The 9/11 terrorist attacks and the war in Afghanistan are among the best-known recent examples of asymmetric warfare: conflicts between nations or groups that have disparate military capabilities and strategies. RAND investigates political and military responses to — and the impacts of — counterinsurgency, terrorism, and other forms of irregular warfare.
REPORT
A comprehensive, landmark history and insider's account chronicles the ongoing battle against al Qa'ida, the greatest threat the West has faced in the modern era.
COMMENTARY
The Afghans will have better prospects for defeating their insurgency with continued improvement, of course, and the United States can contribute to that improvement while American forces remain, writes Christopher Paul.
REPORT
Based on America's recent experience in irregular warfare and future threats, there are several issues that should be considered: organization, the health of U.S. soldiers and their families, training and education, and inter-agency cooperation.
REPORT
A review of recent Israeli military conflicts indicates the United States may be ill-prepared for "hybrid" warfare against state-sponsored adversaries who have a modicum of training and small force numbers, but possess advanced weapons and enough expertise to challenge the U.S. military.
NEWS RELEASE
A review of recent Israeli military conflicts indicates the United States may be ill-prepared for "hybrid" warfare against state-sponsored adversaries who have a modicum of training and small force numbers, but possess advanced weapons and enough expertise to challenge the U.S. military.
RESEARCH BRIEF
Describes a framework for thinking about commanders' critical information needs in countersurgency operations and offers practical ways for commanders to integrate influence activities into combined arms planning and assessment.
REPORT
The U.S. Army is under pressure to demonstrate a valid need for heavy brigade combat teams in the future security environment — an environment in which many believe that such units will be largely irrelevant. Through an examination of adversary capabilities in recent conflicts, the author explores whether heavy armored forces can be justified as a prominent component of the future U.S. Army.
REPORT
This book identifies the procedures and capabilities that the U.S. Department of Defense, other agencies of the U.S. government, U.S. allies and partners, and international organizations require in order to support the transition from counterinsurgency, when the military takes primary responsibility for security and economic operations, to stability and reconstruction, when police and civilian government agencies take the lead.
NEWS RELEASE
A new collection of essays by experts from the RAND Corporation examines America in the decade since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, focusing a critical eye on the nation's actions since the attacks and outlining changes in strategy needed to improve efforts against jihadist groups.
REPORT
A new collection of essays by experts from the RAND Corporation examines America in the decade since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, focusing a critical eye on the nation's actions since the attacks and outlining changes in strategy needed to improve efforts against jihadist groups.
REPORT
An analysis of 30 insurgencies worldwide between 1978 and 2008 determined what factors were ultimately correlated with success or defeat. Comparing Afghanistan in early 2011 against this scorecard results in an uncertain outcome for the conflict there, but the findings may help provide additional guidance as operations continue.
NEWS RELEASE
Good counterinsurgency practices tend to run in packs and whether a campaign includes more good practices than bad ones is a strong predictor of the outcomes of campaigns historically.
REPORT
Approaches to counterinsurgency from 30 recent resolved campaigns show that good counterinsurgency practices tend to "run in packs" and that historically, the balance of selected good and ineffective practices perfectly predicts the outcome of a conflict.
REPORT
Militaries from the United States, Great Britain, Canada, Denmark, and Israel all see a role for heavy forces, including tanks, in irregular warfare and hybrid warfare environments because they reduce operational risk, minimize friendly casualties, and provide an intimidation factor against adversaries.
REPORT
A collection of the 30 most recent resolved insurgencies, covering the period 1978 to 2008, along with a bank of 76 factors that helped or hindered the COIN force in each case and in each phase of each case, supplements an analysis of historical and contemporary insurgencies, providing valuable lessons for U.S. engagement in and support for COIN operations.
REPORT
The U.S. must determine how best to promote long-term security and stability in the Persian Gulf region while seeking to reduce the risks and costs imposed by its role as a permanent regional power—particularly vis-à-vis Iraq's future, the role of Iran, asymmetric threats, regional tensions, and the roles of other external actors.
NEWS RELEASE
Iran's rise as a regional power presents a key foreign policy and security challenge to the United States, but its reach may be more limited than Western conventional wisdom suggests, according to a RAND Corporation study issued today. U.S. strategy must recognize Iran's role as an influential, but not omnipotent, player in the Middle East and work to exploit existing barriers to Iran's harmful activities, while simultaneously seeking…
REPORT
Provides an analytic framework and procedure for the intelligence analysis of irregular warfare (IW) environments that can serve as the basis for IW intelligence curriculum development efforts. Defines IW in terms of two stylized situations: population-centric (such as counterinsurgency) and counterterrorism. Provides a detailed review of IW-relevant defense policy and strategy documents and a list of relevant doctrinal publications.
REPORT
Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have shown that U.S. forces need more-effective techniques and procedures to conduct counterinsurgency. They will most likely face similar, irregular warfare tactics from future enemies. This monograph examines the nature of the contemporary insurgent threat and provides insights on using operational analysis techniques to support intelligence operations in counterinsurgencies.
COMMENTARY
The conflict raging in Iraq has been compared to many earlier wars, but the best historical comparison has been largely overlooked, write John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt in a commentary appearing in United Press International.
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