Gilmore Commission - Minutes
Panel to Assess the Capabilities for Domestic Response
to Terrorist Acts Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction
RAND, Arlington VA
Monday, July 17, 2000
Present:
The Honorable James Gilmore, Chairman
James Clapper, Vice Chairman
Paul Maniscalco
William Reno
James Greenleaf
William Jenaway
Kathleen O'Brien
Richard Falkenrath
Joseph Samuels
George Foresman
Hurbert Williams
Jack Marsh
J. Paul Bremer
Raymond Downey
William Garrison
Patrick Ralston
Dallas Jones
Kenneth Shine
Ellen Embrey, OSD Representative
Michael Wermuth, RAND project director
Members absent:
Ellen Gordon
Patricia Quinlisk
Visitors:
Nick Teta & Tara Sweeney - Bechtel Nevada
James Stanton - University of Maryland
N. Andrew Donofrio - Corsec Security
Ed Anderson - Department of the Navy
Craig Howard - Department of the Navy
Gary Wertz - Department of the Navy
Steven Hart - Department of the Navy
Daniel J. Kaniewski - The Congressional Fire Servies
Steven Caldwell and Deborah Colantonia - GAO
Nick Palarino - House Subcommittee on National Security
John Landry - Central Intelligence Agency
David Beaupre - Tridata
I. Opening Remarks.
Chairman Gilmore: Good morning. It is a pleasure to have RAND, the well known and respected think tank, here, in Northern VA. I'm sure the move is going to benefit both of us and I don't have to sit in downtown traffic either, right Jerry?
I'm pleased to be here with all of you this morning. Just let me say thank you for the kind attention you showed me in regards to my mother passing away. I'm sorry I could not be here last time. Thank you General Clapper for running the last meeting. I appreciate that you all just kept right on rolling along.
I have reviewed the minutes. I want to welcome the two new members of the panel, Joe Samuels and Hubert Williams. Joe is the Chief of Police in Richmond, California, and the third vice president of the International Association of the Chiefs of Police (IACP). Our second new member is Hubert Williams who serves as the president of the Police Foundation. We look forward to your contributions and special expertise. I have had the experience of working together with police officials myself in my years as a prosecutor and Attorney General. I'm sure your input will be most valuable. I also want to add my personal welcome to Jack Marsh and Dr. Richard Falkenrath who joined the panel in March.
A lot has happened since we convened in March. We've had a major exercise to test the response capabilities of the top officials in the Federal Government to address the issues associated with a terrorist event, and new legislation has been introduced in the House in an attempt to solve some of the coordination issues at the Federal level. The State Department and the National Commission on Terrorism have released reports addressing a variety of issues on the subject. Ambassador Bremer chaired the NCT and developed that report on terrorism; and I'm looking forward, Jerry, to your presentation this morning.
I think we all agree that this is a very complex public policy and that there are great implications throughout government. We will be building on the foundation Ambassador Bremer has built. Your suggestions, in particular with regard to our coordination with local responders, will be valuable to our work.
In reading the materials from the last meeting I am amazed at the amount of jargon that is found throughout the work. The next day and a half will be very important in regards to defining the end goal of this work and I can't underscore or underestimate its importance. While the administration will be changing, our panel will extend beyond that point. We have go to give the new administration, whoever it is, something they can use.
One thing that came through as I read you comments from the last time, as a person reading it on the cold page, is this constant emphasis on confusion at the national level. This is the question we asked on the very first day, "who is in charge?" This question remains and this is because there is nobody in charge. This is a good thing for this panel to be addressing. We don't really have the luxury of waiting to fix what this administration has not yet done in terms of focus and coordination. If we can establish a base line national strategy, then we can be of assistance to the incoming administration to address this kind of issue, and that is important.
And in our previous meetings as well over the last year and a half, in all the issues that we have discussed, we are beginning to recognize that we need in our country to be prepared for this eventuality. This has been noted in our previous report that was issued last December, and it was reflected in Ambassador Bremer's report that was done last month.
There are logical areas of relationship between what we are talking about in terms of domestic preparedness - like those that were discussed in Ambassador Bremer's report - such as deterrence, prevention and interdiction as well as the resources for evaluation of threat, training, communication, coordination, etc. We have to make sure that we always remember the larger strategic picture. I want to emphasize that as we discuss this national strategy, what we need to reflect in our next report, we need to provide the staff at RAND with the direction they need so that the report reflects the desires of the panel. So now, Mike, I'm going to turn it over to you, and you can go over some of the administrative details.
II. Housekeeping and Administrative Matters.
Wermuth: I just want to go around the room and introduce others who are with us this morning; we will hold off on the introduction of the presenters until the appropriate time. Let me just note that we do have a couple of guests. First of all, John Landry, Major General US Army (ret) who has helped us with one of these presentations this morning and who is with the National Intelligence Council at the Central Intelligence Agency. He is going to help us facilitate one of these presentations this morning, so we are glad to see you here this morning, General. Back here behind the Governor, a member of the Governor's senior staff, Bruce Morris who is the Chief Deputy Secretary at the department of public safety for the state of Virginia.
That's everyone in the front part of the room; if we could just ask those in the back to introduce themselves, give your name, organization and title if you would we will start over here.
Visitors Introduce themselves: Refer to the first page for a list of those in attendance.
Wermuth: Just for information, we are going to make these notebooks in front of each of you permanent. As updates are needed, we will update them for you. We will be shipping these to the meetings for you so you don't have to lug big notebooks around with you. (Mike Wermuth then went through each area of the notebook explaining what they were and requested updates where the panel knew it was needed.)
Patty Quinlesk is down at the Atlanta CDC meeting today, as well as one of the RAND staff; but Patty will be flying up to meet with us early tomorrow morning. Mr. Chairman there are just so many meetings and conferences and symposiums that address this issue going on that it is almost impossible to avoid scheduling conflicts. Mike Wermuth continued to attend to necessary administrative details.
With that complete, we are ready to start with the business section of the meeting. We are delighted to have some folks from the National Ground Intelligence Center to give us a presentation and demonstration this morning.
III. Technology, Equipment, and Standards Update.
Mike Wermuth then introduced George Goodwin and Rich Babarsky who led a presentation on Joint Assessment of Catastrophic Events (JACE).
JACE - See packet of information added to notebook for additional information. In brief, the presentation explained the capabilities and potential use of JACE:
What JACE is: An architecture that allows a person to preview a catastrophic event and the consequences that result from these events. It will address WMD, natural and industrial events.
Funding information: JACE is funded for five years at 3 million a year but leverages 30 million a year by tying together other agencies.
Uses for JACE: There are many uses for JACE, but today we are demonstrating its use for domestic preparedness. Many of the uses and validations have come from DoD.
JACE representatives provided an on-line Internet demonstration.
There was an invitation to see JACE in action at Ft Leonard Wood, Missouri for any Panel member wanting to attend.
Questions and discussions during the presentation:
Bremer: Can you say a bit more about the integrated terrorism, I&W network?
Goodwin: We are looking for ways to get the Intelligence community into the program for domestic response.
Bremer: So you are not designing a new network?
Goodwin: No we aren't reinventing, we are just trying to bring everyone into the network.
Clapper: What are you capable of putting on the Internet today?
Goodwin: What your seeing today is available on the Internet. All of its capabilities are available, we are using some sensitive material but we use a one-way at JACE to get that into the system.
Embrey: Are there controls over who has access over this?
Barbartsky: Yes, it's on a need to know basis and we control access; the requests have to come through our office.
The presentation then continued with a look at the Arlington Virginia area with a simulated 75-pound release of Sarin gas, in free field with several weather possibilities.
Wermuth: If anyone wants to follow up on attending the demonstration in Ft Leonard Wood Missouri should just let me know and I will make the arrangements.
Clapper: I just want to take this chance to say that this is great for intelligence capabilities for first responders.
Falkenrath: I understand that this is a new project, but why hasn't the medical community been put in place within the system?
Goodwin: We are very interested in that but their bio-models where less mature.
Reno: If I were a city mayor or Governor, I would make the actual plans of various buildings available, as this would be very useful.
O'Brien: You can assume that most cities have a fairly well developed GIS capability and most of us have building information already included.
Chairman Gilmore: When we put the final product from this together, we are going to have to have a glossary for all the acronyms involved. How do you acquire customers? You can't service everyone in the US that might want to use your services.
Goodwin: Yes sir, we can, but they become responsible for it when they take it on.
Time was running short at this point and the presentation was brought to a close. Panel members were asked to hold their questions and forward them to Mike Wermuth to be addressed later. Both Chairman Gilmore and Mike Wermuth then thanked the presenters and then panel moved on to the next presentation.
Mike Wermuth introduced Major Adrian Bogart and Special Agent John Frank, Inter-Agency Board for Equipment Standardization and Inter-Operability
Overview of the Presentation:
A detailed presentation was made about the attempt to bring equipment standards into a single classification for responders across the board. Currently there are two standards. The presenters explained the strategic objectives as standardization and interoperability in an attempt to help the local responders see where they can get resources. They are creating a website with both public and private portals. The presenters felt that there needs to be additional funding for this issue.
Questions, comments and discussions during the Inter-agency Equipment presentation. The IAB annual report was circulated to all panel members.
Chairman Gilmore: I see a practical problem, that is procurement problems, upgrading equipment can take years, an agency buys one level of equipment and then the suggested equipment changes; isn't standardization difficult to achieve?
Frank: No, not necessarily. The level of capability of the equipment will still meet the minimum standards.
Chairman Gilmore: Now, participation is voluntary is it not? So you have some states working with you and some that are not. Although they only have some states working with them, it's better to have something than nothing.
Falkenrath: This was a very helpful briefing. If anything, I think you underestimate the problem - communications are the problem. We only have to look at Columbine as the test case. Four SWAT teams in the building and they could not talk to each other.
Marsh: That was an excellent briefing - I taught part of this last year and we came to two conclusions: 1. The lack of an answer to the question: who is in charge? 2. The complexity of federal system as now structured, to be responsive to states. It seems to me that this commission, as a part of its mission, has got to focus on this. We have overturned some 55 years of experience in the executive agency process, of DOD being the lead agency, and that was vested in DOMS within the Department of Defense. Now the executive agency has shifted to the DOJ as the lead of terrorism because it is assumed that it will be a crime; this makes a lot of difference.
There is some talk -- I talked with the chairman of the House Appropriations Committee for Defense -- and some legislation has already been introduced, to move this away from Justice back to Defense because of the difficulties in establishing a chain of command. Somewhere along the line, we are going to have to raise and discuss that issue. Another one of the things driving this, that is not generally known, is Cyber-terrorism. That is one of the long poles in the tent. The Critical Information Assurance Office, CIAO, being run by the NSC -- I think we are going to have to address that Governor.
Major Adrian Bogart: Using the military in the US is dangerous. The way to do this is to have a single program office. He gives his idea - three tiers - local then state then federal forces. This is complex so we need an annual exercise. Eastwind is one year and Westwind the alternate year.
Marsh: You're right, but Posse Comitatus has been waived by the President for issues relating to WMD.
Samuels: I didn't hear anything about the NIJ's involvement?
Frank: They are involved, as well as OJP and DOE, they're all there.
Wermuth: John and Adrian, thanks.
Chairman Gilmore: We're not trying to cut anyone off, but we have to keep moving.
Bogart: If you have any additional questions please forward them to us. John
Frank: I would like to invite all the panel members to the quarterly meeting.
IV. Report of the National Commission on Terrorism, by L. Paul "Jerry" Bremer.
Mike Wermuth then introduced L. Paul Bremer who gave an overview of the report of the National Commission on Terrorism. He noted that they only had 6 months, and that they fenced off a number of areas because of the short time.
During the presentation, a discussion emerged over the importance of budget authority and its proper place within the government authority for any agency tasked with leading the response to terrorism. In addition, the idea of a new or separate agency to handle terrorism-based on, as one example, the ONDCP model, was repeatedly discussed.
Chairman Gilmore called the meeting back to order for the discussion of the TOPOFF Exercise
V. TOPOFF Exercise.
Wermuth: At our March meeting, we had a presentation from DOJ and FEMA on the primary purpose of TOPOFF - field venues in two cities, Denver and Portsmouth, NH, with NCR 2000 in DC being taken out of the federal umbrella exercise.
Today we are going to hear some of the collective observations from Jim Greenleaf and Richard Falkenrath about this. One side note that should be made is the dedication of panel members; for the record, they have my admiration. Several of the panel observers spent part or all of a weekend away from home and family. Other had travel problems that kept them away from home longer than intended.
Wermuth gave a quick overview of the event, and the site operations at both the field venues and in DC.
Greenleaf: I spent 3 ½ days at the event, which was close to my home, which was helpful. The processes challenged many of those involved and was essentially a successful event - but looking back over it having met with all the principle people a different picture emerges - not all the important issues got covered. One problem was realism; you just can't keep it a secret. Everyone had to sign a document saying that they would keep it a secret. But it just couldn't be done. It was too big and too complex to learn some of the things we need to learn. This same sentiment was also felt by others from the top down.
Most of the people running the exercise were former FBI and military people. We shouldn't have hired contractors - we should have used the people from the agencies. A lot of money was being spent unnecessarily.
One of the main points that was made by people was, if it was the real thing, it would have gone smoother. This it was felt was because some people were worried that they had to go back and work with these same people.
Maybe Portsmouth was too small. For instance, the sites for the command post was chosen because they were free rather than being good sites.
When the bell went off - people were pre-positioned and this may have made it unrealistic. Logistically, a lot of things were pre-positioned; so maybe it wasn't as good as they thought.
When one of these things happens, the FBI really doesn't care about anything other than crisis management; they don't care about consequence management.
When the military showed up their resources were far superior, much better than the FBI. There was a tremendous distinction between the two.
Once the military special unit got involved -- the military was called in because the FBI HRT was tied up -- the military went in and killed everyone in the building. The difference between the culture of the military and the FBI highlighted the law enforcement issues.
This is a big issue that needs to be worked out. Once the military takes over then they have control and don't want to give it up. The FBI hasn't done a lot of exercises with the military and this highlighted many of the issues that need to be addressed.
Standing back and looking at the exercise - there was not one person in charge. I don't know how were going to come up with a solution without resolving this issue.
Falkenrath: I have a few main points: First, It was valuable, but it was too big because of the three sites.
In looking at the first responders - there was no sense of panic - everyone was too calm - it didn't replicate the psychological aspect - but of course there is only so far we can push this aspect. Consequence management efforts revealed that we have no consequence management capabilities. Maybe the subsequent levels but not initially. Outside the FBI, the FEMA had one guy with a laptop and a cell phone. Law enforcement is ready but the consequence management wasn't. There should definitely be an independent after-action report.
Wermuth: The Vice-chair and I went to an overview briefing. Do you want to comment?
Clapper: I don't have that much to say. The briefing was pretty glitzy - a military type of briefing - I was struck that the main spokesmen were contractors, they were more knowledgeable and articulate. The bank of computers was impressive and manned, but the question was, "who is in charge?"
Greenleaf: In defense of FEMA - they had dozens of people there by the second day and they were working well. It was about a four, on the one to ten scale for realism. They should have invited more locals.
Wermuth: Anecdotally, at four in the afternoon of the first day, no federal agency had stepped forward to say they were in charge of crisis or consequence management? It hadn't happened even very late in the day.
Chairman Gilmore: Was there in-fighting going on between agencies?
Greenleaf: There was some fighting that we would have expected between the locals and the FBI.
Falkenrath: The SAC was in charge of the feds, but the FBI didn't go into the local EOC.
Greenleaf: There was this important piece missing. We interviewed the responding cop and he thought he was under sniper attack. There was a slow response because of this.
Embrey: I was a participant. The exercise actually started the Wednesday before with the FBI following intelligence. Thus, it makes sense that they would be more prepared. They called me Saturday afternoon and up till that point it was a crisis management rather than consequence management problem. There was a lack of briefing for those not needing to know, there needs to be a closer nexus between crisis management and consequence management.
Greenleaf: The media, the CNN press conference was good. The FBI didn't participate in the second one though because they thought that it was a FEMA problem.
Chairman Gilmore: Did FEMA take over?
Greenleaf: Yes.
Embrey: There were several meetings in Washington. It was a 24-hour-a day operation.
Greenleaf: The FBI was happy with FEMA's response but saw it as unrelated.
Shine: I think we should follow up on what Richard said, is there an independent group that goes to the event and looks at it like we are?
Greenleaf: Maybe the GAO.
Williams: Was it the police chief that notified the FBI?
Greenleaf: No.
Williams: I think that the lag time for federal authorities should be a consideration for the future.
Chairman Gilmore: What day did you say, was there intelligence work?
Embrey: That's right, the FBI were looking for terrorists in the area.
Chairman Gilmore: That's what I was trying to get at, was there conversation between them?
Panel members then discussed some of the issues emerging from TOPOFF that need to be addressed in the next panel report.
VI. Executive Branch Strategy Plans: US Department of State International Strategy, Ambassador Michael Sheehan and Sam Brinkley.
Mike Wermuth introduces Ambassador Sheehan.
Ambassador Sheehan: I would like to make a few opening remarks and then turn this over to Sam Brinkley.
The Ambassador explained that they were created in the mid 1980's and that they are the lead agency for the international terrorist response. There is both good and bad news about the threat; some are seeking to acquire WMD, but only a few. Two got the death penalty. Primarily they are concerned with the threat posed by bin-Laden. Overall strategy is to "drain the swamp" in the Middle East. Terrorists are, as a result, being shifted east to Afghanistan and Pakistan - also Iran is still a problem. Now we are talking to the Sudanese. About WMD, it would be difficult for bin-Laden in Afghanistan to acquire WMD, but they are trying with vigor. Once they have them it will be hard to deny them entry into the states. Plan is to deny them access before they get it.
Chairman Gilmore: We are able to do this in secret session, if necessary.
Sheehan: We can do that next time, if it would help. The best way to defend is before they get the weapons.
Sam Brinkley was introduced by Ambassador Sheehan and handed out a paper presentation. He reiterated that the State Department is the lead agency for both crisis and consequence management for international incidents. This is different than for the domestic incidents. Everything runs through the chief of mission. The ambassador is in charge.
There was a short discussion about the response to a bio-event. The FEST, it was noted, has no offensive capabilities.
Sheehan: We always lead the FEST, or it doesn't go. We will have a plane up and on the way in four hours.
Ralston: Couldn't this be an act of war?
Sheehan: We don't like to call them an act of war. That legitimizes them to some extent. We are trying to work through who has responsibility in an incident.
Garrison: It works well, but that said, in the course of what we are doing we need to pull from an international program. I don't think we study the international and bring it over to the domestic enough - it works very well.
Mike Wermuth announced a break for lunch with a scheduled start again at 1240, when Mike Wermuth introduced Lisa Gordon Hagerty. She gave a presentation that sparked a discussion related to the requirements, or lack thereof, of local agencies to purchase specific equipment with Federal grant money.
Shine: To what extent is the VA able to deal with the threat?
Hagerty: The VA is storing and could be a possible triage place, maybe better as a back up - but I think mobile hospitals are a better idea.
Chairman Gilmore: Does the executive branch have plans for other similar exercise like TOPOFF?
Hagerty: Yes, and I will get you a copy of the schedule.
Falkenrath: Do we have the authority to force hospitals to open up and treat patients?
Shine: They are not going to lock down; that's unrealistic.
Hagerty: I hope I didn't give that impression. I don't know of a hospital...
Falkenrath: Of course, they will!
There was at this point a side discussion between several members of the panel about whether or not hospitals would shut down if inundated with bio or other mass casualties.
In addition, there was a general agreement among members that the casualty levels could overburden the facilities, and those need to be augmented by the federal assistance.
Ms. Hagerty was concerned that at the end of the federal grant period, local departments still wouldn't be able to meet the challenge. She felt they (the Fed) should have more input into what they (local departments) buy and that there should be a minimum essential equipment list.
Jones: What about the three-year plan?
Hagerty: There is no requirement to buy Chem/bio equipment. Currently it's at the discretion of the grantee. All of the money can be spent on a specific area rather than over the broad needs list.
Hagerty: But let me reiterate, as long as it is on the list they can buy what they want.
Foresman: You have to assume that the state and local governments have a good idea of what they need - have the feds set down and told the state and locals what the end state is?
Hagerty: You can't use a uniform threat assessment for all states.
Foresman: Not to belabor the point . . .
Hagerty: If your offering Virginia, . . .
Richard Falkenrath: I am willing to believe there is waste.
Hagerty: Let's be fair, I never said there was waste.
Falkenrath: I want to see some supporting data.
Hagerty: I am saying that there should be some minimum requirements list.
Shine: I'm responding to the word minimum requirements - if they have what they need -- then maybe they only need communications gear . . .
Downey: There would be documentation on how the money was spent ………
Samuels: I have to lend some support to Hagerty - like with dope and community policing - sometimes those grants are used for other than what they are intended.
The discussion ended with a number of sidebar discussions going on in relation to the use of money and requirements for purchasing specific equipment.
Chairman Gilmore: I believe we need to work a bit more on TOPOFF.
Mike Wermuth introduced Paul Maniscalco.
Maniscalco: I am grateful to the commission to able to go see the most expensive kabuki theater that ever existed. We really need an outside independent look, because this was a commercial enterprise for certain people. Interoperability was never addressed. Basic scene security was forgotten. Medical presentation of the patient was what made the diagnosis not the electronic technology. FEMA was called on the carpet because they were already online prior to the start. This was nothing more than a well-scripted high school play. Eleven million dollars was spent with a very limited return. There was a lot of junk being paid for: pens, caps, stickers, etc.
Wermuth: Paul used the amount $11 million - the NDPO could have been funded for almost two years at that rate.
Foresman: Portsmouth was chosen because it was not in the Nunn-Lugar -- that was intentional. We are going to miss some fundamental lessons learned - we need a good independent assessment.
We focused on the rear end rather than the head - law enforcement and fire respond everyday, but cabinet level officials don't.
A fundamental failure was the lack of accessing of the top officials to do a tabletop.
They separated the exercise in DC at the last minute. DoD played it very realistically.
Shine: Someone should be responsible for an independent assessment of these types of things - that's something this panel should do.
Foresman: The real failure came at Denver, at one of the 157 special cities.
Maniscalco: You are right on target.
Falkenrath: You really need another city. Chemical is so different from bio.
Greenleaf: Once the hot-wash is over . . .
Bremer: A white wash of the hot wash.
Is the Nunn-Lugar money being well spent? I agree with Ken Shine.
Maniscalco: One participant I spoke to said, it was his view of 10 blind men and an elephant. I'm going to save the health and medical aspects till tomorrow. We want federal help but we need a fed acronym dictionary - people didn't know what each federal agency could bring to the table. FEMA didn't even know, didn't even have a book to tell them if they (Feds) could help.
Wermuth: In response to a direct question asked at the TOPOFF After Action Review Conference, Portsmouth said that they could have handled everything without any federal assistance.
Falkenrath: I think this Portsmouth fire chief is wrong.
Wermuth: That may be, but that was his perception.
Chairman Gilmore: After we are done here we can break and then go to executive session. I was curious about the discussion as to whether or not the local medical systems are going to accept people.
Shine: I would question the basic presumption of the event. The question is how do we integrate that?
Chairman Gilmore: What can we do by way of a national plan? I wouldn't underestimate the role of patriotism.
Shine: I agree completely, the medical community needs direction but they will respond when needed.
Greenleaf: I think the locals would have been swallowed up if Portsmouth had been real.
Embrey: I have a lot to add to what has been said. TOPOFF was not realistic. The exercise itself, though, was not without value; the feds got together and ran some tabletop exercises, given the white wash of the hot wash. There was quite a bit of discussion, what is the mechanism for dealing with panic? What authority does the president have to quarantine? Who do you use to deal with panic? They may not have been discussed as part of Topoff, but they are discussed. This was an event that had many masters; so, everyone had their own set of objectives.
Chairman Gilmore: Actually it may have been very realistic - we need to work up a plan and then train to the plan.
Greenleaf: If it had been the real thing it would have gone smoother.
Falkenrath: I don't think so.
Ralston: The next one will go better and the oversight idea is good.
Jones: In the five Nunn/Lugar exercises there has always a tremendous leaning forward of the fed. We need to get back to the scenario based on a realistic threat.
Marsh: What about the jurisdictional question, do we get into that? The legality?
Chairman Gilmore: Yes - we get into that all the time - but there are policy problems with that, does everybody agree with that?
Bremer: There are a lot of areas that are not clear, such as the quarantine authority.
Bremer: Someone ought to do an inventory and find out what the gaps are.
Chairman Gilmore: There is; but there isn't a plan.
Wermuth: We are going to talk about that.
VII. Strategy Framework.
Clapper: The second report should be a framework for a national strategy - putting our money where our mouth is - TOPOFF helped reinforce the need for this. The presidential directives are not a national strategy; that needs to be built from the bottom up perspectives; it needs to come from outside the beltway. As part of that process, we need to identify some end goals. Mike included in the books on tab 5 an outline as a possibility; this is a straw man and it can/will be changed.
We need to give the research staff at RAND our guidance and direction. Then RAND will write the actual proposed text on the paper; then it can be circulated several times until we are all comfortable with it. The timing could not be better: we will distribute the report to the president and the president elect, and to the new Congress - something that the new administration and Congress can take and act on. So let's go thru each section and make suggestions and finish this by the time we break up tomorrow. We need closure on what we are going to charge RAND with what we want them to do for us. Now, I will turn it over to Mike Wermuth.
Wermuth led the panel though the basic structure of the proposed outline.
Foresman: Are we talking about these as relationships? Not significant details, right?
Wermuth: Right, in somewhat broader terms, a framework rather than an actual strategy.
Bremer: I'm a bit uneasy. Our commission was only 6 months - we were briefed on the budget, but we took a pass on the budget, but if a three year commission can't look at the budget, who can?
Wermuth: We had previously discussed concentrating on budget questions in the third report.
Falkenrath: We should not ignore budget issues, but I suggest that this report be primarily one on the "ways" we should do things, and then the third report can concentrate on "means" - the funding implications.
Wermuth: I think we can put some dollar figures or priorities in the actual "means" description when we get to that point. Not sure we know enough even now to say $11 billion, is too much, too little, just about right, or allocated the best way.
Marsh: I think we should pick up the major points of the last commission, who's in charge and the complexity; we need to build on the Bremer report. The problem is a systemic one - we haven't yet begun to build a structure that can reach from the international to the domestic - we have to build a framework. The fundamental problem is, it's a maze. This committee against that one, both the executive and the congress.
Reno: I agree. If we want to shape future events then we have to deal with budget. I am concerned with the word " framework". Framework is in the eye of the beholder.
Chairman Gilmore: I agree with the position that everyone has taken. Local people are going to show up and the feds are going to show up. Then we will have a conflict. Our great goal is to write a plan that says who is on first. Then the budget.
Wermuth: In the next report, even without dollars and numbers, we should state conclusions like the overwhelming perhaps exclusive Federal role for Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, leading the to the establishment of national standards. Locals can't do it themselves. It's an appropriate role for the federal government. Then they can offer standards to the States and localities, maybe some assistance in acquisition. Or you will end up with different standards for each jurisdiction.
Jack Marsh: Are we clear on who is in charge?
Lots of heads indicating NO by panel members.
Clapper: With regards to threat - we should reinforce what is in the Bremer report. Step back and look at the forest - the sub-divisions and individual sub points.
Bremer: Lets step even further back than that, what are the three or four most important conclusions we are going to make?
Clapper: I think personally, the government isn't organized to handle these threats. I think we need to make some fairly provocative recommendations to congress on how they are to get their act together. On information sharing, on national standards.
Falkenrath: I am concerned about this idea for a number of reasons - we are thinking about an answer at the federal level rather than at the local level.
Clapper: I agree, but basing on FEMA, in the consequence management context it's pretty good. An embellished FEMA could have its own intelligence capacity.
Embrey: RAND is saying that we need to have some identifiable goals, we have some preliminary conclusions, but we should have a path.
Clapper: I accept that.
Falkenrath: I want to criticize the Congress - get rid of a half dozen congressional committees.
Bremer: I'm all for telling Congress how they compound the problem.
Chairman Gilmore: What are we paying for? I would feel better defining roles.
Reno: RAND is known for writing good military strategy - that tells you how; we are talking about organizing without knowing the strategy. RAND needs to give a good shot at the strategy. Then that will tell us if we need this or that.
Clapper: If we were able to flesh out this outline - that would emerge.
Falkenrath: I want some type of quantifiable measuring device.
Marsh: What is included in the definition of a threat? Cyber terrorism is occurring. The DOE and DOJ have already had non-classified files downloaded. I don't want egg on our face because we didn't say what was obvious.
Chairman Gilmore: I concur and Mike you mentioned each twice.
Wermuth: It will be addressed.
Maniscalco: But Richard, is it how many suits you have or how many people you have to wear the suits? No one has a base line.
Chairman Gilmore: It's impossible to prepare for everything.
Dallas Jones: Isn't that what Lisa (Gordon-Hagerty) was saying?
William Garrison: If we are going to make an impact, now is our chance, let's not miss this opportunity.
Clapper: Is every one happy with the roman numerals?
Chairman Gilmore: Well, should we be thinking shorter?
Bremer: If you want it to be read. Make it short. RAND guys take this away and comeback with a two-page outline. I'm lost with this outline; we ought to be thinking about, what are the elements of the strategy? What are the conclusions?
Chairman Gilmore: Is your complaint that it is too involved?
Bremer: Yes, if we don't have it very quickly . . . this second report is the important one.
Samuels: Would the budget be in this? Lay out the goals; what are the increments?
O'Brien: I think there is a way of saying, theses are the roles at a conceptual level in this document, rather than a much more explicit concrete level. Then say, if this is the role, then these are the resources needed.
Embrey: The mandate is to define how well the fed is responding to the threat. If you define the end-state, then make requirements . . . that would be much more constructive.
Bremer: I would take out the 8-year plan.
Falkenrath: Why do we need a time frame?
Bremer: I don't know, I assume its because you have some things you want done in the short term and others you want to do over the long term.
Wermuth: Yes, it's because there are some short-term things and some long time things that we will want to do. If you don't put in some dates - only say short term and long term --then you leave it to open to everybody to decide what the time frames mean. I would strongly argue, whether we have two or three time phrases, that we need to have some dates in the future.
Falkenrath: The hard thing is setting the goals not the time frames.
Chairman Gilmore: Earlier I heard, what is our headline? Well, our headline might be, the government is not organized to do this right or the government is in disorder. What gets us more action in Washington? I think it is pointing out what is wrong. This is something this commission might want to come to grips with.
Bremer: It seems to me that this report has basically three chapters, the first chapter, what is the desired state? Authorities state, federal and local. The second chapter is what is the current state and what is the desired state; then from that flows the third part, which is the recommendations. You can do this on a two and a five-year term. I agree with Mike, you should avoid short and long term. Get into specifics. Seems to me if you do a desired state on authorities and budget, that's an organization or at least an outline that I can follow. Seems to me pretty straightforward.
Chairman Gilmore: Do we agree that some definition of roles and overall state of preparedness is necessary? If you don't give the state and the fed's some idea of the time, you are avoiding the nub of the issue.
Falkenrath: I feel like, Jerry. Your second two chapters, current state and recommendations, are really report three. I also see three chapters, the first the same as yours. The second then would be what are the preliminary thoughts on the organization of what this desired end state would be.
Wermuth: At each level?
Falkenrath: At Each Level. The third would be what are preliminary thoughts are on budgetary priorities. Otherwise we are not going to get this done by December.
Bremer: We had this discussion on the first report. The time for us to have an impact is this December. Not December of 2001; the farther we can lead the better.
Chairman Gilmore: There is a consensus here on giving the most comprehensive and hard-hitting report as possible.
Wermuth: Mr. Chairman I know we are about to run out of time today. I would hope, whether we use this straw man or something else, we need to describe an end-state we have to state some basic assumptions. This is an attempt to get there. I think there are other ways to do it, but we need to be able to articulate that. What are the expectations of the US public? We have to get this down on paper.
Chairman Gilmore recessed the meeting and told the panel that General Clapper would be chairing the meeting on Tuesday because he had to be away.
Tuesday, July 18th Meeting Minutes