Gilmore Commission - Minutes

Panel to Assess the Capabilities for Domestic Response
to Terrorist Acts Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction

Arlington, Virginia
30 September 2002

Present
James Gilmore, Chairman
Paul Maniscalco
Pat Ralston
Jerry Bremer
James Greenleaf
William Reno
Jack Marsh
Ken Shine
George Foresman
John Hathaway
John Lombardi
Mike Wermuth
Jennifer Brower
(On phone: Dallas Jones)

I. Opening Remarks

Chairman. Good morning, we are ready for our Sept 30th meeting. Welcome. I would like to express appreciation to the DOD for this meeting room, everyone has been extremely accommodating.

When we met last, we covered 8-10 topics. Had there been little debate we could have gotten through them but there was debate and hence this meeting today. The areas where we were spending time were, strategy and structure, the creation of a new agency and the use of the military. Today we are going to try to discuss some of these issues.

Wermuth: We will go through the strategy and structure discussion. After lunch we will switch over to dealing with the role of the military. We have two representatives to talk about OSD and the NORTHCOM process this afternoon.

You have an outline of the structure of 4th report and the strategy and structure sub panel paper with revisions from last time, as well as detail on national strategy for OHS. There is a point paper from the use of military sub panel. Additional material about where Congress seems to be heading in this area and House and Senate bills as they currently stand are also in the packet.

The Strategy and Structure papers we have are revisions from last time.

II. Strategy and Structure Discussion

Bremer: I think we have been successful in determining a NEW threat to US. What is new is that we are at war and that has to play a role in what we discuss today. We need to recognize that we are at war. We have stressed that a good policy is good intelligence and if you want to prevent attacks, then intelligence is vital, We have addressed two, insemination across the federal structure which is going well and collection and analysis, which needs more work. What is new is that we have terrorists living among us, which was not clear when we started 3 years ago. It puts pressure on analysis and collection issues. As we address the threat, the current structure of our government is inadequate, in particular the issue of how you fuse together people who are doing terrorism work and have ability to collect intelligence. After the next attack, the pressures to go too far are significant. We thought it was important to separate collection from analysis to ensure that there is not an overreaction after the next attack.

In the first three pages you have concrete recommendations on a fusion center. We have suggested adding an analysis center to this fusion center. NCTC should have civil liberties, and protections that are already there so that intelligence can be focused on this fusion center. I think they are well laid out in this paper. We see a new threat that has to be dealt with in a new way.

Chairman: I don't think there was any debate about the fusion.
I will read what we are talking about…
[STRUCTURE AND STRATEGY SUBPANEL PAGE 2-3]

Foresman: We need a discussion about whether the FBI had been misled on FISA. But it still doesn't address validity; it would move it out of the current justice department.

Brower: What is the significance of not having the wiretap capability?

Spaulding: It is purely law enforcement authority. FISA will give them electronic surveillance capability for only foreign ties.

Chairman: The real question here is about if people are members of foreign military units or not. How do you treat people as military combatants in the US? The last example of something like this is during the Civil War.

Reno: The circumstances the US faces are different than ever before, there is no invading army but an invading enemies. Some of them are even citizens of the US. But if you believe what we have read, they are also enemies of the US. They are not in uniforms but their outcomes will be the same as an enemy. If you believe that the conditions are different, that there are enemies inside the US that are behaving as formal adversaries, then the US should pursue different polices than when this didn't exist.

Marsh: The issue is who will head it and how they are picked is important. Some leadership is defined by rotation. We should make recommendations that this person could be someone who has a background in civil rights and liberties. They should be appointed by the President and approved by Congress.

Chairman: How can you determine this?

Marsh: Here is a person who must have experience in judiciary. Something like that.

Bremer: It is important to separate two different things. There is nothing in this paper that changes the criminal justice system, there is no change of the application of the law, whether they are terrorists or other. The FBI as a law enforcement agency, is simply not capable of doing the collection and analysis. It is still the organization which has the primary enforcement of the law but we should set up something that would work beside it to do collection and analysis. Not a question of changing the law.

Shine: If you think back to communist scares plus WWII, many people including the FBI were arguing that communists were just as dangerous as the kinds of people we are worried about today….I am not convinced that this is new. I am thinking about the kind of civil liberties breeches of that era.

In the beginning of the statement, the center would be able to draw information from the CIA, FBI and the CIS. Is this the intent? Will it look at intelligence from the CIA? (yes) Where is that it indicated?

Spaulding: It is referring to collection of raw intelligence, as opposed to receiving information from overseas from the CIA.

Shine: What makes us believe that this entity would have access to this kind of analysis?

Bremer: If you have this kind of entity, you have a better chance of having this happen. Agencies will be required to share intelligence. That is all you can do, it is the President firing people if they don't do it. Its just leadership You can't guarantee that they will cooperate.

Shine: If you are an FBI agent investigating something and you come across important information, you have to recognize that. You have to have some way to get information from here to there. Is there any way to organize this kind of center to have a regular and efficient way to get information from one place to another?

Wermuth: There are steering committees and staff to deal with this.

Spaulding: The recommendation is not to create another analytical center, it's to take people from existing centers and put them into a new analytical agency. They have to have their intelligence analyzed so this would be the only way to do it. Identifying the information that goes there is done at the CIA by reports officers. And the FBI should have this, people who determine who should have the information if found.

Bremer: We transfer analytical capabilities from each agency to this new one. The problem would be that the CIA or FBI could create new analysis capability that they would hide from the President.

Dallas: If you create a distance you also fuse information from all the other agencies. This way the info from the CIA and military intelligence would all be brought together.

Chairman: We are not talking about ALL information going to this center? Just the counter terrorism part, correct?

Ralston: Yes, this way the information will be interchanged within this group.

Foresman: We are reacting to Sept. 11 and making sure we are not overreacting. Is there a compelling argument that this should be broader than just terrorism?

Chairman: How do you know what is terrorism and what is not? What is the difference between drug dealers, terrorists and mafia members? What would go into this center?

Greenleaf: I agree with Jerry 99.9% of time. I agree that the bureau lacks the analytical capabilities on terrorism AND organized crime etc. It has been substandard, there is a lack of computer power. But we are running the risk of oversimplifying the issues. We talked about domestic and international terrorism. I don't think there are many organizations in this country that are purely domestic. Even if they appear domestic they may have international loops. I really have a hard time with the issue of collection, not a problem with the fusion center, pulling together the different agencies. In the 50s-70s the FBI had a great domestic intelligence program, which it got from working closely with local and state levels. It got in trouble in the 70s because they thought they had international support but many groups were using religious organizations as a threat to the US government. I don't subscribe to the notion that the bureau cannot collect information effectively, I think the problem is that because of the Attorney General's guidelines that they have pulled back. My concern is that if you set up a separate structure, you have duplication problems with a system that is already in place that does work, it just needs to work better. I hesitate to recommend that a new center needs to be created that would work parallel to the bureau.
I think we would be better off to give FBI agents the green light to be more aggressive instead of creating a new center.

Marsh: We have to keep in mind that we are not writing the law, we are just making recommendations. The senior FBI agent at the scene of the crime is the authority. There were two world trade center bombings, the first were pursued as a crime. The second caused a dilemma; it was an act of terrorism and an act of war. When it is an act of war you change your parameters on the international scene.

Greenleaf: If we think about the end product, to create an organization that the ultimate goal is to neutralize terrorism. At the end of the day if we identify all the people in a way that is not recognized in a court of law, then what do you do with these people? If in the process of neutralizing these people, we will have prevented the attack but do we then treat them as prisoners of war or through the justice system?

Bremer: Just as MI5 can pass information on to Scotland Yard, this agency would pass the information on. We are not saying that as this group collects information and they see an opportunity to move to the criminal track then it couldn't happen. Like every other industrialized nation does.

Bremer: It is not relevant if the person is a US citizen, what is, is whether there is connection to a terrorist organization.

Bremer: There is a whole body of law since FISA was passed in the 70s. There would be no different than now. We have 25 years of documented cases of how to define this.

Shine: There are two parts, the analytical part and the collection part. You can make the argument that the collection part can lead to all sorts of outcomes besides criminal prosecution.

Foresman: The end product is a better capacity for analysis and for fusion and intelligence bits being collected. We are still missing the whole component of state and locals. How would something like this engender the state and local piece of it?

Foresman: We could probably design something with a lot of checks and balances at the federal level but it is harder to put these checks and balances at the local level, not sure we have a mechanism that provides these checks and balances.

Bremer: We could put a sentence in that addresses that. What George is talking about is a fusion itself and he is right. A lot of useful intelligence IS going to come from the local level. There should be some way to get that kind of information.

Reno: When I look at this paper I ask myself whether the panel is committed to the premise that we would support domestic collection by anyone, as a fundamental premise.

Chairman: What is difference between criminal prosecution and collection?

Reno: The role of the court system is to hold the laws of the US, as written in the constitution. It is not designed to deal with the new environment, in my view. An investigation that one collects intelligence for is entirely difference than the psyche of putting all the pieces together that may never go toward prosecutions.

Chairman: When I was a prosecutor, I dealt with a number of specialized investigatory units looking for drugs. They worked in organized way to determine all aspects of drug trafficking. The only thing they were limited by was the law. You can't tap a phone without adhering to certain statutes. This is intelligence gathering. These things will never be used for prosecution but they point the way toward things that could be used in a courtroom. If you violated certain statutes you could never use that information for prosecution, but at least you KNEW what was going on. We are asking for people to go out and how is it different from this? .

Bremer: We need a separate collection information source because the FBI sees all cases in a criminal matter. This requires a change in their organizational culture.

Chairman: I am little unclear about the role of local police authorities. They investigate someone as a terrorist and then what do they do? If we find someone who is a terrorist what do we do with him? What does neutralization include?

Wermuth: Rand has no position on this yet. We are trying to listen and determine our research position in this issue. I think we are talking about scope. In 1990, the intelligence community came to the DEA and asked to see all of their drug cases but couldn't because of grand testimony going on. They asked to see closed cases, within 90 days the analytical people had drawn a diagram of a drug cartel. If in Minneapolis they could have seen that computer, legally, it could have led to information about those hijackers in the US. That first lead would have created a larger scope. Larger scope of activity is where intelligence is most importance of understanding the magnitude that you won't get looking at individuals. It's the building of the entire puzzle of understanding the entire organization.

Chairman: There is more to discuss than just what we have been talking about.

Bremer: Page 3
We need a strategic assessment of threats within the US. We suggest that the President stresses that this new fusion center have a strategic assessment. For threats INSIDE the US.
Page 4
It's in the house bill but not in Senate…give DHS authority to direct intelligence requirements to the Intelligence Community for collection.

Wermuth: The new department responsibly is only for critical infrastructure protection. They will do an assessment of key aspects.

Chairman: It seems identical to the NCTC. Can we just put it is in DHS?

Wermuth: NCTC may develop threat assessment but they don't have everything. They don't have DHS. It won't have that authority.

Maniscalco: Why does NCTC have to be a separate organization?

Wermuth: If it is under DHS it will be seen as DHS and therefore not sensitive to all the requirements of all the other agencies that need its services.

Chairman: I still don't see a distinction between the mission of DHS and mission of this organization because they are identical. I see nothing that they are not.

Wermuth: DHS has no authority over what we were talking about this morning, criminal prosecution. The CIA and FBI will be more willing to work with a freestanding organization than something under DHS.

Wermuth: The national strategy does a great job of laying out who is in charge if there is a threat in infrastructure. DHS is the leader of this, they list secondary leaders. This recommendation puts forth that they should do this for everything, especially for bio-health.

Brower: The problem is that when it is not an act of Presidential Emergency, it isn't as clearly defined by OHS.

Wermuth: The anthrax attacks last year, we didn't ever have a federal response plan, didn't get to all the emergency agencies because there was no declaration of an emergency.

Shine: Communications is a key element. Now if there were an event, head of CEC would be in communication with the country. Then DHS would have to have separate conferences. Operating arms would be in HHS. It just doesn't make sense to me.

Foresman: You can have a lead federal agency for functional area but the overall functional area would be DHS. We might need to put in a recommendation that we are clear that lead federal agencies like DOE, HHS, and EPA, they become the lead federal agency but not the overall in-charge agency.

Shine: This says that DHS is the lead agency.

Brower: We discussed that even with a bio-terrorism event, not everything would be bio-terrorism related.

Maniscalco: That is why the DHS would be involved.

Foresman: The overall federal coordinating agency would be DHS but the lead agency in the event of a bio-terrorism attack would still be the HHS.

Shine: I don't see that in here.

Wermuth: If you see DHS as senior coordinating lead agency. This was intended to make HHS the principal supporting agency.

Foresman: You understand that DHS is always the coordinating agency but there are supporting agencies in each area.

Jones: Last sentence on page 4.. “in charge” They are not in charge of it all, they are in charge in the result of biological event.

Shine: I would be more comfortable with George's ideas.

Bremer: Legal authorities….an old issue. There are some gaps in some areas like quarantine, and vaccination. We recommend that the President have the Attorney General provide review or a commission to do the same thing. A commission is not my choice because it takes longer, it's bigger and less efficient.

Wermuth: Given the current political climate, I think that a review by an independent commission might carry more weight.

Foresman: We are creating a lot of state laws in a mixed bag approach, whether the AG does it or a commission does it, we need to bring in the state levels. We need to make sure that however we do it, we do it national-centric and not federal-centric.

Chairman: Is there an advocate for an independent commission at the table? There isn't one. We will strike that from the recommendation and put in something about state and local levels.

Chairman: Can we double back to our prior issue? The idea of the agency and what it has to do with the fusion center. A question of whether this agency is meant to be a legal structured agency or not?

Bremer: Let me try to summarize why it is a good idea to make a recommendation. It's a question of how effective information collection is. You can make it effective by making it focused. That takes care of the cultural issue, there are down sides for example, the possibly of duplication. And it is also the case that you might have some loss of the connectivity between the local and people collection. I think the pros outweigh the cons. You separate the collection from law enforcement, so you don't get accusations that we are creating a secret police. It is clear that by being more focused and more culturally directed that people will object to this. The difference is that the political debate is moving in the direction of our recommendation. The question is being raised about how to do this. This will happen, after the next attack. Especially if it turns out that it was done by people living within the US. Once it happens the chances of protecting civil liberties will be much less than if we do it right now.

Marsh: Will it go through the center or go through the DOD?

Bremer: We didn't say.

Spaulding: Information from NSA analysts should be there too. There are current policy restrictions but they are work-arounds.

Reno: I agree that there will be another attack, it is obligatory of the commission to put forth what we think will help that. The issue is of intelligence collection for the law enforcement or for military operations. This is why our panel says that we should not rely on the FBI but to create a new agency that is psychologically different to deal with these military operations. If I were to have a fallback it would be to make a clear adjustment on the expansion of the FBI, to make sure they have a clear distinction between operations for these military operations.

Chairman: All in favor of supporting Jerry's proposal (3 nos).

Shine: Should we have a numerical vote?

Brower: 7 yes 3 no.

Greenleaf: Did we decide whether this should be freestanding or part of DHS?

Chairman: Does anyone have another idea than it being stand-alone?

Foresman: If we are going to engage in the national debate maybe we should say that DHS shouldn't have any intelligence function, put it all in the other entity.

Wermuth: This is already what they have, DHS has no threat analysis.

Shine: I think that future of an anti-terrorism agenda and the role of state level is still on the table. We might want to focus on this in next year's recommendations.

III. Use of Military Discussion

Chairman: The afternoon session is on the use of the military in the case of homeland security and homeland response. We have made statements that call for a response that maximize the civil liberties in the US. The concept is that the first responders should be properly financed and equipped. They should be used in conjunction with a lead agency like FEMA etc. If there is a need for more manpower, then the National Guard is called in by the governor. This would be done consistently with the constitution and civil liberties. Now enter NORTHCOM, a four-star military organization set up to deal with terrorist attacks in the homeland. Should we mention NORTHCOM? What is the proper role of this organization? What would they do? Who is in charge?

Reno: We have two guests coming in from NORTHCOM at 2:00 I believe. I would like to go to the NORTHCOM graphic and discuss it and then raise the issue of Special Forces operations as we discussed it in sub panel. We will discuss the recommendations we have come up with and then turn it over to you to discuss what we need to. (show NORTHCOM diagram)

This is our understanding, the combatant commander has coordinating responsibility, the forces are owned by the component commanders except the drug organization. When you look at this there is no obvious SOCOM communication from the graphics. When we looked at special operations we recognize that they have unique teams that can respond to a full range of responsibility.

As we looked at special operations we are mindful of what we have stated, the sequence of federal activity, you would first go through local organizations, then go to national guard, then federal capability in which for former operations prior to NORTHCOM would go to something like FEMA and the civilian lead agency would be replaced by NORTHCOM.

Recommendations: NORTHCOM have its own dedicated SOF assigned from SOCOM on a rotating basis, and SOCOM's force structure be increased to support the new requirement.

As an alternative: SOF unit could be designated for potential domestic use by the combatant commander of NORTHCOM, who will be charged with preparing the unit to operate domestically in support of civil authority…

Alternative 2: The NORTHCOM relationship with the SOF unit designated for potential domestic use be clarified to include, at a minimum pre-attack coordinating authority and OPCON when SOF are required to be engaged.

Wermuth: Alternative 1 means that they are under the alternate control of combatant command at all times, even before an attack. Alternate 2 means that they do not have control until after an attack happens. It is more direct approach under Alternate 1 before an attack but after an attack more direct under Alternate 2.

Bremer: Can they be operational by word of the Attorney General?

Kuster: If we are talking about the use of special operations to deal with a chemical or nuclear attack. The AG to the Secretary of Defense in consultation with the President will be used to determine the use of force. When you get into lethal response, someone actually shooting enemies, it is only based on Presidents word.

IV. Presentation by Lt. Colonel Walsh

Wermuth: Lt. Col. Walsh is here representing the Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense in his capacity of homeland defense. They will discuss the OSD restructuring and Assistant Secretary position. He will also talk about NORTHCOM and whether it will or will not provide military assistance to civil authorities. Those are the kinds of things we would like to discuss.

Walsh: I would like to speak about the fundamental role of NORTHCOM. There is great discovery to be found. DOD would be the leader in this and US NORTHCOM as a supplemental to the lead agency. We have done some studies- took a look at what NORTHCOM's role with reserves was. We also took a look at nine scenarios in which DOD would be involved in NORTHCOM. What we know is that the system that we have is not broken. NORTHCOM is to report on military significance within AOR, trying not to duplicate but to keep NORTHCOM informed. We don't see NORTHCOM having to deal with many missions except 9-11-like scenarios. We see a majority of NORTHCOM's missions as support for a lead agency.

The combatant commander is in charge of training and coordinating as necessary.
Areas of NORTHCOM that needs more work
1. AT/FP anti-terrorism force protection. Combatant commander has AT/FP leadership position. From 1 October 2002 until a date to be determined, the combatant commander is not in a leadership position until called upon. There will be an outline of AT/FP of NORTHCOM's responsibility
2. Critical infrastructure protection. We have identified 1205 critical infrastructure positions that DOD should be responsible for. We are asking NORTHCOM to be responsible for complete critical infrastructure for each of the combatant commands. There is no program that NORTHCOM is responsible for, it will be determined as required as an order from OSD.
3. The inter-agency relationships to other agencies. Anything that goes out of NORTHCOM must go through the Secretary of Defense. We want to make sure the formal relationship goes through OSD and the other relationships go through us.

These are the three areas that NORTHCOM and OSD are working at this time.

Wermuth: You said in extraordinary circumstances the DOD would be the lead federal agency within that set. Is that purely homeland defense mission or could it include something that would fall outside that?

Walsh: I believe that homeland defense would fall into the extraordinary category. Perhaps there could be other events outside homeland defense that would fall into this category as well.

Wermuth: Right now your planning is for purely homeland defense events?

Walsh: Yes that is correct.

Reno: How is NORTHCOM determining its requirements for national guard, reserve, state support, interactive support and the rest, is it going through that process?

Walsh: Yes it is. A plan finished 30 June and transferred to NORTHCOM staff addresses this. A mission analysis was performed and we are providing guidance as we speak. They only have 20-25% capability as far as staff now. They need to flush out all these issues through mission analysis. They are planning on a position to deal with AT/FP but now they just don't have the staff to do it. The J5 and J3 would have to give you a better idea of where they are at for that. They are starting at the high end, which is homeland defense first.

Wermuth: Who are the non-NORTHCOM member invited?

Walsh: FBI, members of joint staff, members of inter-agencies….

Chairman: It strikes me as pretty identical. Everyone on JIAC is federal….what an opportunity for NORTHCOM to include local and state people. You could set up a system on the regional level to do this.

Kuster: But who is in charge? NORTHCOM? We don't want to put NORTHCOM in a position where the overseas person is fighting the war. Here NORTHCOM is not the lead in fighting the war. We don't want to give the impression to the state and local level that someone will be telling them what to do.

Chairman: We have as a commission recommended that the DOD never be the lead federal agency, it would always be in support of a civilian lead agency. From what you said today, this would not be the case?

Walsh: Only in extraordinary cases would that happen.

Hathaway: If you have a military plane carrying a nuclear weapon and it goes down the lead would be DOD. It is a MSCA issue.

Bremer: When this occurs have they practiced enough and do the civil liberties exist that this will be done correctly?

Kuster: Every deployment order that we take is subject to the general council and believe me, everything we go through goes through legal scrutiny.

Brower: If the military is already stretched so thin that they cant promise to defend the homeland how can we recommend them to do TOPOFF?

Maniscalco: Perhaps we might want to look at the issue of how QDR has impacted the military. The original issue is that we can engage in 2 different arenas at the same time. At any given time now there are about 10-12 arenas and now we are setting up NORTHCOM, where are they going to get the resources?

Kuster: What aspects would be employed within TOPOFF? You will see OSD, joint staff as far as role-playing. But you won't see us moving aircraft to California. We will only use resources for the war arena and not simulations.

Wermuth: When NORTHCOM comes to its full capability it will be the sole support for natural incidents and others?

Rice: For the US it includes SOUTHCOM commander and the joint forces commander. Yes, it will be an all hazards approach.

Wermuth: When the new Assistant Secretariat is formed will the DOMS function move to that new secretariat?

Rice: We view the DOMS portion will most likely move to the joint staff. We can execute an order in 2-3 hours. Wherever that executive agency resides in OSD it needs to have that same access to get an execution order signed in a little amount of time.

Marsh: The system that he describes has existed for years and years. This system that we are putting together has problems because of size and inefficiency and because of lack of experience. I believe there is going to be a great deal of duplication and inefficiency.

Foresman: To use what Bremer said earlier, I came in thinking that NORTHCOM would be the 300lb gorilla and I am down now to an 80lb gorilla. As bad as the system was before, at least we understood it. But we have changed now and we have to make the best of it. If DOMS is going to continue in the future, I haven't heard a whole lot of consistency in the DOD today.

Wermuth: If I understand this correctly, regardless of whether the execute order piece moves to joint staff and the rest goes to the new assistant secretariat NORTHCOM is still the command where this is going to be placed. For the execution piece, within the lower 48 it will all go to NORTHCOM.

Hathaway: It will be smoother in the long term. Eventually you will see in the next couple of years a more effective, more responsive organization.

Reno: I suggest that we take out the SOF I and say we agree with the President's strategy. If you turn to capabilities and requirement (page 4)…that will be a natural evolution to missions assigned to NORTHCOM. I think this recommendation is a reasonable one. Federal and state levels are important. So what this sub panel is now recommending is that the National Guard, and the Secretary of Defense would have certain positions that are exclusively for homeland defense. It means they would retrain these missions to meet NORTHCOM's standards. It's far more restrictive than our recommendations in our third report. The commitment that the Guard would make would be more restrictive. We would have units designed for commitments of homeland security only.

Jones: If we do that they may be put into competition with hazardous material teams, and again we will have overlap and duplication. Having that as their principal and not exclusive mission it would be better.

Reno: Guard would like to have non-exclusive missions. The design for military police units for example would be different if they were designed exclusively for homeland security.

Wermuth: Would it make you feel better if we said in consultation with other authorities in the recommendation? The answer could be none if you go through that consultation process.

Marsh: I think what this is raising is a fundamental fight between the Guard and the active force. The Guard doesn't want language that restrict them from use of force. The key is the wording.

Chairman: Is the committee ready to say that right now? Bill why don't you draft something that we will fax to everyone that we can put in our final draft. I don't think that the commission disagrees with your recommendation.

Wermuth: The question is if we do something before Dec 15 and if so what and when? By the time we get to the last meeting we have usually agreed on items that go in, there are not a lot of policy decisions being made at the last meeting, mostly editing.

Foresman: Strategy and Structure and the use of the military are two areas that we should try to get something out for. Whether it's a White Paper or something else.

Wermuth: We are not as far along on other chapters as we are on this, except medical maybe.

Bremer: I am not sure we are going to be comfortable if the interim report only has these two areas. These are two important areas.

Chairman: We will put together a draft of the interim report and then publish it later on.

Bremer: There is something to be said of putting out a 10 page paper of the Gilmore Commission's opinion of Strategy and Structure…what they are doing right and what they are doing wrong. Include some recommendations.

Chairman: Draft it up and we will try to circulate it in the next two weeks.

Adjourn