Europe and the geopolitics of AGI

What is the issue?

In recent years, artificial general intelligence (AGI) has moved from speculation to the centre of political debate. Senior European policy makers now speak openly about AI systems approaching human-level capabilities on short timescales. In her speech at the Annual EU Budget Conference 2025, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen remarked that when the current budget was negotiated, ‘we thought AI would only approach human reasoning around 2050. Now we expect this to happen already next year.’

Moreover, experts increasingly discuss the possibility that more capable AI systems could alter growth trajectories, change the balance of military power, and introduce new levers for economic coercion, surveillance and influence. Indeed, export controls on advanced semiconductors, the emergence of AI-enabled military systems on the battlefield in Ukraine, and large-scale public and private investments in computing infrastructure are now widely interpreted as signs that AI is becoming a central domain of strategic competition.

Although it is too early to know which sides of these debates will prove correct, it is evident that if anything resembling AGI were to emerge soon, Europe would enter this transition under considerable strain. It must assess whether its current economic, technological and institutional foundations are fit for a world in which AI systems might match or exceed human capabilities across most domains.

How did we help?

We scrutinised the underlying assumptions behind prevalent statements that AGI is coming soon and that its emergence would reshape geopolitics. Our aim was not to provide a comprehensive or definitive treatment of AGI timelines or geopolitical impacts; instead, we conducted a focused review of the most influential arguments and evidence bearing on these two claims, clarifying what is known, what is contested, and where uncertainty remains. We also discussed how different communities define and dispute the term ‘AGI’. Taking seriously the possibility that AGI could emerge on a relatively short timescale, we went on to assess Europe’s preparedness along three key dimensions: strategic awareness, competitive positioning and leverage, and robustness of current policy strategies.

What did we find?

Europe is currently underprepared for a transformation to a world with AGI. On present trajectories, the EU and its Member States risk being forced into a choice between deep dependence on foreign AI systems and relative economic and strategic marginalisation. Still, Europe retains significant strength. The EU’s economic scale, regulatory capacity, research base and commitment to multilateral cooperation provide a strong foundation. By building on this strength, Europe can assume a leading role in a potential AGI transition.

What can be done?

We recommend that the European Commission President should commission an AGI Preparedness Report with the political authority, analytical breadth and urgency of the Draghi Report. This report should address three questions: how can Europe capture economic benefits from AGI while remaining sovereign, how can it prepare its institutions and societies for rapid change resulting from AGI, and how can it strengthen international stability, security and shared prosperity in a world shaped by AGI.