Gilmore Commission - Minutes

Panel to Assess the Capabilities for Domestic Response
to Terrorist Acts Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction

Washington, D.C.
Monday, December 13, 1999

Present
The Honorable James Gilmore, Chairman
James Clapper, Vice Chairman
L. Paul Bremer
Raymond Downey
George Foresman
James Greenleaf
Paul Maniscalco
Kathleen O'Brien
Patricia Quinlisk
Patrick Ralston
William Reno
Kenneth Shine

Present by Teleconference:
Ellen Gordon

Also Present:
Ellen Embrey, Department of Defense Representative
Michael Wermuth, RAND project director

Members Absent:
Wiliam Garrison
William Jenaway
Dallas Jones
Ronald Neubauer

I. Opening Remarks by Governor James Gilmore (Chairman):

Chairman: Good morning ladies and gentlemen. It is a couple of minutes after nine so we will get going. Welcome to the meeting of the Panel to Assess the Capabilities for Domestic Response to Terrorist Acts involving Weapons of Mass Destruction. I appreciate all of you coming to California and here to RAND headquarters to continue this process. The more I read and am involved with this, the more I appreciate that we have a little longer with the process. It is delightful to work with all of you.

The chairman reviewed the panel membership and reintroduced each member.

Chairman: We have several vacancies resulting from resignations. Dr. James Q. Wilson is not going to be able to participate. The former secretary of defense, Mr. Donald Rumsfeld is not going to be to continue his participation either. We have added former secretary of the Army, Jack Marsh and Dr. Richard Falkenrath, a prominent author and professor at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard. I understand that Richard Falkenrath has some done of the most forward thinking and writing of the time with respect to terrorism, RAND not included. Neither gentleman could come to California today.

The chairman reviewed the agenda for the day, introduced Mike Wermuth of RAND, who has taken over from Bruce Hoffman and invited candid discussion from the panel on the report, the process and where we go from here. The chairman directed Mike Wermuth to work closely with Vice Chairman Jim Clapper.

Chairman: The foremost work of the day is the first annual report. Whatever we say in this report will most likely be tested by the sands of time. The report must be reflective of the panel. I think the work (the draft report) is a good foundation, strong academic, strong factual assessment. I wonder whether or not it reflects the nature of the risks. As Jim Clapper has said, we really do not know what we do not know. This report has to go to Congress and the President. I want everyone to be comfortable with the contents.

The chairman turned the meeting over to Mr. Wermuth for administrative matters and to facilitate the discussion of the draft report.

II. Housekeeping and administrative matters issues

Wermuth: Let me mention we are set up to audio record the meeting. The meeting is open and we want to capture the meeting accurately. If anyone objects, please let me know. If we discuss classified materiel, we will stop the recording.

Mr. Wermuth introduced Jeffrey Isaacson, Susan Hosek and CDR Marvin Heinze of the RAND staff.

Wermuth: We send out a lot of information to all of you. Let me know if it gets to be too much or if you need it in a different form.

III. Discussion of the First Annual Report.

Mr. Wermuth reviewed the report outline.

Wermuth: After the Governor's comments, we probably should go through the report section by section. We have some flexibility in today's schedule. We can spend as much time as needed on the report.

Clapper: Procedurally, what are the mechanics of how the report will be rendered?

Wermuth: To make a long story short: The legislation required an interim, six-month report. Due to the timing of the appointment of the Chairman and formation of the committee, that interim report would have been at approximately the same time as the annual report. OSD (Legislative Affairs) checked with Congress and determined that, due to the timing, there would be no need for the interim, six-month report. Wednesday is the deadline for the annual report. Our plan is to meet the statutory requirement by having the Governor sign the letter of transmittals for the required copies to the President and the Congressional leadership. We will print hard copy and deliver to each of the permanent committees, some of the temporary committees, and selected agencies and specified officials in the Executive Branch. Letters will be sent to every member of Congress and all governors advising them of the publication of the report and providing a website address for access to the report.

Chairman: I am going to open the floor for discussion. Everyone should have a opportunity to have his or her say. I would like to go last, but here are some of my key issues. What message are we trying to send? My sense is that the executive summary sends three signals: 1. Terrorism is a serious issue. 2. We are overstating the catastrophic event. 3. More emphasis needs to be placed on the higher probability/ lower consequence event. The assertion is that you cannot assume that preparations for a catastrophic event prepares you for a lessor event. There are a number of conclusions on page ix, which we need to go through. Now is the appropriate time to have discussion on this report.

Maniscalco: I am not sure we are capturing the essence of the issues. We spend considerable time on historical aspects, then attempt to make predictions. I have a number of markups. Qualification of definitions is important. My comments are sort of specific and we are tight for time. How do you want me to proceed?

Chairman: Give us your impressions. Specifics need to be identified. Submit your lists of small amendments and corrections to staff.

Maniscalco: I think we are on the radar screen. I think we are close to where we need to be. We need to rethink what are objectives are. Are we studying terrorism or are we determining readiness? I think our mission is to study how state, local, tribal and territorial governments are prepared to respond.

O'Brien: It makes sense to me that this report focuses more on the threat. The work we have to come will focus on response. In various comments from panel members, the emphasis of discussion seems to be on the higher probability/lower consequence event vs. the lower probability/higher consequence event. I think we need to discuss that today. Putting the threat in perspective (page 34) is the most important part. I also think the panel needs to agree on the context of our work. I made some suggestions on some basic assumptions. They were put forward primarily for discussion. I think it is important for the panel to agree on the context of what we are going to study.

Chairman: Do you have an opinion on high/low?

O'Brien: I am comfortable with the balance as it is stated in the draft.

Greenleaf: I have tried to approach this issue with a broad perspective, listen to the speakers and presentations. I am comfortable with the final product. I was struck that the agencies that had the opportunity to respond to the report nit picked but did not take exception with the major issues of the report. I was quite taken back by the lack of dialog from the agencies, which suggested to me we are going in the right direction. The area I am uncomfortable, based on my 30 years in the FBI, is that I am not sure the panel has been exposed to the threat at a highly classified level. Other than that, I am comfortable with the report.

Chairman: We are expected to assess based on the information provided and access we have. The panel is cleared to Secret. Some of us have greater access.

Bremer: I have been briefed all the way up through the classifications. In my view you should be comfortable with your conclusions. Those with greater access would probably come to the same conclusion.

Shine: As a disclaimer, I want everyone to realize I am a trustee of RAND, although I have no special contact with the individuals working this project. I think this report serves an extremely valuable role. As a biologist, I understand the difficulties in creating a catastrophic biologic event. Putting this into perspective the way we have done is providing a major service. I believe the high/low analysis is the correct answer. That being said, the three things I am concerned about are: - There is not enough emphasis on medical surveillance. This is needed so we know when an event happens. - The report emphasizes that the low consequence event creates terror or hysteria. We do not discuss the management of information. Providing information to the public in a timely and credible way will be important. - We need to do something about definitions. The implication of the low consequence event says you cannot train for the WMD event separately, but must integrate into overall training. We do not quite make a connection between the high probability/low consequence event and continuous training.

Chairman: Any questions, please raise your hand. I am going to ask questions. The report hammers home that the catastrophic biologic event is unlikely and not something any terrorist group can do.

Shine: That is not how I read the report. The notion that anyone can introduce smallpox to tens of thousands of cases in days is just wrong. Anthrax also has problems. In must be transmitted in air and that is hard to do. Technically it is extremely difficult.

Gordon: We as a panel need to be careful we do not predict whether something will occur.

Chairman: I will get to all hands. Dr. Quinlisk.

Quinlisk: I agree with Dr Shine. First responders always focus on going to the scene. With some of these events, we will not have a scene. We do need to talk about (medical) surveillance. In some cases surveillance will determine whether we even have an event. Terror by announcement is a threat without medical surveillance to disprove it. The report does not address the medical system: isolation rooms, ICUs, drugs, vaccines, and laboratories. There are areas which are not addressed in this report which I have concerns about.

Shine: We need greater emphasis on recognition. The medical system is a major issue.

Reno: I would like to expound on the comments, but first let me go down my items. - It is important to lay out the concept of the panel's approach. - We should approach holistically. Are we developing a national strategy? Probably not. Should we? - Now to the report itself: o I do not believe it appropriate to be critical of the prior approach to high consequence events. o We need a more balanced approach. Now is the time to balance the approach o I am troubled by some of the comments, such as: previous beliefs that restraint may be disappearing, then: terrorists may be compelled to use these weapons. Is there intelligence that terrorists may use these weapons? If so the worst case is more significant. I recommend we soften the criticism. o Communications. If you have a national strategy, you would have a national communications strategy o Final point. The report begins to focus on resources. That may not be wise at this point. It can lead to the wrong conclusion too quickly.

Bremer: The Intelligence Community is less concerned about the likelihood of CBRN then the terrorist experts. There is a movement by terrorists toward higher casualties per incident. The Intelligence Community is more definitive then the terrorist experts that this is on the lower probability for a major incident.

Gordon: We do not want to be critical in the report in black and white.

Dual use is common in emergency management. We must integrate the training and planning and make it multi-hazard.

I think too much effort has been spent analyzing the threat in this report. We need a little bit more substance of what we are recommending.

What actually happens if we do not meet the statutory deadlines of the report?

Discussion followed on ramifications of meeting or not meeting the deadline of 15 December.

Gordon: I think it is important to look at definitions. I do not agree with the report's definition of terrorism.

Embrey: There have been some discussions on definitions. Weapons of Mass Destruction has been discussed in law. There is more than one version of a definition in law. I suggest you not try to create definitions, but adopt others definitions. There are conclusions being made as part of the discussion. There needs to be more panel flavor and less analytical derivative, if I am clear. Other than that, the conclusions are valid and we just need to make sure we balance it based on the concerns that each of the panel members brings.

Ralston: We need a bottom-up approach. Nunn, Lugar Domenici only identified 120 and some added cities. There are local jurisdiction concerns. We hear that the training is fine, but where is the equipment. The equipment is so important to local jurisdictions. Jurisdictions are looking to the federal government for answers in this area. The other thing I want to mention is definitions. Our definitions should be somewhat consistent with those in law.

Bremer: I have three comments:

- Quantify the threat. We have to make some judgments or we are not doing our job. By and large the report finds a balance and reaches a conclusion. The report correctly emphasizes the higher probability, lower consequence event. By taking out the words high/low and using higher/ lower you give us a little bit of flexibility. By coming to higher vs. high I think we have some flexibility, and I do not think we can do more than that. This is all about creating a hedging strategy. - On the definitional questions, there is some talk on significance. One footnote defines significance based on the number of casualties. Casualties is only one measure of significance. Significance has at least two dimension, one the number of casualties; the other, perhaps just as important is the psychological impact. - Information management. How do you talk to the American public before an incident? How do you conduct information management in crisis? Management of the strategic consequence is important to this report.

Chairman: I think Jerry Bremer is right about information management. Look at Columbine. This is a classic case of two disturbed young men whose actions have carried into every household in the nation. The hysteria connected with that incident has been repeated over and over in this high communication society which we live in. Unscrupulous interest groups and politicians are prepared to latch on to this phenomenon and try to change national policy. Terrorists will want to do exactly that also.

Ralston: The term copycat is appropriate. These things still go on.

Quinlisk: That is very important. Communications is also preventative for the future.

Maniscalco: Which brings us back to an earlier discussions. We have to live with the Congressional qualifier: Weapons of Mass Destruction. These are all events which can be cataloged as weapons of mass effect. They all drain the community. Weapons of Mass ŒDisruption,' a social disruption, also drain community coffers.

Quinlisk: Maybe we need to add a third item. Not just casualties, or psychological, but the resources needed to solve the problem. There may be an event with no deaths, but requiring massive resources to resolve.

Downey: I was wondering if I were an outsider, reading the cover sheet "Assessing Domestic Capabilities." Do we really address this? We do not address capabilities in this first report and we should do something about that. We need to address the cover sheet and the title.

Shine: Let's add Roman numeral I, "Assessing the Threat" to the title page.

Chairman: We should have something in the title that explains that this ­ the threat -- is the focus only for this first report.

Downey: I was looking on page 62, National response. I need clarification of what the national response system is and think we should clarify it in the report. In the executive summary we state a national standard for response is needed. I don't know that a national standard is doable. I think we need to identify the response standards quickly if we are going to tackle standards. We need to pick up the pace. World Trade Center was 7 years ago. Oklahoma City 5 years ago. Even if we get training done, the responder will still need equipment.

Chairman: You were responsible for the World Trade Center response. Did you know it was a terrorist attack?

Downey: We originally thought it was a transformer explosion. I would say it was one to one-and-a-half hours before we realized it was a bomb. There were 1100 persons injured at WTC. Six hundred of them traveled home before getting treatment. We did not look at Oklahoma City or World Trade Center as a CBR event.

Chairman: We will finish the roundtable. Then after California presentations we will return to this discussion at the appropriate time.

Quinlisk: Overall the higher probability/lower consequence theme struck a resonant note with me. I am also interested in agricultural terrorism. In Iowa we basically have three crops: corn, pigs and soybeans. Hit one of them and the whole state is devastated.

We need to address the legal authority in addition to capacity. Can we shut the borders to a commodity? Can we force the quarantine of a patient? I think I have already addressed the need for more emphasis on medical/health issues.

In definitions, I am concerned the word "responder" seems to be used different ways and implies different groups of people. We may need a another term to cover second or later responders such as hospital personnel.

The last thing I will say is, about surveillance. Surveillance also needs investigation to put the picture together. It will be a surveillance/investigation component.

Chairman: Surveillance also means that you determine what kind of an act you have when you have an incident. You need to examine the incident to know what it is?

Quinlisk: Not just for bio. Chem and radiological are also included.

Clapper: My concerns, for the sake of brevity are captured in the executive summary, on page 8 , beginning with "the panel concludes". I would like to be able to sign up to a statement with that much certitude.

Do not draw any comfort from Intel Community's lack of indicators. The Intel Community has been taken to task before for not exploring the doable, but relying only on what we know.

Vice Chairman Clapper proposed a rewrite of the page 8 key paragraph and urged an approach of balance, suggesting also a new paragraph for page I of the preface.

Clapper: I thought explosives are technically a chemical. Are explosives a chemical weapon?

Maniscalco: It goes back to the legislative definition of WMD.

Clapper: We need to address cyberterrorism.

Chairman: Let me try to be quick. We discussed cyberterrorism earlier and indicated we would get to it later.

I am OK with the executive summary up to page ix. I begin to have problems there. I think the report demonstrates a certain schizophrenia. Let me focus on this one paragraph on page ix. The paragraph which starts with "The panel" and concludes with "needs our attention." This is a very puzzling paragraph. There are three contradictory statements in this paragraph.. I do not want the report to be schizophrenic. I am not willing to minimize the high consequence event. I also, do not know about the potential for use of tactical nuclear weapons from the former Soviet Union.

Let's take a break, and we will come back to this discussion after we hear from California.

IV. Presentations by California and Los Angeles officials.

Presentations were made concerning Los Angeles area WMD preparedness efforts.

Michael Guerin and Timothy Miles, California Office of Emergency Services Highlights of comments on federal programs supporting WMD preparedness. - Resources appreciated, timeliness unpredictable - NLD Training program population based which caused challenges in training less dense portions of the state. - National Guard RAID teams locations did not seem to take state desires into account - Better coordination needed.

A discussion on law enforcement intelligence collection followed.

Battalion Chief Ron Watson, Los Angeles County Fire Department - Discussed the teaming of local public safety organizations in the Los Angeles area through the Terrorism Working Group and the Terrorism Early Warning Group - Discussed the fire department concerns about the chemical exposure of large numbers of people and shortages of equipment and training.

Sgt John Sullivan, Los Angeles Sheriff's Department - Current federal WMD response enhancement efforts are fragmented - Effectiveness is hampered by a lack of understanding of the diversity of local government structures. - Federal grant programs are cumbersome. - WMD preparedness is treated separately from other public safety concerns - Enhanced information/intelligence sharing is essential.

Dr John Celentano, Los Angeles County Emergency Medical Services. -Training. Some hospital training has been conducted in LA area ( 1100 people). EMS training will start this year. -Equipment and supplies. LA area has some supplies. More are needed. -Systems. Early warning and identification will be a challenge.

Ellis Stanley, City of Los Angeles Emergency Preparedness Division -The federal programs lack flexibility at the local level. -There is a comprehensive Terrorism Working Group on the Los Angeles area. -We are concerned about the folks from DC arriving and changing the relationship we have with our local federal representatives.

Lunch Break

V. Continued Discussion of First Annual Report.

Chairman: We have three hours this afternoon to discuss the report and our Year 2000 plans. Let me raise a few issues myself. Lets go back to tab 3. The documentation indicates the report was circulated through the interagency process. Mike, how many agencies commented on the draft report?

Wermuth: You have all received copies of interagency comments. Among the agencies who made comments are: DOD, DTRA, Joint Staff, NDPO, ASD SOLIC, USCG, EPA, DOE, HHS, Department of the Army, FEMA, FBI, OSD Command Control Communications and Intelligence, OSD Strategy and Threat Reduction. To date, no agency wants their comments include in the record. HHS and NDPO still owe us final agreement.

The chairman then led an open discussion which itemized continued concerns that the report not completely discredit the possibility of a higher consequence event, but recommend a rebalancing of the emphasis on the higher consequence event and the more likely lower consequence event. Vice Chair Clapper offered a specific rewrite for two paragraphs, which were adopted after some discussion and modifications. Each conclusion in the executive summary was then reviewed and some changes in emphasis and specific wording made. Alternate concluding paragraphs for the executive summary were discussed and rejected. The concluding paragraph of the draft executive summary was deleted without replacement. A proposal by Dr. Shine to add two more conclusions in the executive summary was withdrawn after some discussion.

VI. Public Comment Period.

Shawnda Westly, representing the California Professional Firefighters, provided the panel with a written presentation stressing the need for firefighter input, the need for firefighter specific training, and offering that the IAFF has developed a curriculum which is focused on the firefighter response to WMD incidents.

VII. Panel Activities for FY2000

Mr. Wermuth presented an outline of the work planned for FY 2000. The first phase of the proposed work includes a survey of a statistically relevant number of responders in various jurisdictions. Some discussion took place on the need to obtain information through surveys, the challenges of obtaining a significant number of responses. The RAND team was directed to find out what survey information might be already collected and make use of that information in the research. Interviews of selected local, state and federal officials were discussed as the second part of the research. Panel members were asked to make themselves available to assist in conducting interviews with officials in their respective functional areas. Case studies a were discussed and approved as an effective method of gathering information. Panel members suggested that RAND examine After Action reports and other written material as part of their case studies.

VIII. Communications Strategy for the Annual Report

Wermuth: To what extent do we want to distribute the annual report. Specific copies are required to be distributed and the normal procedure is to post the report on the world wide web. What does the panel want to do?

Embrey: The report has been reviewed within DOD and is approved for public release.

A discussion followed on holding a press briefing. The panel concluded a press package and a press briefing would be appropriate. The press briefing was tentatively scheduled for Friday, 17 December in Washington DC.

IX. Administrative Matters.

Wermuth: Panel member Ron Neubauer has not participated in any of the activities of the panel to date. He has been the President of the IACP, and has been too busy. I point this out for the panel's consideration.

Chairman: Approach Mr. Neubauer and ask him if he might suggest a replacement who could represent the police view on our panel.

Wermuth: I suggest consideration by the panel that every other meeting be a working meeting like this one. We can also tie the alternate meetings to events or exercises that the panel feels it should attend. Shall we set meeting dates?

Chairman. I cannot commit to a March meeting date at this time. The legislature will be in session most of that month. I will look at my schedule and get back with everyone.

The decision on the next meeting date was deferred.

A motion to adopt the annual report as amended during this meeting was proposed and seconded. Motion passed by voice vote.

A motion to adopt the minutes of the September meeting was made and seconded. Motion passed by voice vote.

The meeting adjourned at 1720.