Gilmore Commission - Minutes
Panel to Assess the Capabilities for Domestic Response
to Terrorist Acts Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction
Richmond, Virginia
Thursday, September 28, 2000
Present:
The Honorable James Gilmore, Chairman
James Clapper, Vice Chairman
L. Paul Bremer
Paul Maniscalco
Richard Falkenrath
George Foresman
William Garrison
Ellen Gordon
James Greenleaf
Dallas Jones
Jack Marsh
Kathleen O'Brien
Patrick Ralston
William Reno
Hubert Williams
Also present:
Ellen Embrey, Department of Defense Representative
Michael Wermuth, RAND project director
Members Absent:
Raymond Downey
William Jenaway
M. Patricia Quinlisk
Joseph Samuels
Kenneth Shine
(James Clapper opened the discussion with a call for basic introductions, administrative overview, and orientation, mentioning that the panel has substantial ground to cover in the next two days. He then suggested that Mike Wermuth provide the panel with a National Security Council update.)
I. National Security Council Update.
Wermuth: We did ask an NSC representative to attend, but unfortunately they already had commitments in New Mexico.
(Wermuth presented a copy of letter from Dick Clarke to Congressman Shays, which was discussed.)
Wermuth: I also have some second-hand notes given to me on a meeting between the NSC, OMB, and some members of Congress. Dick Clarke was asked several pointed questions, in his capacity as National Coordinator, on the inadequacy of the Attorney General's strategy. Mr. Clarke responded that domestic preparedness is only a small part of the Attorney General's strategy (e.g. Section 1.8b); though he did agree that coordination is weak and that some criticism is justified - e.g., there is no connection between planning and budget allocation.
Marsh: What is the possibility of getting a "new entity" from this Congress?
Wermuth: The "stars are not aligned" for this Congress to agree on legislation before the end of this Congress, whenever they decide to adjourn.
(Discussion continued on the political dynamics of domestic preparedness and the absence of a TOPOFF After Action Report until possibly December. James Clapper stated that the panel does not necessarily need that formal report, especially in light of the fact that the panel has its own observations.)
II. Report on the State and Local Advisory Group Meeting - Bruce Morris
Morris: There was a great deal of discussion on federal guidance to state and local planners with regard to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) preparedness. This lack of coordination and guidance was a resounding theme. We heard two days of discussion about how the NDPO was still alive and well. Both the Attorney General and FEMA Director Witt agreed that a broader national strategy was needed. I finally asked what the expectations were from this (State and Local Advisory) group. The response was "input and support." I asked if funding was the background problem and if we (group members) should try to act on our own to advocate an increase in and better allocation of funding. It was abundantly clear that the opportunity for some significant leadership and guidance is available and needed. The general feeling was that we are not much further along than we were in 1998.
Embrey: : I had a similar perception and I share his (Morris') disappointment in the timing and the management of the meeting itself. I made a list of things that were said:
1. A single UCS/ICS (unified command system/incident command system) at the national level is needed;
2. A real national strategy needs to be put in place with state and local input;
3. The DC feds should keep out of the response business;
4. A disconnect exists between law enforcement communities;
5. One crisis management site is more effective than two and this should be under a unified command system;
6. "Where's the beef… I heard there was $10 billion being spent on terrorism… why is funding a problem?"
7. Regional coordination and planning is essential and the document needs to integrate this concept across the spectrum of response; and
8. National equipment and training is essential and has not been provided.
Falkenrath: This is instructive; a half-baked idea without buy-in is not going to work regardless of the intellectual beauty of the proposal. Anything would be better if just supported by both the Administration and Congress. It is worth saying that a joint effort is important.
(James Clapper announces a break before the start of sub-panel discussions).
III. Training, Equipping, and Exercising Sub-panel.
Vice Chairman: I do want to stress that by the end of the day we should have an idea of where we want to be with regards to a national strategy. The RAND staff will flesh out our recommendations. Before we begin, I'd like Mike (Wermuth) to explain the methodology for the sub-panel discussions that have taken place previous to this full panel meeting.
Wermuth: We had five substantive sub-panels that engaged in discussions, and I'll restate the methodology behind them for those of you who have not yet participated in a sub-panel discussion (explaining the framework). You will hear the back-briefs of these sub-panels, and the next step will be the full panel's feedback and modification to the sub-panel's decisions. RAND will flesh these recommendations out and bring the sub-panels back together in the October timeframe to take them to the next level of articulating the recommendations. The full draft report will then be available early in November for you to see individually, with a full panel conference call in mid-November. We should then be able to put the final stamp on the report with some minor modifications and get the final report to the President and Congress by 15 December 2000. We decided to use this sub-panel method because we need the subject matter expertise that the panel members bring to the table. We do not feel that RAND empirical research can make up for this experience.
(Discussion on the outline presented by Wermuth in the handout).
Reno: I came away from the last meeting with the impression that this document should be an action document. If you take that approach, then the introduction would be a call-to-action and the chapters would be our recommendations for such actions.
Vice Chairman: Yes that's how I remember it. We should make some specific recommendations. For example, we have 9 subject areas so if we make 2-3 recommendations in each area that is a lot of recommendations. These recommendations are what we should focus on.
Falkenrath: And that would be in addition to the national plan-type recommendations.
Bremer: Let's have Mike (Wermuth) draft the introduction section and write the preface well. After we read it, then we can decide whether we should place it at the beginning or as part of the appendix. Let's put this issue aside.
Wermuth: So can we come to an agreement? We have an executive summary as a freestanding document. I suggest 20 pages for that document. The main body of the report can have additional introductory material, complete appendices, all of the explanatory material.
(Training, Equipping and Exercising Sub-panel discussion resumes)
Falkenrath: I have four questions that apply to training, equipping, and exercising as well as research and development: 1) Training to do what? 2) How is this training and equipment provided? For example, using block grants; 3) To what goal? 4) How to maintain this?
Jones: The point is that if we are going to recommend that there should be training requirements, we should take advantage of the existing and adequate state programs that are doing a good job. We should continue to fully utilize and fund these existing programs.
Vice Chairman: If we go back to Richard's (Falkenrath) briefing (reference in handout) of the 5 major drivers of the potential threat, we could recommend that a matrix be built, showing where training for that particular need is already being done. From this matrix, those responsible could derive some minimal standards and attempt to offer that particular training from whoever is already doing it. In addition, this matrix would reveal some holes that need to be addressed.
O'Brien: I am concerned that if we do this we are in fact going backwards and we will spend 3 years going backwards. We should look at the core competencies and fund programs that achieve these core competencies. Of course, this panel cannot get to an operational level, but we can get down to a conceptual level.
Maniscalco: We don't want to get into trouble by defining terrorism as "hazmat with an attitude." Terrorism is a small component of response planning, and these people have a finite amount of time, capacity, and content. It is the casualties and the inability to manage the casualties that will kick us in the tail.
Bremer: Yes, we need to avoid getting drawn into the details. A lot of what we are going to do is pass on an action plan and a suggestion of "where you ought to look." We need to take a certain level of generality: state the objectives, assess the problems, and then present the solutions. We ought to be saying:
1. We should make the best use of existing equipment and training;
2. We ought to identify best practices and core competencies;
3. Be flexible… don't assume that the federal government can set up the best program.
Vice Chairman: One more thing we ought to say is that the organizational entity needs to be a coordinator.
Falkenrath: Yes, and tie this in. We need to make it clear that the entity has the flexibility to put money where it makes the most sense; the current system is about all federal agencies creating their own programs.
Vice Chairman: The chief training officer of this entity should have a national training council for identifying best practices and certification as well as training. This council should be similar to the SLAG, with representatives from every constituent group.
Wermuth: To summarize, we have a national training officer with an inventory of state and local training systems, as well as the federal system, deciding: training to do what, to whom and how, as well as how the programs should be maintained and integrated. This officer's tasking authority still needs to be determined, but he/she should look into programs that may still be needed and should develop a plan for the evaluation and feedback of all these programs, with the national training council.
Bremer: The report should also make a point about flexibility and this training officer should tie the best practices to the certification process.
Foresman: The DOJ program stipulates that states should develop strategic plans. Elements of these plans are the end goal and what states are doing right now to reach these goals. We could use these plans to capture some meat and potatoes in this section of the report. Vice Chairman: Maybe we should just add some " for examples" in this report and then go into detail in our next year's report.
Wermuth: Are there other issues that need to be addressed in the "equipping" piece?
Bremer: The report should indicate that there is even a broader philosophical point - this program eases the budget requirements because it includes training and equipment the nation should be focusing on anyway.
Jones: Yes, terrorism is really an annex for emergency responders.
Falkenrath: I think the federal government is moving away from the all-hazards structure and trying to create a different terrorism approach. We should say something about this, to oppose this trend.
Marsh: What about bi-state response and border communities? We can't treat states separately in regional scenarios.
Wermuth: Yes, the multi-purpose and multi-jurisdiction approach can underpin this whole report. For example, the LA area multi-jurisdictional approach, and Northeast compact where all five states provide mutual support in the event of a regional emergency.
Jones: Same thing with the Montana fire. Our experience shows that the unified command system is always infinitely expandable. These multi-state systems allow local, state, and federal resources to be maximized.
Williams: The question is, would that training/equipping official, this new "chief," actually have any authority?
Bremer: I think someone can answer that conceptually. Authority derives from whatever or wherever the office is that we finally recommend. The role is the same when it comes to training and equipping. This officer uses best practices to certify programs. The officer essentially says, "If you (states) want to use federal money, then you have to meet these qualifications. On the other hand, if you want to buy your own equipment, fine.
IV. Research and Development.
Bremer: Research and development is very important, but the standards we discussed under training and equipment may incorporate this and then we could capture the greater details into an appendix.
Falkenrath: Yes, and this can't be done in the next 45 minutes. Let's kick this can down the road.
Reno: I think we ought to address this and NOT kick it down because it's terribly important. A coordinated R&D program has never been a part of the WMD program. My point is that there is so much work to do. For example, there are all kinds of laboratories doing exactly the same work. There needs to be a way to target money at the gaps. Dual-use is key. Bremer: Laboratory work is for long-range not the short-term, like at Los Alamos; there is no such national program. You should establish a national lab or put it in an existing lab; and this new entity needs to be able to make this happen.
Embrey: The Office of Science and Technology in the White House has been trying to coordinate and eliminate the duplicity of R&D. I would like to ask them to circulate that information to you. I think it would be instructive.
Bremer: Right. But it's not working and we need to suggest how to fix it. Vice Chairman: I'm not sure if this will merit a separate section but we'll see what RAND comes up with.
Wermuth: Yes, we will draft R&D as a freestanding piece but you may decide to put it under something. This decision should also apply to all of the sections. We purposely designed an overlap with the sub-panel topics so as to not miss anything.
Vice Chairman: Dual use is the best point. We have to have somebody in charge that has visibility and knows if classified research is going on. Then he/she can make certain it is migrated to first responders. (Lunch Break, Governor Jim Gilmore, Chairman, enters to chair the meeting.)
Chairman: I am confident that Congress and the President will listen to this report. There are strong opinions in this panel and one of our challenges is to try to arrive at a consensus. However, if our decisions cannot be unanimous then I am prepared to take a vote.
V. Policy Development and Intergovernmental Processes.
(Administrative note: Each sub-panel designated a spokesperson; Jerry Bremer was chosen to represent the sub-panel on Policy Development and Intergovernmental Processes)
Bremer: We examined the fact that there is no national strategy on terrorism, let alone even a federal plan. So we looked at the implications of this absence for Congress and the Federal Branch:
1. Congress: Stove-piping is taking place in Congress, though we decided that you can't blame Congress for not developing a national strategy, that is the job of the President and so this is a second-order problem.
2. Executive Branch: We looked at various options and came up with a role for the new entity. The new entity should: develop the national strategy and plans with an emphasis on preventing and deterring attacks; have budgetary authority and political responsibility (a director nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate). We did not recommend a veto power but believe it should have an authority similar to the ONDCP "budget" certification process. Finally it should have some ability to task and analyze intelligence for international and domestic threats. We looked at five organizational options to accomplish these goals: ONDCP, status quo, a stronger FEMA, DoD, or HHS. We also determined that the entity should have a board of governors. I think this is probably the single-most important recommendation we can make. We did not reach agreement on whether the new entity should be domestic only, or international and domestic.
Chairman: If an agency is not certified, what does this mean?
Bremer: They can re-work the program or appeal to the President to see if it really supports the President's plan.
Falkenrath: The only thing that it does not take into account is that the Congress gives money. So if the money is given, it is also spent.
Wermuth: Well, that money would simply be a deliberate strategy on the part of Congress to not follow the executive strategy, which does happen sometimes.
Embrey: So, if such an entity were established then a Congressional Committee would provide oversight? You need to fix both ends.
Wermuth: Yes, that is contained in the synopses (reference to handout). Separate select committees in Senate and House should be created as part of a single picture to look at domestic preparedness in its entirety.
Gordon: What caused the committee to give all the criteria (reference to handout) to an Executive Office of the President model rather than FEMA?
Bremer: Our sense was that you need an organization that will have substantial authority over other agencies' budgets. A co-equal cabinet office would not be able to gain authority over others' budgets.
Gordon: We need to be careful that we are not re-inventing the wheel. FEMA should still have operational authority; the budget issue I understand.
Chairman: I think that's right.
Clapper: There needs to be an element at the White House level that has political accountability; and an important dimension is the connectivity to the state and local. Operationally, the best federal entity to do that is FEMA. So we need to include something about the relationship with or connectivity to FEMA
Wermuth: If you'll notice where we outline the functions and tasks: this entity in the White House will not have operational control, a command and control capacity; it is policy, program, budget functions. The FEMA operational pieces would continue to reside in FEMA; the law enforcement piece would continue to reside in the FBI. No operational control functions would be transferred into this entity
Marsh: We have gotten involved in a terminology called the need for an "entity." The next question is where does the entity go? I think it should be in DoD; it is the DoD that has communication, transportation, and manpower capabilities. Philosophically, when you look at the system of terrorism response… "Terrorism is a crime"… so therefore it's in the FBI. But many agencies are not used to working under DOJ in emergency situations. E.g., DOMS (the Director of Military Support in DoD). There is historical experience in dealing with these people (DOMS). If you go into a DOMS operation, with a wide range of contingencies from oil spills to prison riots; they have always become part of the team. It is the DoD that has communication, transportation, and manpower capabilities; the gravity always shifts to the DoD. In those instances the DoD works for FEMA and there is not an attempt to usurp FEMA; you don't need to make major changes in command structures to accommodate a new threat.
Chairman: Are we beginning to address a distinction between a natural disaster and a criminal activity? Let's think about the locals for a minute, whom are they used to taking orders from?
Gordon: We talked about this in another sub-panel, the all-hazards approach… I don't think you can distinguish between one or the other; my opinion is that the person in charge may be different at the local level.
Greenleaf: The FBI's main view is "who did it" and this shouldn't be swallowed up in consequence management; the FBI would be in the middle of this firestorm. It is not in their mandate to support the other things around them, like consequence management. TOP OFF really brought home this point Reno: We need to talk about who's in charge. To be perfectly candid, McCaffrey does not have the authority to execute the type of things they need to execute. On the other hand, DOMS (DoD/Army) can't execute until certain disaster levels are triggered; FEMA is the same way. You could have a model in which FEMA could be the planner and DoD would be responsible for execution. The two agencies would work together for all disasters.
Reno: We need to talk about who's in charge. To be perfectly candid, McCaffrey does not have the authority to execute the type of things they need to execute. On the other hand, DOMS (DoD/Army) can't execute until certain disaster levels are triggered; FEMA is the same way. You could have a model in which FEMA could be the planner and DoD would be responsible for execution. The two agencies would work together for all disasters.
Greenleaf: Our group put the specific emphasis on prevention, that would be part of the task of this entity, and that's why it can't be FEMA.
O'Brien: I think the proposal before us puts the emphasis on the beginning of the cycle and then coordinating the rest. The local government's excellence needs to be in the response, so I think there is a sound conceptual basis for the "Executive Office of the President" (EOP) proposal before us.
Falkenrath: I think this EOP option is the best alternative because it could:
1) develop a national strategy;
2) articulate the strategy especially to the Congress;
3) oversee government-wide programs and budgets (that's why it can't be an existing agency); and
4) provide information fusion.
Jones: I support the EOP proposal, but keeping in mind that we're talking about who is going to coordinate federal programs. FEMA is response and recovery, but I don't see it as the proper agency for coordinating terrorism response planning. So I think it would be foolish for us to create a new group to come in and take charge, and the new EOP entity will not do that.
Chairman: That would lend itself to a planning or organizational structure. What we need is a national strategy to coordinate state or local assets. Planning has to be national, so if you agree that locals are the first responders who is the best planning office?
Jones: The EOP coordinates, and FEMA works in the states to help them plan.
Williams: Yes, this is not just a federal effort, it's a national effort. An existing agency will never have the respect of an EOP office nor will it have the power to bring together all the local, state and federal resources.
Chairman: Who directs the (national) response?
Bremer: The President; that's not going to change.
Jones: Yes, even with an earthquake; you have to see over time after the incident if it goes all the way to the President.
Chairman: Are we discussing a planning and strategy entity or a command and control entity?
Clapper: Both, but this proposal (entity in the EOP) is filling the policy, strategy, and resource allocation vacuum.
Chairman: So who is in charge?
Jones and Gordon: Initially, the Governor.
Clapper: If it transcended state boundaries, then the response would probably be guided by a unified command with different responsibilities.
Jones: No one agency is really going to be in control and command; you are in charge of your field.
Chairman: When we talk about a national strategy, the proposal on the floor is to put this planning and coordinating responsibility in the EOP, but the execution is under the Governor and with FEMA bringing in assets?
Falkenrath: One outstanding question, could an attack be so big and so bad that all these command relationships go out the door? In a bio attack would any of these responses address the problem? And I'm still worried about that part. The (Presidential) authority is there but they are not actively planning for it. We might want to say something about that.
Chairman: So this EOP entity would deal with that? I hear the group distinctly dividing the functions: one is the operational level with the governor unless the President triggers his national authority, the second is the planning under this entity.
Reno: I'm just concerned that the new entity will still not have enough authority. Is it our intent to give all these standards and strategies to this new entity and put those same enhancements into the law?
Bremer: Those are very good questions, and I think the answer to your question is that they get subsumed under either strategy or budget. So my answer is yes, those things would reside as part of this office, with a bit more teeth. The new office would not execute it, but would set standards and coordinate in all these functions.
(Break)
Chairman: Let's see if I can capture where we are going. We have an EOP entity with responsibility for a blueprint strategy. Operations and implementation are still a state and Governor responsibility, does everybody agree with this?
(Basic consensus)
VI. Collecting Intelligence, Assessing Threats and Sharing Information Sub-Panel (Jim Clapper presenting for the sub-panel).
Vice Chairman: We still have a cultural split between domestic and foreign intelligence. Now, in light of what we just agreed on (EOP entity), there is the potential to create an office that would attempt to facilitate this coordination. In National Commission on Terrorism report there was a recommendation for removing some of the restrictions on HUMINT collection, my own involvement says that this is a good recommendation. In addition, there needs to be more of a focus on MASINT (developing sensor and other indicators for chemical and biological weapons). We also discussed the need for a senior official in an intelligence office as part of the new entity. We also talked about the use of forensics to determine if it even was a terrorist attack and how this is an important part of deterrence. Finally, we concluded that the analytic effort - as distinguished from collection - is somewhat fragmented. I discovered a general Counter-Drug Intelligence Plan and think we should give consideration to an analogous document for terrorism. We could recommend such a product for terrorism, co-authored and co-led by the FBI, CIA, and this entity that we propose. Finally, we concluded that there needs to be a thorough and consistent way of conveying information down to the state and local levels (e.g., something like "IntelLink").
Falkenrath: I suggest that this section of the report recommend more intensive information gathering on groups at home.
Wermuth: How?
Falkenrath: Track dual-use technologies for chemical and biological weapons, not on people but on purchases of chemicals and equipment.
Williams: If we are going there, the language we use needs to be explicit. The problem is that unless we are clear in our definition, and people will take this and go over the line. Is it your intent to establish an intelligence capacity within the new entity?
Vice Chairman: If we are going to have an EOP entity, it needs to have access to intelligence collection and analysis. There needs to be an advocate to support intelligence for terrorism, especially as it straddles both domestic and foreign intelligence.
Chairman: I thought we were going to address the issue of the foreign intelligence gathering and disseminating it to the state and local levels?
Falkenrath: I would personally be willing to accept that if people buy anthrax-type chemicals, these activities should be reported.
Bremer: My recommendation is that the CIA guidelines overseas should be loosened, but keep the AG domestic guidelines as long as they are made more clear. Then look for activities that could reasonably be attributed to chem/bio terrorism.
Chairman: Are we talking domestic or foreign?
Clapper: The thing about terrorism is that you can't compartmentalize domestic and foreign terrorism. I feel that we ought to make the effort to treat the threat as a unitary one and not separate between domestic and foreign threats.
Chairman: Why not just use the general threats we have identified in our first report? What about information sharing?
Maniscalco: It's not only getting the information, when we (locals) get it, it's filtered and not timely. Do law enforcement people at the local level need a clearance at least at the SECRET level?
Chairman: What would be wrong with tasking this new organization to identify people in the local law enforcement officers and clear them, at least to the SECRET level?
Jones: We have done this in California and it is kept very small intentionally. It works very effectively.
Bremer: The dissemination is the easiest one to solve; we recommend SECRET and put up a computer system. But what kind of intelligence function should this new office have. My own view is to recommend a coordination model, and that is as far as I would go at the intelligence level.
Garrison: This morning we said that prevention is a high priority, this intelligence collection is an important part of that and sharing information internationally is equally important. We should recommend higher priority to the prevention function of this new entity. I think we should establish the entity and a priority on prevention and information sharing, both down and up, and that is detailed enough.
Williams: I support this. The report should be explicit about the coordinating function of this new entity. We don't want to create an additional complexity and detract more than anything else. We have other agencies that are doing a good job of collecting, gathering, and dealing with intelligence.
Bremer: I think Mike's suggestion is a good one. We should have a threat update as part of the national strategy, something similar to the threat assessment we did earlier -- the types of organizations that might seek to use NBC, probabilities -- to guide the resource decision process.
Chairman: So we have agreed on a clearance type of regime within a structure designated and defined by this office for the dissemination of relevant information. We will also recommend a system whereby we watch the instrumentality of chemical and biological weapons. Finally we will emphasize a high priority for prevention. The key point is that this agency is going to go further and say "these are the resources we are going to contribute to this."
VII. Planning, Coordinating, Operating Cooperatively (Ellen Gordon presenting for the sub-panel).
Gordon: We recognized that there is a lot of response planning going on at the state and local level. A single concept of operations (CONOPS) needs to be recognized and handed off to the states so that our plans can complement federal plans. There needs to be a single joint emergency operations center. There needs to be a standardized incident command system (ICS) that should also take into account state/local/fed functions. There needs to be a unified command system above the tactical level, for state and federal coordination. The whole job can't be done without coordinating. Each state government needs a central point of contact (POC) on all the issues. We recommend that state emergency agencies do this because they wear the local-to-federal hats.
Wermuth: This issue on the federal agencies bypassing the state and going directly to locals is an issue that comes up in every sub-panel. You will see this concept of using the state EM entity as a coordinator replicated in other recommendations. (Side discussion on issues relating to the Congress)
Clapper: Is this the place to address Congress?
Falkenrath: No, that is in section two, on federal government responsibilities.
Wermuth: We didn't seem to come to closure on that… recommending one joint or two separate ad hoc special committees in Congress to work directly with the new EOP entity, to look at this collectively from a congressional level.
Marsh: Instead of having committees in both houses, you should have one joint committee between the house and the senate, that would be much more effective and more efficient.
Clapper: Is that do-able?
Chairman: If we pose it as a recommendation it would be fine.
Falkenrath: The real problem is getting the existing committees to give up their authority. Let's say that bluntly.
(Returning to issue of the State EM entity as the "focal point")
O'Brien: We need to be careful that the federal government does not work JUST with the states, they also need to involve the operational folks in the cities.
Greenleaf: Are you recommending a joint operations center where the FBI is crisis management and FEMA is dealing with consequence management? I have problems with that, especially with regard to classified information. It seems like it makes more sense that FEMA work with the state operations, but not with the FBI.
Jones: The difference is who "they" (the FBI) think are key people for the FBI to deal with. When we're co-located, then we (locals) can pick who the key people are.
Maniscalco: We did the same thing with the WTC. You make the decision-makers talk, without one agency determining who the key player is. You may not have the top dog there, but the one who does attend is prepared to make decisions.
Reno: To me, the purpose of having the single center is a single line of command. You don't re-design the clock in a crisis. We ought to be able to visualize a clean chain of authority and to replicate this every time. I don't think you can handle this without one single person being responsible to the federal government, to me we need to establish a single chain of command.
Bremer: When we talked about the role of the DoD, and we addressed it in the same way earlier today, there is no question in my mind that in 10,000-casualties type of responses the President is going to be the incident commander and he is probably going to employ DoD personnel. It seems to me that this new office should exercise and plan coordination for this type of scenario.
Chairman: Are we re-introducing the category that we spoke about this morning? It warrants serious discussion if we are going to put a major incident under the military. I thought we settled it that the head of FEMA was going to deal with this.
Bremer: Shouldn't the DoD be prepared…?
Embrey: To supply resources… not more…
Bremer: . . .to take charge… in chemical and biological incidents.
Falkenrath: I don't think that we should recommend that this is how it happens, but the President should have this option.
Reno: My issue is to establish a clean definition of responsibility and authority, it does not matter who it is.
Bremer: It is easy to envision the circumstance when the President wants DoD to be in the lead. If you haven't exercised it ahead, then civil liberties go out the door.
Chairman: I thought the way we were discussing this was that a civilian would be in charge, with the President working through FEMA, for example; so I'm struggling over the definition of "lead agency." I don't see any discussion that DoD should be lead agency.
Bremer: Yes, and you can plan and exercise this…
Chairman: With or without FEMA?
Bremer: It doesn't matter.
Williams: Usually when the military comes in they take command and control and we are trying to hedge this, it is my understanding that if the military takes control they supersede local authority.
Reno: What we're talking about is thousands dead, maybe even the local authorities dead and you HAVE to have help. In these instances, the military is likely to come in.
Williams: Can this be done without martial law?
Wermuth: Yes…
Marsh: If local authority breaks down the President automatically has authority.
(Break and adjourn for the day.)