Gilmore Commission - Minutes

Panel to Assess the Capabilities for Domestic Response to Terrorist Acts Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction

Washington, D.C.
Wednesday, June 9, 1999

Present:
The Honorable James Gilmore, Governor
LTG James Clapper
Raymond Downey
George Foresman
MG William Garrison
Ellen Gordon
James Greenleaf
Bill Jenaway
Paul Maniscalco
Kathleen O'Brien
M. Patricia Quinlisk
Patrick Ralston
Donald Rumsfeld
Kenneth Shine
Ellen Embrey/COL Janet Drew
Bruce Hoffman
Jennifer Brower

I. Welcome by Governor James Gilmore

This is a great service to U.S., everyone thinks it's critical. As we prepare for the new millennium we need to be prepared for the ever increasing likelihood of this type of attack. Preparation must cut across all areas of government. This is a complex problem which demands vision from everyone here.

Significant efforts have been made in this area, we need now to evaluate if we are ready. This is an opportunity to create a strategic direction for the country on this issue.

Our Tasks:

1. To accurately frame the threat.
   
2. To evaluate effective levels of preparedness that are necessary.
   
3. To examine current abilities.
   
4. To make recommendations for response preparedness.

Our ultimate goal is to make the U.S. safer.

II. Housekeeping Issues

Hoffman: The panel members are seated along the sides of the table. Along the wall are briefers and staffers. At the head of the table is the panel chairman, Governor Gilmore; the DoD representative, Ms. Ellen Embrey; George Foresman, a non-voting panel member; Jennifer Brower and myself, the RAND research staff. Jeffrey Isaacson of RAND is also present. (Roger Brown arrived later in the morning.)

The Analytical Task Plan:

1. Review the threat.
   
2. Look at response.
   
3. Consequence Management and Recovery

We have begun work on Tasks 1 and 2, Task 3 will begin shortly. This year we will finish Task 1.

Approval of Minutes
Comments/Corrections

Quinlisk: The reference in minutes to "cultural" terrorism should be changed to "agricultural" terrorism.

Shine: Motion to adopt with change.

Approval unanimous.

Rules of Order

Gordon: Will votes be put to the majority of the panel or only majority of those in attendance?

Jenaway: We only have 13 present today.

Hoffman: 4 members were not able to attend, we will eventually have 18 panel members. One more appointment is to be confirmed.

O'Brien: Can members attend by teleconference?

Hoffman: Yes.

Gilmore: 12 will be a quorum.

Hoffman: If we use a simple majority, who will be the tie-breaker?

GROUP: The chairman.

Gilmore: We should record a tie vote in the record.

Rumsfeld: I am uncomfortable with talk of voting and minority views. We should be able to come to an agreement. If we don't, it may be a legitimate, different direction and both should be noted.

Gilmore: Agree that we should reach consensus where we can.

Quinlisk: We would want opposing view noted.

Clapper: I agree. Generally my experience has been that consensus is reached. The likelihood for contention is not great, but there should probably be a mechanism in place in case.

Ralston: If minority opinion says "I want this on the record" then it should be recorded.

Hoffman: A simple majority would be preferable to 2/3 vote.

GROUP: All agree - motion adopted.

Appointment of Vice-Chair:

Hoffman: Motion to appoint a vice chair adopted.

Gilmore: It would be nice to have someone stand in when I cannot attend Panel meetings. I would suggest General Clapper.

Clapper: I would agree to do it, and I am here locally.

Gilmore: We will take this up as a vote at the end of the day.

Future Meetings:

Hoffman: The calendar provided shows days that are clear on the Governor's schedule. Should the next meeting be a two-day meeting?

Gilmore: Where will we hold the meeting?

Hoffman: That will be based on the type of information presented, if there is classified information it will have to be at a RAND facility, either here in Washington or in Santa Monica, California.

September Meeting

Quinlisk/Rumsfeld: Can't do either day.

Jenaway: Can't do the 24th.

Quinlisk: On September 23rd there is a nationwide effort on Biothreat.

Gilmore: What about the 22nd?

Hoffman: Meeting will be held on September 22nd here at RAND's Washington office, from 9:30 until 5:30 p.m. Breakfast begins at 9:00 am.

December Meeting:

GROUP: Do "Day After" simulation at RAND's Santa Monica office on morning of 12/13 and business meeting in the afternoon. Then use 12/14 in the morning for the rest of the meeting so that Panel members can catch afternoon flights back to the East Coast.

March Meeting

Maniscalco: It's difficult to identify the place without knowing whether we will need to hear or discuss classified material.

Gilmore: We could designate a time and date and leave the place open.

Comments on the Analytic Support Plan

Hoffman: We should look at this as a living document. We need it to begin work, but we can add and adapt it as we proceed.

Items to Return to at Close of Meeting:

1. Adoption of Rules of Order
   
2. Selection of Vice Chair
   
3. Whether or not to do simulation exercise
   
4. Calendar for March 2000 forward

III. RAND Work to Date

Brower reviewed work-to-date on analytical task plan.

Status of panel-directed tasks to summarize key documents (see hand-outs of overheads distributed at meeting)

Discussion with key institutions and/or individuals

Conferences attended by RAND staff

Task Analytical Work

Task 1

Comparative analysis of federal agencies
Identification of terrorist motivations
Examination of terrorist capabilities

Task 2

Key country response (e.g., Israel and France)
Identification of nation-wide standards for training and preparedness by state and local responders

Administration and Logistical Support

1. security clearances
   
2. meetings
   
3. web-site
   
4. response and comments

Group requested and were provided with copies of vugraphs.

Hoffman: The GAO is doing a lot of work in this area as well. We are in contact with several of their staff who are involved in similar efforts.

IV. Peter Wilson (RAND) - "Day-After" Simulation

This methodology was developed 8 years ago, originally for the Air Force. It can be used to explore new/future problems.

Elements of exercise:

1. Stimulate thinking and discussion of new or emerging threats (e.g. WMD terrorism in the U.S.)
2. Think about issues in a proactive sense
3. Feedback process
   
   • Place participants in a future history simulation and then work backwards to analyze options, choices, and decisionmaking processes.
     
   • Have participants draft decision memos in a short period of time
     
   • In third step, identify problems and issues raised in steps one and two.
4. Future history
   • Fiscal and economic factors
     
   • Technical developments
     
   • Geo/physical developments

Structure (takes 3-5 hours):

1. Start in future with read-aheads
2. Step 1 - work on an option paper (~1 hour)
3. Step 2 - Get the "very bad news", and prepare second decision memo.
4. Step 3 - Strategize policy investments, operations, R&D needed to address illuminated problems

1. Counter NBC exercises
2. Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP), "Day After in Cyberspace"
3. Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (examine implications of technology on money laundering/financial crime)
4. Strategic Resource Exercise
5. Y2K

Benefits:

1. High level policy exercises, stimulus for working and thinking about problems
2. Takes only three to five hours
3. An efficient way to explore a variety of scenarios
4. Allows you to explore a future crisis with individuals from different groups
5. Provides early insight as to possible clusters of response

Questions:

Gordon: How will the exercise benefit us as we work towards the four tasks at hand?

Brower: Everyone is coming from a different perspective. It will get panel members talking to each other. It will help to demonstrate how parts of the U.S. government work together, learn from each other, helps to flush out different options and get a sense of what panel members can contribute to Task 2.

Wilson: We would go through a series of test exercises, we would develop well-tested scenarios before presenting them to the group (perhaps using panel members' own staff for testing).

Clapper: This would be an internal exercise for this panel. It would be a useful vehicle for federal/state/local groups. May want to orchestrate the same thing at these levels and use it as an outreach tool.

Gilmore: I propose that we think this through and revisit at the end of day.

V. Security Issues

Brower:

Definition of secret information:

1. any information that impacts the security of the U.S.
   
2. information that is derived from sensitive sources

To have access/be made aware of this information you need:

1. proper level of clearance
   
2. need to know
   
3. have signed appropriate forms

Reporting requirements:

1. report attempts by any unauthorized individual to collect information
   
2. report loss or compromise of information

Your responsibility:

1. contact RAND security before removing any written materials from premises
   
2. can speak over telephone only on secured lines when discussing classified material
   

VI. Briefings

(1) Dr. Christopher Davis (InSight International) - "The Threat of State-Sponsored Biological Terrorism" (unclassified)

This is a briefing that should have been given 10 to 20 years ago. Previously we worked in an atmosphere where very little of this would have been believed. Many did not believe that this would be a threat to the U.S.

There existed a climate of "nuclear blindness", that is, with the rise of inter-continental missiles and US unilateral disarmament, our focus was on nuclear and biological threats.

What are biological weapons? They are weapons that employ micro-organisms to kill or incapacitate people, animals, or crops. They can be clandestine or an overt attack. Key advantages of biological weapons include multiple delivery systems and wide utility.

The U.S. Program with Biological Weapons

American trials with pathogens began in 1942/43 in the Gruinard Islands.

[Shows diagram for particles and downward spread.]

Even many individuals within the U.S. don't understand how great the U.S. capability was. In 1969 when President Nixon unilaterally disarmed, the program was not abandoned because it was a failure.

[Shows a variety of diagrams of weapons - both liquid and dry-filled.]

The former Soviet Union believed that the U.S. bio weapons program could come back on line within three months, but this was not true. Russians when they visited the U.S. more recently were amazed to see a test-sphere for bio weapons (which is now a national monument) outside of a building.

The Former Soviet Union/Russian Biological Weapons Program:

The FSU did not believe that the U.S. had disposed of its bio weapons program. They saw the advances in technology in chemical areas, biotech and pharmaceuticals and perceived them as opportunities for weapons development. Rather than taking an interest in biotech and pharmaceuticals they put their emphasis on BW. They built this program rather than biotech/pharmaceuticals. The civilian component of the bio weapons program ran parallel to the military program with over 70,000 chemists, biologists, etc. They began a program in 1973-74 in the biomedical area.

Key features of this program:

1. Civilian facilities "Biopreparat"
   
2. Military facilities
   
3. Most secret classification--above nuclear
   
4. Vast scope, comprehensive
   
5. Highest political backing (though in the 1980-90s no one will listen/believe this)
   
6. Huge financing (billions of rubles, 80-100K people)
   
7. Military control
   
8. Large agent production (tons of small pox)
   
9. Mobilization plans

All types of buildings were used. In 1980-90s they built facilities that they claimed could not be involved in BW because of the type of building or where they were located (in urban areas, etc.).

In 1989 an important scientist (Poshesnick?) left the former Soviet program at Institute for Biological Preparation. This was a breakthrough, people had to start listening to what we had to say.

Key Aims of Russian Program

1. Overall goal - to reduce the size needed to get desired effect.
2. Reduce coagulation of materials when stored.
3. Wanted to improve:
   
   1. Industrial production scale-up techniques
   2. Production rates
   3. Yield of micro-organisms
   4. Virulence
   5. Resistance to antibiotics
   6. Wanted to maximize viability during dissemination

Soviet Bioagents Conception of Use (DIDN'T GET ALL OF THIS CHART)

Key Development Goals

Development of:

1. Dry solid particulate (which is more stable)
2. Miniaturization of production facilities
3. Mobile production and filling facilities
4. Multiple resistant strains
5. Cruise missile dissemination system
6. Combination organisms (e.g. plague plasmids in E. Coli)

The story continues to be bad:

1. Yeltsin's statement in 1992 on abandoning capability indicated the development of new, more dangerous weapons.
2. Development of ethnic weapons/sleeper weapons.
3. What happened to the plans for agents--Should have withdrawn and destroyed them. Some are kept in vaults and available if needed to start over. Personnel involved are still in power.
4. What about military facilities? They have become more covert since official dissolution of the program.
5. Personnel paid by other states (e.g. Iran).
6. Attacks on flora and fauna? Economic warfare--a large part of the scientists were involved in this.
7. Bioregulator programs? Molecules to influence human organisms.
8. What about bio weapons deployed in/from space? Mostly rumors.

Iraqi Program:

1974 - Earliest known date of establishment
1984 - Fundamental research group Al-Muthana
1987 - Transfer/expansion - fungal and anti-plant
1988 - Industrial scale - BTX, Anthrax

Agents:

Delivery System:

R400 Bombs - Anthrax, Aflatoxin

Although capabilities may be somewhat destroyed, you still see the same people continuing work, the capabilities still exist in both Iraq and Russia.

Questions:

Rumsfeld: What about underground facilities?

Davis: Some facilities are half above, half below. There are rumors of completely underground facilities. Very few have actually been visited, we have only scratched the surface. The greatest danger is that the problem remains. Russians have never given a full and frank disclosure of everything since 1946.

Clapper: Is there a parallel defensive program?

Davis: Yes, like what the U.S. is now putting in place. Reserve antibiotics (Soviet era). The biggest difficulty is finding out what has happened since 1992. They didn't give all information away because they felt they might need it some day. The Russians have a different approach to life, we need to think about what drives the country.

Shine: (1) What other countries should we look at? (2) What has been the significance of this information for the UK, what principals have underlied their response measures?

Davis: (1) Rumors about other Middle Eastern countries, seepage from the USSR, former Soviet states. There is too much shifting ground to be specific.

(2) You need political will and follow-up with money. In the UK it is difficult to get money to get things done. But we do have the National Health System. The origins of this was that it was first built to counter potential weapons, then it evolved into the Nation Health System.

Foresman: We've talked about traditional mechanisms for delivery of these microbes, what else is being developed outside of the military?

Davis: You can make a point without a lot of hardware for delivery. Aerosol generation capability exists, with this you can get as much effect as if you were to land a missile.

Gilmore: Can anyone (enemy) think that this kind of attack would not spread to rest of the world?

Davis: It does take time to spread. This gives time for the rest of the world to respond. "Blow-back" did occur in WWII. In these cases you have delay time.

Gilmore: But what about air/sea travel, the enemy can't control that.

Davis: You have to define the climate, define the posture that the afflicted group is in.

Embrey: Do we know the status of the materials previously produced (e.g., small pox, plague)?

Davis: Since 1992 it is possible that a vast majority has been destroyed. But we don't know for sure how much and we don't know what they started with and where all the sources are.

Davis: Closing Thought: It's the unknown that I worry about and the misleading feeling that the problem has gone away.

(2) Larry K. Gershwin (CIA)--"Threat Posed to the U.S. by International Terrorism Using Chemical and Biological Weapons"

See classified notes in library.

(3) Commander John Weidner (DoE)--"Nuclear Terrorism: The Threat from Explosives Employing Fissile and Non-Fissile Materials"

See classified notes in library.

(4) Elizabeth Q. Ten Eyck (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission)--"Nuclear Terrorism: The Threat from Radioactive Release and Attacks on Commercial Power Plants"

See classified notes in library.

(5) Lisa E. Gordon-Hagerty (National Security Council)--"Terrorism and WMD: The Threat to the U.S. and the National Policy in Response"

See classified notes in library.

VII. Housekeeping Issues

Issues to finalize:

Adoption of Rules of Order:

- Will use Roberts Rules of Order as back-up. Adopted by panel.

Appointment of Vice Chair:

- General Clapper as vice chair. Agreed upon without objection.

Simulation Exercise

Agreed upon. All in favor.

Confirmation of Calendar:

September 22, 1999: RAND DC. 9:30 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. Breakfast at 9:00 a.m.

December 13-14, 1999: RAND Santa Monica. Monday 9:30a.m. to 5:30p.m. Tuesday session ends at 12:00 p.m. Breakfast at 9:00a.m. both days.

March 20, 2000 - Location will be based on material. 9:30 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. Breakfast at 9:00 a.m.

For future months, the draft calendar presented to the panel will be used as tentative target dates so members can try and leave those weeks open. Beginning or end of week is easier to get away (Sunday evening arrivals).

Stakeholders

Brower asked Panel to please add to the list of stakeholders and return information to RAND.

Next Meeting

Panel would like to hear from:

NDPO
FBI
USDA

Should also check on
ATF (will hear from them at later date)
Congress--committee that mandated this panel
Dahlgren - Special technology office. Assesses vulnerability in the U.S.
HHS--OEP coordinates HHS Activities.

There were no requests for public comment.

Following off-the-record discussions among Panel members, Governor Gilmore closed the meeting.

NOTE: Member privately requested to me that it would be helpful for panel members to have a list of each others' names and mailing addresses.