An evaluation of the Dutch Merchant Shipping Protection Act

Colorful cargo containers on a large freighter ship at sea seen from above

Photo by Dhav/Adobe Stoc

What is the issue?

The Merchant Shipping Protection Act (Wet ter Bescherming Koopvaardij) allows Dutch merchant ships, subject to strict conditions, to utilise armed private maritime security teams to protect themselves against piracy in high-risk maritime areas, particularly around the Gulf of Aden and the Horn of Africa.

Prior to the introduction of the Merchant Shipping Protection Act, the Netherlands protected its commercial shipping exclusively with military teams, known as Vessel Protection Detachments (VPDs). This approach encountered growing problems. For Dutch shipping companies, the use of military teams was often too slow, inflexible and too costly. They indicated that, as a result of this approach, they were missing out on or unable to carry out contracts. To counter these negative effects on Dutch commercial shipping and to protect its competitive position, the Merchant Shipping Protection Act was adopted in 2019 and subsequently came into force on 1 February 2022. The Act has a twofold objective: firstly, to ensure the safety of Dutch commercial shipping within the risk area designated by the Merchant Shipping Protection Act; and secondly, to achieve a level playing field between Dutch commercial shipping and international commercial shipping.

How did we help?

RAND Europe, together with the University of Utrecht, conducted an evaluation of the Merchant Shipping Protection Act on behalf of the Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek- en Datacentrum [Research and Data Centre, WODC].

The evaluation aims to provide insight into:

  1. The legal framework and any potential legal bottlenecks of the Merchant Shipping Protection Act
  2. The application and implementation of the Merchant Shipping Protection Act
  3. Any other bottlenecks or success factors
  4. How those involved assess the effectiveness of the Merchant Shipping Protection Act.

To conduct this evaluation, an extensive literature review of available publications on piracy in the risk area designated by the Merchant Shipping Protection Act, relevant legislation, relevant quantitative data, and documents drawn up by relevant parties such as the Coastguard and the Inspectie Leefomgeving en Transport [Human Environment and Transport Inspectorate] (ILT) was carried out. This was supplemented with a legal analysis of the Merchant Shipping Protection Act and a number of interviews with actors involved in the implementation and supervision of the Merchant Shipping Act. These findings were then discussed during a validation workshop with a group of experts and stakeholders.

What did we find?

Analysis shows that the Merchant Shipping Protection Act places stringent requirements on the deployment of private maritime security, even by international standards. At the core of these requirements is the so-called ‘VPD-unless’ principle, which permits the deployment of private maritime security in Dutch commercial shipping only if military security, by means of a Vessel Protection Detachment (VPD), is not possible or would entail disproportionate costs or detours for the shipping company.

As a result of how the VPD-unless principle is interpreted, private maritime security cannot be deployed in cases where the Dutch Ministry of Defence does not approve the deployment of VPDs, as has been the case in the risk area of the Merchant Shipping Protection Act since late 2023, due to the worsening security situation in the Red Sea. As a result, there was only a relatively brief period between 2022 and the end of 2023, during which private maritime security teams were being approved on Dutch commercial ships.

Supervision under the Merchant Shipping Act is carefully organised, but can sometimes be difficult to carry out remotely. Private maritime security teams often use vessel-based armouries for the purposes of storing weapons and logistics. These vessel-based armouries often operate under flags of non-maritime states such as Mongolia, which means their activities are difficult to monitor.

Implementation of the Merchant Shipping Act has largely proceeded smoothly after some initial obstacles, although cooperation between different parties and transparency could be improved. The Dutch market for maritime security proved small, with only two private maritime security companies currently holding a licence.

The effectiveness of the Merchant Shipping Act is assessed positively by involved parties, but is difficult to ascertain in practice. When the Merchant Shipping Act was adopted in 2022, the threat of piracy in the risk area had already diminished, and private maritime security was only deployed until late 2023.

What can be done?

  • Test the entire Merchant Shipping Protection Act process through a scenario-based exercise to identify bottlenecks and enhance cooperation between stakeholders.
  • Amend the requirements within the Merchant Shipping Protection Act so that they are more readily applicable in an international context.
  • Consider options for tightening supervision of the management of weapons and floating armouries.
  • Reconsider the prevailing interpretation of the ‘VPD-unless’ principle.
  • Make the decision-making process regarding whether or not to deploy VPDs in the risk area more transparent.
  • Consider measures to keep the Dutch market attractive to private maritime security companies.

Project Team

Additional team member

  • Emma Zürcher
  • Cedric Ryngaert, Utrecht University