on Facebook
on Twitter
on YouTube
Document Information
After Saddam
Prewar Planning and the Occupation of Iraq
This monograph begins by examining prewar planning efforts for postwar Iraq, in order to establish what U.S. policymakers expected the postwar situation to look like and what their plans were for reconstruction. The monograph then examines the role of U.S. military forces after major combat officially ended on May 1, 2003; the analysis covers this period through the end of June 2004. Finally, the monograph examines civilian efforts at reconstruction after major combat ended, focusing on the activities of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and its efforts to rebuild structures of governance, security forces, economic policy, and essential services prior to June 28, 2004, the day that the CPA dissolved and transferred authority to the Interim Iraqi Government. The authors conclude that the U.S. government was unprepared for the challenges of postwar Iraq for three reasons: a failure to challenge fundamental assumptions about postwar Iraq; ineffective interagency coordination; and the failure to assign responsibility and resources for providing security in the immediate aftermath of major combat operations.
See Also:
Support RAND Research — Buy This Product!
Paperback Cover Price: $38.00
Discounted Web Price: $34.20
Pages: 312
ISBN/EAN: 9780833044587
Free, downloadable PDF file(s) are available below.
RAND makes an electronic version of this document available for free as a public service. If you find this information valuable, please consider purchasing a paper copy of the full document to help support RAND research.
Use Adobe Acrobat Reader version 7.0 or higher for the best experience.
Contents
Chapter One:
Introduction
Chapter Two:
Military Planning Efforts
Chapter Three:
Civilian Planning Efforts
Chapter Four:
Task Force IV
Chapter Five:
The Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance
Chapter Six:
Humanitarian Planning
Chapter Seven:
Combat Operations During Phase IV
Chapter Eight:
The Coalition Provisional Authority
Chapter Nine:
Building New Iraqi Security Forces
Chapter Ten:
Governance and Political Reconstruction
Chapter Eleven:
Economic Policy
Chapter Twelve:
Essential Services and Infrastructure
Chapter Thirteen:
Assessing Postwar Efforts
Appendix:
Strategic Studies Institute's Mission Matrix for Iraq
The research described in this report was sponsored by the United States Army and conducted by the RAND Arroyo Center.
This product is part of the RAND Corporation monograph series. RAND monographs present major research findings that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors. All RAND monographs undergo rigorous peer review to ensure high standards for research quality and objectivity.
Permission is given to duplicate this electronic document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Copies may not be duplicated for commercial purposes. Unauthorized posting of RAND PDFs to a non-RAND Web site is prohibited. RAND PDFs are protected under copyright law. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit the RAND Permissions page.
The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit research organization providing objective analysis and effective solutions that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors around the world. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.
* RAND research is conducted across divisions, centers, and projects; these organizational components are represented in the "Related RAND Divisions" section above.
Top
RAND® is a registered trademark. Copyright © 1994-2009 RAND Corporation. Last Modified: January 06, 2009 