Understanding Russian strategic culture and the low-yield nuclear threat

What is the issue?

Russia’s historical, political, and ideological context fosters a zero-sum worldview, territorial anxieties, and an enduring perception of threat from the West. These factors have led to a prominent role for non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNWs) in Russian defence planning, especially as means of deterrence, compellence and escalation management. Recent Russian actions and rhetoric – in the context of NATO enlargement, ongoing conflict in Ukraine, and shifting military balances – have intensified Western concerns about the circumstances under which Russia might use or threaten to use NSNWs. Understanding the drivers behind these policies is vital for formulating effective deterrence, crisis management and risk reduction strategies among NATO Allies.

How did we help?

RAND Europe addressed this issue by analysing how Russian strategic culture shapes the country’s non-strategic nuclear posture and behaviour, particularly in the context of the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. The research team conducted a narrative literature review covering Russian and Western sources, developed scenario-based analyses exploring circumstances under which Russia might use non-strategic nuclear weapons, and interviewed subject matter experts to obtain insights on Russian decision making and its implications for NATO Allies. These approaches provided an understanding of the cultural, historical and ideological factors driving Russia’s nuclear strategy and informed recommendations for strengthening deterrence and crisis management in Europe.

What did we find?

The study finds that Russia views its NSNWs as critical for countering perceived conventional shortcomings against NATO and as tools for signalling, compellence and escalation management. Scenario analysis suggests that Russia could contemplate NSNW use in response to existential threats, such as major conventional conflicts or large-scale cyber-attacks that endanger its second-strike capability. However, the research also highlights that Russia would likely take several pre-emptive or signalling actions before considering nuclear use. The findings stress the need for NATO to better understand Russian strategic culture and improve communication and cohesion to manage escalation risks effectively.

What can be done?

To mitigate the risks posed by Russia’s NSNWs and enhance Alliance security, the report recommends several key actions:

1. NATO and its Allies should prioritise clearer and more coherent communication with Russia – including more transparent signalling and nuclear planning – while improving public discourse on nuclear deterrence.
2. Regular exercises and assessments based on potential Russian escalation pathways are advised to strengthen Alliance response and cohesion.
3. NATO should consider expanding nuclear sharing arrangements and exploring the stationing of NSNWs or modern dual-capable aircraft in eastern Europe or the Baltics to address gaps in deterrence.
4. The report emphasises the need for ongoing analysis of Russian strategic culture, better monitoring of NSNW deployments, and integrating both nuclear and conventional capabilities into deterrence planning to ensure that Alliance responses remain flexible and effective.

Additional team member

Beatrice Aubert