Cocaine trafficking via seaports
The Port of Rotterdam in a comparative perspective with Le Havre
What is the issue?
Europe’s largest seaports are vital gateways for global trade, but their scale, speed and complex logistics also make them attractive to cocaine trafficking networks. As security measures improve, traffickers adapt their methods – exploiting container flows, peripheral logistics nodes, digital systems and insider access.
This study examines how these risks play out in Rotterdam, compared with Le Havre. It shows that vulnerabilities differ by port, but that trafficking networks operate across the Northern Range as an integrated corridor. This makes the issue not only one of enforcement, but of cross-border governance, digital security, intelligence sharing and resilience against corruption and recruitment.
How did we help?
The study examined how cocaine is trafficked through the Port of Rotterdam and how its vulnerabilities compare with those of Le Havre. It aimed to update understanding of criminal methods, port-specific risks and displacement dynamics across European seaports, and to identify lessons for strengthening port security and resilience.
The research used a mixed-methods approach, combining a targeted review of academic and grey literature from 2015–2025 with semi-structured interviews with stakeholders in security, law enforcement, logistics and governance in and around Rotterdam. Findings from the Rotterdam case study were compared with an analysis of Le Havre to draw broader insights for European ports.
What did we find?
Cocaine trafficking through European seaports is becoming more adaptive, decentralised and digitally enabled. In Rotterdam, traditional rip-on/rip-off methods have declined as security has tightened, with traffickers increasingly using cover cargo, reefer containers, smaller shipments, peripheral logistics nodes, digital infiltration and inland transport routes.
The study found that Rotterdam and Le Havre face different criminal ecosystems. Corruption remains a structural enabler in both ports, while patterns of violence differ according to local governance and criminal organisation. In Rotterdam, vulnerabilities are distributed across technical, logistical and IT roles, while Le Havre’s labour-controlled structure creates concentrated risks around docker access and coercion.
Rotterdam has made notable progress through multi-agency cooperation, digital reforms, public-private information sharing and prevention efforts. By contrast, Le Havre’s response remains more fragmented, with weaker port-city coordination and limited mechanisms to address labour-linked vulnerabilities.
What can be done?
The findings highlight several cross-cutting priorities for European port systems, which face a common set of pressures from highly adaptive and transnational trafficking networks:
- Build resilience in both port workforces and communities to reduce vulnerability to corruption or recruitment by criminal networks.
- Focus enforcement efforts on structural weaknesses and vulnerabilities such as corruption and risks in peripheral and secondary logistics nodes.
- Develop and institutionalise long-term, institutionalised cooperation between public and private actors.
- Strengthen cross-border intelligence sharing and coordination networks, including both public and private actors.
- Connect port security strategies to broader municipal and national governance frameworks.