Terrorism Panel
Panel to Assess the Capabilities for Domestic Response
to Terrorist Acts Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction
Monday, August 26, 2001, Arlington, VA
Present:
The Honorable James Gilmore, Chairman
James Clapper, Vice-Chairman
James Greenleaf
Jack Marsh
Kenneth Shine
George Foresman
Kathleen O'Brien
William Reno
Patrick Ralston
Patricia Quinlisk
Ellen Gordan
Dallas Jones
Paul Maniscalco
Raymond Downey
Joseph Samuels
Hubert Williams
Also present:
Ellen Embrey
Mike Wermuth
Members Absent:
William Garrison
L. Paul Bremer
Bill Jenaway
I. Opening Remarks by Governor James Gilmore (Chairman):
Chairman. Opening Remarks. A little over two years ago we began this process of evaluating federal, state and local preparedness for weapons of mass destruction terrorism. We have produced timely and accurate and relevant recommendations that make sense from public policy and practical standpoints. To the credit of the panel and RAND support we have now gone one more step and created a survey to reach even better conclusions. I want to highlight three key survey findings: 1) the survey response rate was 65%, 2) survey results were consistent with panel's findings, and 3) the survey supports our contention that it is not just about WMD or terrorism: guns, bombs, or computers can be considered weapons of mass destruction. There is nothing in the news that indicates that the world is a safer place today. I want to acknowledge the Vice-Chairman; this is his last meeting. He has been tapped to be the head of NIMA. We are all appreciative of your tireless dedication.
Vice Chairman. Thank you very much. To watch all these members come together and publish deep and analytical reports has been a great experience.
Jones. I'm a little disheartened by the lack of urgency on coordination. Whatever we can do in our testimony, we should bring attention to that crucial element.
Chairman. True. Look at all of these reports: we still are not looking at the fire departments, hospitals, or public health.
Shine. I know tomorrow, you are going to be talking about the final report. Are we going to have a chapter that takes some of these big-picture issues and focus on those?
Wermuth. Absolutely. If you look at the Second Report, we are following that structure.
Shine. Using that as evidence for the overarching themes, the big difference is that we have indepth analysis to emphasize the big issues.
Reno. Almost every major public figure says, "not if but when" and I think we need in our final report is to audit our own recommendations so that if you are chairing the recommendations after a big incident, you can say, "if this had been done then it would not have happened this way."
II . Introduction of Guests
III. Health and Medical Sub-Panel Presentation and Discussion
Shine. This report represents the deliberations of the sub-panel on health and medical issues. In putting this chapter together, we were guided by three principals: 1) coordinating: communications, training, exercises, 2) building on existing programs, and 3) parsimony.
In giving the background we recognized that there has been some improvement in coordination, but these have not included the non-emergency part of the health system. We also want to get across to the reader that while explosions are acute, we are also looking at stuttering events in chemical and biological events. In Australia, scientists have developed a potential strong mouse pox threat. Also there is another development of small pox, with a new antigen that we do not have a vaccine for. This poses an interesting policy dilemma. Can the military develop a vaccine to mouse pox, if they cannot produce the disease?
We are also worried about hospital capacity and intelligence to inform the public health community. The AMA has made a series of proposals and we think those should be encouraged. But we also want to emphasize building on current education programs so that the people find the issues of bio-terrorism in conjunction with what they are doing.
We felt that the laboratory response network of CDC was a good program that needs to be implemented with adequate resources. We believe that in conjunction with the DHHS, there also needs to be all-hazards response model and exercise templates.
We recommended an increase in resources for exercises with public and private health facilities. No matter how hard you plan, you will not know that it works unless you exercise it. We do not believe that local entities will fund these exercises, moreover the evaluation of such exercises is important and tying it to federal funds indicates this.
We also recommended the establishment of a government-owned, contractor-operated national facility for vaccines. This also includes difficulties of access to vaccines, with both indicating where they are, how to get to them and the appropriate triage methods. The National Office can develop a plan. In some instances it will be driven by military concerns, but sometimes by private requirements. We are not talking about a huge amount of funds, but a prioritization.
We do not know what hospital beds are available in both public and private capacity. We think that there is room for a national survey to determine this type of information, conducted by HHS.
Finally, public education is important, not just the public health community but the public in general. This issue requires a great deal of thought. In many issues it is not a reality of an attack but a rumor of an attack or a minor event blown up into a major even with negative responses to everyone.
Williams. I was wondering if you have explicit recommendations on the legal side. Particularly on the private hospitals and them giving out information on the availability of hospital beds?
Shine. We approached it a bit differently. We thought that in the survey, one would have to address legal issues, but we did not address them explicitly. But we would be willing to do that.
Williams. Well, we definitely need a mechanism to look at the legal issues.
Chairman. We could offer the requirements and then this gives justification for legislative requirements.
Marsh. It would seem to me that in the reports you can cite an example as to why we need quarantine. Basically quarantine is within the governor of the state, but if there is an inter-state issue it is under ATW. If you could show an example of how that would be a problem and then lay out the issues. Also the Secretary of the Army handles identification (JVACP) and if you can't get identification before you can get a vaccine. It is a very major problem and we need to give some examples why.
Reno. I like the government-owned, contractor-operated is a good recommendation. I think it should be highlighted; otherwise it will be talked about, but not acted upon.
Marsh. Is there some reference to the West Nile?
Shine. What is happening is that it is diffusing up and down the coast. The number of effected humans has been small. Of course, there is interest in developing a vaccine. But what about just killing mosquitoes? You do not want to remove support from mosquito-abatement programs.
Quinlisk. It is more of an attitude problem than anything else. We are trying to say that hospitals should not have to get involved in bio-terrorism, but biological disasters like a flu-epidemic or a chemical spill or food poisoning. Exercises are exactly the way to change how people think about it.
Maniscalco. If we try to sell this, the bonus is that we can get great utility out of it. We can also use the plans for non-terrorism incidents.
Embrey. In the health community there is not standard existing system for delivering healthcare. If the Panel's recommendation is to build on existing systems, then the case study should show the different levels of "the system" and how terrorism applies.
Jones. In several areas it seems like the report is primarily thinking about bio-terrorism. But it feels like it is being stove-piped, these plans need to be incorporated into existing plans. When we do not integrate plans top to bottom, you make mistakes. If we fail to stress the need to exercise multi-facility and multi-jurisdiction operations, you are also going to make mistakes. That is what is not being done. It is a terribly different dynamic.
Samuels. I want to suggest that we add a section on evaluation. How will we know what the effort has been? I'm not talking about a performance measurements, but at least overall criteria. That may also create a sense of urgency.
Quinlisk. I just do not want to forget the agricultural piece.
Wermuth. I think there have been a number of developments - HHS and Agriculture - we can try to put a hook and tie it back in.
O'Brien. I think the recommendations here are good about bringing in the health and medical community into the other emergency community. We are still talking around accountability and responsibility. I do not know think it should be in this chapter, but in the Governor's letter or the Executive Summary. Accountability needs to be part of the big system.
IV. Border Security Sub-Panel Presentation and Discussion
Vice Chairman. If you have the draft in front of you, the way it is laid out is that it is a description of the problem and then our recommendations. It includes a number of statistics that illustrate the magnitude of the challenge. As I commented earlier, a lot depends on the development of a national office.
We endorse the concept of a central database for each entity to input and have the advantage of the results. Along the lines of the concept, beyond maritime domain awareness, this chapter also addresses border awareness.
We want to provide incentives to transport agents to share information to the border security entities, bearing in mind that most traffic is legitimate. In this context, of course, there is no such thing as 100% guaranteed security.
Greenleaf. I looked at the Coast Guard presentation and was struck by the fact that the Coast Guard expanded, while the budget has gone down. The Coast Guard really does need help financially. It is unfair for us to give them more responsibility with limited resources.
Reno. Does anyone know if our National Security Strategy addresses trafficking and those types of issues?
Wermuth. If I understand your question, the issue of terrorist devices has not been addressed in the National Strategy or National Military Strategy in depth. But it was mentioned only in passing.
Williams. You mention that only about 3% of the trucks are given a comprehensive search. I was wondering whether or not you had thought of increasing the number of inspections. What would be an adequate percentage? If you cannot stop them all, then it is important to say that it is impossible to stop them all.
Vice Chairman. There is an existing methodology for focusing on potential suspects.
Williams. I like the investment in intelligence.
Greenleaf. That 3% is driven by intelligence.
Embrey. What authority do the various entities have to detain suspicious vehicles or to share information? What about airports?
Wermuth. Part of the response is "it depends." If illegal things are entering the country and it is non-drug related it is a U.S. Customs issue. And the understanding level is why we need the joint information-sharing structure.
Vice Chairman. If it is an international port, the public health community is involved.
Quinlisk. The problem with airports is that ill people make it through the system. With people with meningitis, sometimes it goes through to the hospital.
Maniscalco. Tracking is also a problem.
V. Use of the Military Sub-Panel Presentation and Discussion
Wermuth. Please note the comments from Ambassador Bremer behind the draft chapter.
Reno. If you look at our discussion we have the view on the one hand that the military brings a strong command and control structure to any emergency and crisis. On the flip side, our society is founded on an understanding that the military is not supposed to be intrusive.
So we start with recognition of what we have stated before: that the DoD NEVER be a lead federal agency. Then we describe a list of principles to guide the use of the military. It is important that we recognize that military training is not necessarily complementary to the mission that they may have to do for response to domestic WMD terrorism.
All terrorism is, of course, local. We also recognize that as the incident grows and expands, it is going to expand beyond the capability of local responders and even states. Only at that point would we expect as a matter or principle for the military to be called in. If we expect the military to provide that decisive edge, then they must also have plans and train to fall in and support the civilian leadership.
Jerry Bremer suggested that we take the legal authorities section out. But we lay this out because we want the Secretary of Defense to publish a compendium of authorities. We believe it is important that there be an educational effort so that all agencies can understand the legislative authorities.
We also highlight that DoD coordinates with the DoJ, but not state and local leadership. When you look at the FEMA regions and the natural work that FEMA does, we might be able to enhance the coordination of the military by positioning liaison officers in the regions. We want to create a coordination mechanism for training, exercises, and plans.
Finally, we made the general recommendation that no matter how good plans are that if the training and exercises are not evaluated you do not have a high-performing operation.
Gordan. I have some concerns about us being too supportive of the Secretary of Defense directing missions of the National Guard. I do not want us to take away the Governor's responsibility. I do not want to take away work-time for terrorism missions.
Chairman. How would you feel if on page three - Secretary of Defense publishing the compendium - why not have the Attorney General rather than the Secretary of Defense?
General Consensus
Foresman. We also discussed input from State and local authorities in that process as well.
Chairman. Should we do that through the attorney generals of the states or the Governors?
Chairman. I am trying to see if there is a difference between the National Guard detailed for WMD consequences and a fire?
Reno. Perhaps rather than mission areasÖ it is mission capabilities. This may be more palatable.
Chairman. For consequences it is not worrisome. But if you are going to be shooting at somebody it is much more serious. I think that there would be enough police and FBI agents to deal with that. I just do not want to designate the Guard to move out with rifles and shoot at people.
Samuels. As a police chief, I have a lot of men and women who are part of the Reserve unit and then develop and enhance their skills. But these skills are not relevant to their role as a police officer. But if they are going to Reserve training, it could be in emergency management and training for terrorism. So when they get back to their jurisdiction, I have a point person that I can go to. That may be a possibility.
Embrey. I think I understand what the Use of the Military Sub-Panel wants to address, but it is not going about it in the right way. How prepared and organized are we to respond within the U.S.? Second, how do we train them on the authorities that exist and how is that different to what is out there, given a large incident? How do we communicate to the communities about our capabilities to plan and exercise appropriately?
Vice Chairman. I would argue for a more provocative approach. I think the notion of having a single element in DoD to oversee the whole range of issues makes sense. That is not to say that there are not sensitivities to the fact. I still vote for a much more prominent role of the National Guard.
I would also vote for a shortened version of the legal authorities. I would add that the compendium should be written in layman's terms so state and locals can understand it.
Maniscalco. The mutual assurance compacts is an issue that you may be harming when you try to redistribute assets.
Chairman. What we are really talking about is that the military is not coming in behind the civilians until they are overwhelmed. The civilian group on the ground will then bow to the point that they are overwhelmed and we need to add more forces into the situation.
Jones. We have the largest Guard in the U.S and we use them every year. We use multi-agency coordination. It is never going to happen that the military comes in and takes control. Look at it, an atom bomb in San Francisco: the Governor is still going to be the Governor.
Shine. Do state authorities have to ask for help? Or does the military decide to come in to help?
Downey. The President has the authority to implement the federal response.
Wermuth. This is why we spent a little bit more time on the legal authorities.
Shine. My only point is that this is very confusing. Could you create a chart or a table for how it works? What are the various options?
Chairman. We are now getting down to the nub and we are envisioning the actual response. There is nothing wrong with having the locals in charge and the ability to swing into play the Guard and the Reserve. I have always been haunted that if the balloon goes up the President is going to call in the 82nd Airborne. I think we need to reorder this chapter. Maybe civilian control should not be at the front - National Guard, training, authorities, and conclude with the principal point.
Reno. Are you still going to have two coordinating officers side-to-side or is there going to be one lead?
Foresman. The Governor and the President do not have to designate the emergency managers that we are speaking about. Irrespective of command and control, you are still looking at a civilian level of response.
Reno. Who is in charge?
Chairman. Both. They are both still in charge.
Foresman. In a terrorist event, if the two officers cannot come to agreement then the Governor and President discuss it. The last person in the line is the President for terrorism. Ideally, the Governor and the President should not get to that point.
Jones. We do have some bad responses that tend to topple governments. Earthquakes are a good example. Time and time again these countries come and study our system. It's the criminal element that confuses the issues. We do have some things to look at. What we do need is how best to utilize the military and their role.
Chairman. I want to bring in the comments by Jerry Bremer. He talks about reordering the paragraph as we discussed and I think that many of his points are valid, at least from 6 on.
Wermuth. Actually, 6-10 comments have been reflected in our latest draft.
Adjourn until Tomorrow