twofold. First, the average number of births in cohorts having completed their reproductive activity grew. This means that a fraction of second and third births would probably not have occurred unless the pronatalist measures had been taken. On the other hand, women had their first three births at younger and younger ages, and reduced the intervals between births more frequently than before, thus continuing a tendency which had emerged earlier. A considerable portion of families achieved their reproductive goals earlier, giving birth to the desired number of children during a short period of five to six years, and did so at a younger age as compared with the preceding cohorts.
During 1992-1994, there has been a slowdown in the tempo of cohort fertility due to the postponement of births of the second and third order (while first birth is not delayed). The fact that five years earlier many of the cohorts had produced their first and second births ahead of the "normal" schedule appears to have made a considerable contribution to the fall of TFR during the early 1990s. Despite a recent significant drop in age-specific fertility in the absence of the mentioned policy measures, none of the cohorts, even the most recent, has returned to the relatively "slower" tempo of family formation characteristic of the end of 1970s (Table 2.1). A slight decrease in cohort fertility during the early 1990s can be observed for women who by 1994 reached the ages of 23-34.
| Age | 1980 | 1987 | 1990 | 1993 |
| 18 | 0.035 | 0.048 | 0.056 | 0.063 |
| 20 | 0.194 | 0.238 | 0.267 | 0.267 |
| 25 | 0.958 | 1.026 | 1.051 | 1.020 |
| 30 | 1.451 | 1.527 | 1.580 | 1.533 |
| 35 | 1.715 | 1.758 | 1.798 | 1.822 |
| 40 | 1.946 | 1.792 | 1.840 | 1.883 |
| 45 | 1.978 | 1.934 | 1.846 | 1.819 |
No doubt, today's hard times for Russian society play a role in the postponement of births observed recently. At the same time, one should take into account the possibility that today the population may be coming back to the former more natural and moderate tempo of procreation. The shift to longer intervals between births seems to be an inevitable "negative" compensation for the pronatalist population policy pursued during the 1980s.
For now, statistical evaluation of the contributions of each of the mentioned factors to the postponement of births is not possible. It is clear that both the end of pronatalist policies and the economic downturn of the 1990s have affected current fertility dynamics. During the last three years (1992-1994), their overall contribution to the drop in fertility, in terms of completed mean number of children per woman, can be estimated to not exceed 0.05 children for women around age 30 and 0.03 children for women around age 25. No sign of the impact of recent developments on the younger cohorts has been detected. One should keep in mind that births postponed today due to changes in family plans might be made up a few years later, representing still another short-term shift in birth timing in a number of cohorts, similar to that observed in the 1980s. In this case, the completed number of births would behave as if no postponement had occurred.
The cohort analysis presented above clearly demonstrates that there is not sufficient evidence to associate a so-called "crisis" in Russian fertility with the current political and socioeconomic situation, as is frequently done in the media with non-professional speculations about population issues.
As shown in the first section of this paper, a complex process of change in fertility behavior patterns has been occurring in the West since the late 1960s. To achieve the relatively small number of children desired, people were modifying their behavioral patterns in ways that have been termed "the second demographic transition." The second demographic transition in fertility and nuptiality is characterized by the following features:
As a result, a new pattern of fertility timing has begun to emerge. This new fertility model has, no doubt, become possible owing to the development of effective contraceptive means and techniques, offering unprecedented opportunities for couples to pursue their own strategy with respect to the desired number of births and their spacing.
The first indication of a changing fertility model in Russia was that the upward trend in fertility for the 15-19 age group has reversed since 1991. The increase in adolescent fertility observed until that moment may be attributed to earlier initiation of premarital sexual relations associated with "the sexual revolution."
The Second Demographic Transition as a Process of Change in Age-Specific Fertility Patterns
Let us follow the process underlying the changes in age-specific patterns of fertility in advanced countries, taking as a starting point the onset of its decline in age group 15-19. The countries selected for a comparative analysis[20] differ in the initial date of steady fertility decline at ages 15-19 from 1966 in Sweden to 1979 in Greece. In the United States the decline has been occurring since 1971-1972. It can be noted that the decline in adolescent fertility is quite independent of overall levels of fertility. TFR varied from 1.72 in Germany to 3.19 in New Zealand. As mentioned above, the desired final number of children and desired timing of births appear to be relatively independent and, to a certain extent, adaptable characteristics of fertility.
At the beginning of the mentioned changes, not all the countries under study had a fertility rate at ages 20-24 higher than at ages 25-29. For instance, for Australia, Italy, and Sweden, the ratio of the former to the latter was 0.94-0.95, and was even lower in the Netherlands--0.77. However, by the onset of the change process, this index tended to rise in all the countries without exception, even in those where the corresponding ratio was below unity. The highest values of the ratio were recorded for Hungary (1.59), Austria (1.37), the United States (1.25), and for Greece (1.21). It reached 1.01 in England, 1.08 in Luxembourg, 1.10 in Finland, and 1.14 in France and Germany.
The decline in adolescent fertility is followed after a certain interval by reductions in the ratio of fertility rate at ages 20-24 to that at ages 25-29. On average, the length of the time lag ranged across the countries from one to five years. However, certain countries, for instance, the United States, had no delay at all. The countries with higher ratio values needed, naturally, more time to level off the rates of fertility at these age groups. Thus, in Hungary the leveling off process has not yet been completed, while it lasted 18 years in Austria, 10 in the United States, 9 in Greece, 6-7 in Germany and France, and 2 years in England and Luxembourg.
The next stage in the process of transformation of the age pattern of fertility is characterized by increasing absolute and relative contributions to overall fertility by the 30-34 age group, and then the 35-39 age group. Recently, in the most advanced populations, a slight rise in fertility rates has been recorded even for ages 40-44. The change in age fertility pattern, therefore, represents, from a statistical standpoint, a process of successive redistribution of births from younger age groups to older ones. During such a redistribution, a drop in the size of TFR tends to occur due to both the incomplete realization of postponed births (the postponement of birth across a few cohorts underlies the changes in age-specific fertility) and to diminishing numbers of unplanned and unwanted births, particularly at young ages.
In other studies (of the evolution of regional demographic differences in Russia, of cross-country comparisons of demographic transition patterns,[21] and of modeling the mortality transition[22]) we have attempted to model the entire process of age-curve modification. The basic variables used in these studies are the tempo of change in fertility for each age group and in the ratio of fertility intensities for different age groups, using the initiation of the decline in adolescent fertility as a starting point. Since the given process is to be presented in an imaginary comparable time scale, the impact of the overall fertility levels can be eliminated to a certain extent. To evaluate the range of variation in indicators of change in age-fertility patterns, we have constructed indices for a set of the countries under study using the same time scale.
By the early 1990s, no signs were observable of the onset of a second demographic transition in Russia. Even the capital city regions had barely begun to join in the process, which had emerged in the advanced countries over the past two decades. However, Russia could be considered to be exhibiting a `pre-transitional' pattern of age fertility of an extreme variant that stands out very clearly against not only the western European countries but even certain countries of eastern Europe. Peculiarly Russian features of this `pre-transitional' pattern are a more pronounced dissymmetry and a higher age concentration of births resulting from earlier nuptiality and a greater concentration of births at young ages.
Until recently, Russian women had their children at younger and younger ages, with a greater concentration of births in the youngest age groups. In 1990, the fertility rate in the 15-19 age group in Russia was 55.6 per 1,000, the highest ever reached during the post-war period in any of the western European countries (excepting Austria, where it was 63 per 1,000 in 1966-1968). (A similar level was observed in 1971 in Australia, until 1974 in New Zealand, until 1976 in the United States, while Canada did not show the described pattern at all.)
In Russia, over several decades, with the exception of only a short period in the mid-1980s, the contribution of ages 25-49 to total fertility was falling. The contribution by mothers aged 15-24 accounted for 56 percent of TFR in 1990, the all-time high for western European countries and non-European developed countries in the post-war period. Only in such eastern European countries as Bulgaria, the former GDR, and Hungary did the process of fertility shifting to younger ages go somewhat further than it did in Russia.
Nonetheless, the fertility trends of recent years provide us with some evidence suggesting that Russia seems to be starting to embark on a second demographic transition.
As already mentioned, the preceding growth of adolescent fertility resulted largely from changes in the sexual behavior of youth--from poor knowledge about contraceptive methods and a predominantly non-economic attitude to marriage and family at the time. From the beginning of the 1960s, adolescent fertility exhibited a strikingly steady upward trend. It did not respond to any external interventions or have breaks in its monotonic trend, as was the case in the other age groups during certain periods. So, we may assume that behind the appearance of fertility decline in that age group must be factors beyond changes in the political and economic climate.
1 - Number Per 100 Live Births; 2 - Number Per 1,000 Women Ages 15-49
Figure 2.21--Trends in Abortion Indicators in Russia, 1959-1992
Figure 2.22--Trends in Total Fertility Rate (TFR) and Total Abortion Rate (TAR) in Russia, 1970-1993
Figure 2.23 presents a medium-scenario fertility projections up to 2015 based on the described hypothesis of modifications in age-specific fertility patterns. The figure shows that the fertility rate at ages 20-24 is higher than at ages 25-29 and the tempo of change of their ratio appears to be very slow. The redistribution of births between these age groups in the latter's favor is believed to have taken place over a rather long time. The contribution of age groups 30-34 and 35-39 to fertility tends to increase, but the rate of increase grows at different speeds through the course of transition. The decline of the age-specific fertility rate for the youngest age group (15-19) is slower than that in the advanced countries.
Figure 2.23--Actual and Projected Age-Specific Fertility Rates in Russia, 1992-2015
The analysis of fertility since the beginning of the 20th century through recent decades in comparison with other advanced countries shows that Russia has followed a unique path in fertility trends during the entire period under study. Russia's peculiarities were caused by differences in its initial date of transition and in its process of social modernization. Russia's social and political transformations have had great consequences for its population history. Its demographic processes were influenced by social catastrophes which repeatedly broke the long-term patterns of population change.
Ultimately, however, social crises could not overcome the major evolutionary component of Russia's population dynamics. Fundamental patterns of fertility change have forced their way through the chaos of irregular fluctuations in birth rates and unequal demographic contributions of different generations.
The postwar period vividly demonstrated opposite trends in the total fertility rate (TFR) and completed fertility within most other countries in comparison with Russia. Fluctuations in these trends in Russia were determined by peculiarities in the timing of fertility: a shift to younger ages in nuptiality and fertility, a reduction of intervals between births, and a family planning model based on abortion.
The government's population policies during the 1980s accelerated a transition to the two-child family model in Russia. On the other hand, it brought a further reduction in the intervals between births. This tendency was broken in the 1990s and, during the last decade, by sharp fluctuations in period fertility rates. The widespread public opinion is that the economic slump has caused a slowdown of fertility. It is easy to associate the changes in economics with the current postponement of births. However, the results of cohort analysis have revealed the superficiality of this explanation. The postponement of higher-order births in the 1990s reflects the shift to longer intervals between births and can be considered as a compensatory effect for the pronatalist policy of 1980s. None of the cohorts has returned to the slower tempo of family formation of the 1970s. Hence, the growth and subsequent fall of the TFR during the 1980-1990s appears to be a peculiar artifact that resulted from the distribution of women by the number of children already born or intervals between births. Thus, there is not sufficient evidence to associate the decrease in Russian fertility with the current political and economic crisis. Future social and demographic developments and continuing research should serve to clarify the correlation between fertility and social changes in Russia.
A complex process of change in fertility patterns over the past three decades has occurred in most Western countries. Those shifts are mainly associated with changes in the individual life cycle, and, in particular, in the timing of marriage and family formation. All these trends are interpreted as "the Second Demographic Transition." Until recently, Russia has demonstrated opposite trends in comparison with the West. Russia has tended to follow in the footsteps of the most advanced populations, but at present the Second Demographic Transition in Russia is still in its infancy. Most of the specific features of Russia's fertility dynamics appear to be extreme points of a generalized statistical range for the more advanced nations. If the Second Demographic Transition progresses further in Russia as in other developed countries, it will be apparent in tendencies toward nuptiality and fertility at older ages and changes in the scheduling of these demographic processes.
2. Avdeev A., Monnier, A., "A la découverte de la fécondité russe contemporaine," Population, No. 4-5, 1993, pp. 870-871.
3. Avdeev A., Blum, A., Troitskaja, "Histoire de la statitique de l'avortement en Russie et en URSS jusqu'en 1991," Population, No. 4-5, 1993, pp. 931.
4. Carlson E., "Inverted Easterlin Fertility Cycles and Kornai's `Soft' Budget Constraint," Population and Development Review, Vol.18(4), 1992, p. 670.
5. Central Statistical Office of Russia. Unpublished official data and calculations collected by authors.
6. Chenais, J.C., "La Transition Demographique," Paris: INED, 1986, pp. 520-521.
7. Lutz W., Finnish Fertility Since 1722, Publication of the Population Research Institute, Series D, No. 18. Helsinki, 1987, pp. 121-122.
8. Monnier A. (1991). The Demographic Situation of Europe and the Developed Countries Overseas: An Annual Report, 1991. Population. An English Selection. Vol. 3., p. 229; Monnier, A., de Guibert-Lantoine C. (1993). The Demographic Situation of Europe and the Developed Countries Overseas: An annual report. Population. An English Selection. Vol.5., pp. 264-265.
9. Patterns of Fertility in Low-fertility Settings, U.N. N.Y. ST/ESA/SER.A/131, 1992, pp. 83-115.
10. Preston S.H., "The Decline of Fertility in Non-European Industrialized Countries," in Below-Replacement Fertility in Industrial Societies. Ed. by K.Davis, M.S.Bernstam, R.Ricardo-Campbell. Population and Development Review. Vol.12 (Supplement), 1987, p. 27.
11. Ralu, J.L. A. Blum, eds., European Population, Vol. 1, "Country Analysis," Paris: John Libbey and Co., Ltd., 1991.
12. Recent Demographic Developments in Europe and North America, 1992, Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 1993.
13. Sardon, J.P., "Generation Replacement in Europe Since 1900," Population, An English Selection. Vol. 3., 1991, pp. 19-20.
14. Vishnevsky, A.G., Anichkin, A.B., and T.A.Vishnevskaya (1990), "Low Fertility Settings in the USSR: 1959-1989." Tables and Graphs, Center for Demography and Human Ecology (working paper), Moscow. (In Russian.)
15. Zakharov, S.V. (1994), "Demography. Population of the Russian Federation," in New Russia: An Information and Statistical Almanac, `SP All Russia' Publishing House, p. 124. (in Russian).
Discussants: Catherine Jackson, RAND; and Jack Molyneaux, RAND
The discussants of Dr. Zakharov's paper suggested that the analysis of fertility trends should take into account both government policy and structural socio-economic changes. Pro-natalist measures (e.g., in the Soviet Union in the first half of the 1980s) as well as anti-natalist policies (in most developing nations) can yield enduring results only if enacted in a receptive socio-economic environment. Thus in Russia, current and future fertility policies should be based on the country's socio-economic circumstances. Demographic policy decisions need to be incorporated into the whole system of social and economic development policies. The complexity of this matter calls for a new methodology of analysis. Sophisticated analytical tools must be employed to assess the net impact of government's policies on reproductive behavior in general, and specifically, on proximate determinants of fertility such as marriage, contraception, and abortion.
[2]Huss M. M., "Pronatalism in the Inter-war Period in France," Journal of Contemporary History, Vol.25, 1990, pp.39-68.
[3]Zakharov S., "La transition démographique en Russie et l'évolution des disparités démographiques regionales," in, Modles de la démographie historique. Eds.: A. Blum, N. Bonneuil, and D. Blanchet, Paris, 1992, pp. 353-370; Zakharov, S. V., "Changes in Spatial Variation of Demographic Indicators in Russia," Demographic Trends and Patterns in the Soviet Union Before 1991. Eds.: W. Lutz, S. Scherbov and A. Volkov, 1994, pp. 113-130.
[4]Hajnal J., "European Marriage Patterns in Perspective," Population in History, Ed. by D.V.Glass and D.E.S. Eversley, London, 1965; Vishnevsky A., et S. Zakharov, "Similitudes et divergences des transitions de fécondité dans les Europes de l'Est et de l'Ouest depuis 1880." Paper presented at Chaire Quetelet 1992: Transitions démograpques et Sociétés, Louvain-la-Neuve, September 15-17, 1992.
[5]Tolts, M., "Nuptiality in Russia in the Nineteenth and the Beginning of the Twentieth Century," in Nuptiality, Fertility, Mortality in Russia and the USSR. Ed.: A. G. Vishnevsky, Moscow, 1977, pp.138-153. (In Russian.)
[6]Zakharov, S. V., "Changes in Spatial Variation of Demographic Indicators in Russia," in Demographic Trends and Patterns in the Soviet Union before 1991. Ed. by W. Lutz, S. Scherbov and A. Volkov, 1994, p. 126.
[7]In Figures 2.1 and Figure 2.2. Western European countries are represented by Austria, Belgium, England and Wales, Finland, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland; Eastern European countries include Albania, Bulgaria, Czechia (Czechoslovakia), Hungary, Poland, Romania, Serbia (Yugoslavia).
[8]Vishnevsky, A.G., "Land and Money," The Person (Human Being), No. 3, 1993, pp. 5-20. (In Russian.)
[9]Blum, A., M. Ely, and S. Zakharov (1992). Démographie soviétique--1920-1950, une redécouverte. Annales de Démographie Historique, Paris, pp. 7-22.
[10]Avdeev, A., and A. Monnier, "Á la découverte de la fécondité Russe contemporaine," Population, No. 4-5, 1994, pp. 870-871.
[11]Andreev, E.M., Darsky, L.E., and Kharkova, T.L., Population of the USSR: 1922-1991, Moscow, 1993, p. 81. (In Russian.)
[12]Patterns of Fertility in Low-fertility Settings, U.N. ST/ESA/SER.A/131, 1992, pp. 23-41.
[13]For example, see Julie DaVanzo and M. Oman Rahman, American Families: Trends and Policy Issues, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, P-7859, 1993, Figure 1.
[14]Bourgeois-Pichat, J., "The Unprecedented Shortage of Births in Europe," in Below-Replacement Fertility in Industrial Societes: Causes, Consequences, Policies. Ed. by K. Davis et al, Population and Development Review (Supplement to Vol.12, 1986), 1987, pp. 3-25.
[15]Van de Kaa, D.J., "Europe's Second Demographic Transition," Population Bulletin, Washington, Vol. 42 (1), 1987.
[16]Avdeev, A. A., and Troitskaya, I. A., "Intermediate Determinants of Fertility in the USSR," in Demography and Sociology: Family and Family Policy. Ed. by A.G. Vishnevsky, Moscow, 1991, p. 145. (In Russian.)
[17]Avdeev A., Blum A. et I. Troitskaja, "Histoire de la statistique de i'avortement en Russie et en URSS jusqu'en 1991," Population, No. 4-5, 1994, p. 931.
[18]Comparing the estimated number of women giving birth to 0 to 10 children obtained by the forward method for 1989 with the corresponding data from the 1989 census, we find that the error for fifty birth-cohorts of women varies between 0.1 percent and 3 percent. The "reverse" method estimates for 1979 differ from the 1979 census data in a similar fashion.
[19]Rallu J. L., L. Toulemon, "Les mesures de la fécondité tranversale," Population, 1993, No. 1, pp. 7-26; No. 2, pp. 369-404.
[20]These include 16 countries: Australia, Austria, Finland, France, Germany (Western Germany), Greece, Hungary, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, England and Wales, and the United States. In all of them the change in the age pattern of fertility is unequivocally evident.
[21] See reference 2.
[22] Vassin, Sergei, "Epidemiological Transition of Mortality Curves in Terms of the Brass Logit System," European Journal of Population, No. 10, 1994, pp. 43-68.
[23]For detailed information on trends in abortion in the former USSR and Russia, see A. Avdeev, A. Blum, I. Troitskaja, "L'avortement et la Contaception en Russie et Dans l'ex-URSS: Histoire et Présent," Dossiers et Recherches, INED, No. 41, Octobre 1993; A. Avdeev, A. Blum, I. Troitskaja, "Histoire de la Statistique de L'Avortement en Russie et en URSS Jusqu'en 1991, Population, No. 4-5, 1993, pp. 903-934; A. Popov, "Family Planning and Induced Abortion in the Post Soviet Russia of the Early 1990s: Unmet Needs in Information Supply," 1994, in this volume.