Russia sees the U.S.-led international order as a threat to its interests. U.S. and Russian interests overlap in some areas, such as counterterrorism. But they are directly opposed in others. What are America's policy options?
National Security Research Division
Blog Posts and Media Coverage
Why do some individuals engage in political violence in Yemen, while others do not? We examine the role that social, political, and economic factors play on individual behavior toward violence in the midst of Yemen's bloody and multiyear civil war. We use a unique national survey conducted in Yemen in 2016 to better understand why Yemenis may reject political violence despite persistent conflict and civil unrest across the country.
This Perspective presents scenarios for sectarian relations in the Middle East out to 2026. It lays out four different scenarios as plausible examples of an even greater number of alternative futures, concluding that while sectarianism casts a shadow over the Middle East, it is only one lens for understanding the region's conflicts and some of the drivers of sectarianism are amenable to policy interventions.
Testimony presented before the House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces on May 18, 2017.
In this report, RAND researchers analyze Russian core interests and views of the international order. The authors find that Russia sees the current international order as dominated by the United States and as a threat to some of Russia's interests. For several areas, U.S. and Russian interests overlap and cooperation is feasible. In other areas, U.S. and Russian interests conflict, and this report offers options for U.S. policy going forward.
Document submitted May 5, 2017, as an addendum to testimony before the House Armed Services Committee on March 22, 2017.
The U.S.-led strategy to defeat the Islamic State has been criticized for a lack of clarity, overemphasis on tactical objectives, and insufficient attention to the underlying causes of the greater civil conflict across both Iraq and Syria. This report assesses the current strategy and presents three options, derived from subject-matter-expert input. It recommends a new strategy to address root causes.