On ''Other War''
Lessons from Five Decades of RAND Counterinsurgency Research
The challenges posed by insurgency and instability have proved difficult to surmount. This difficulty may embolden future opponents to embrace insurgency in combating the United States. Both the current and future conduct of the war on terror demand that the United States improve its ability to conduct counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. This study makes recommendations for improving COIN based on RAND’s decades-long study of it.
First, organization for COIN must be improved. The Provincial Reconstruction Team model that has been implemented in parts of Iraq and Afghanistan is a good start, but does not go far enough. This model, which unites U.S. civilian and military personnel with local government, should be expanded and made the basis for current and future COIN efforts. Second, amnesty and reward programs should be implemented or expanded. These programs push insurgents out of the movement without having to fight them literally to the last person. A new study of insurgent motivation and morale should also be undertaken. Third, given the cross-border elements of insurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan, border security systems should be studied for both conflicts. Finally, pacification efforts should be focused on the lowest political echelons and combined with census-taking and national identification cards.
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Document Details
- Copyright: RAND Corporation
- Availability: Available
- Format: Paperback
- Pages: 118
- List Price: $20.00
- Price: $16.00
- ISBN/EAN: 978-0-8330-3926-2
- Document Number: MG-482-OSD
- Year: 2006
- Series: Monographs
Contents
Chapter One
Introduction
Chapter Two
The Wizards of Less-Than-Armageddon: RAND and COIN
Chapter Three
Analogies and War: Are Theory and Empirics from Prior COIN Relevant?
Chapter Four
COIN Theory: What Are Insurgencies and How Does One Fight Them?
Chapter Five
The Social Scientists’ Wars: RAND and COIN Practice
Chapter Six
COIN Old and New
Appendix
RAND Counterinsurgency Publications, 1955-1995: Selected Annotated Bibliography
Book Review Excerpts
"This monograph succinctly summarizes lessons learned again and again in Malaya, Vietnam, Algeria, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and other conflicts in the post-World War Two erra. In six short chapters, Long constructs what is essentially a paradigm for the conduct of counterinsurgency (COIN)… It is of great importance that the lessons summarized in this monograph be incorporated in pre-deployment training so that the actions of US combatants do not become counter-productive to the overall effort (witness the lasting impact of the 2004–2004 Abu Ghraib Prison abuses)… Conventional forces, if they are to be effective in current and future conflict, need to better understand and employ the lessons encapsulated in this book."
- Air Power History, Spring 2008
"[An] essential work for any scholar of small wars and counterinsurgency. Long's 'On Other War' contains a wealth of information on doctrinal development and two excellent bibliographies of counterinsurgency publications."
- Journal of Military History, October 2007
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