What is the issue?
In order to maintain situational awareness and effectively direct operations, the armed forces need to maintain command and control (C2). C2 includes the entire cycle of military operations, including assessment, planning, preparation, and execution of military activities.
However, C2 is becoming increasingly complex due to the interplay between several macro-trends. The buildout of computing and telecommunications infrastructure has enabled the widespread gathering and analysis of data. Much of this infrastructure is civilian and provided by commercial actors, over which Defence has no direct control. Advances in computer and data science, such as progress in machine learning models, have made it possible to quickly parse this data, find patterns, and propose courses of action. However, the information environment is becoming increasingly contested as large amounts of fake news, disinformation, and AI-generated material fill the information space. This makes it increasingly difficult to distinguish factual and relevant data from incorrect information or noise. At the same time, the different operational domains are increasingly intertwined, with multi-domain operations becoming the norm. This renders traditional command models, focused on controlling a single geographic area, less effective.
While there has been some research on individual trends impacting C2, there has been little research on the complex interplays between the trends impacting C2 and how this may impact strategic stability. In addition, there is little understanding of the ways in which governance options, if any, may be helpful to address these risks.
How did we help?
This project, commissioned by the UK Foreign Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO), offers insights into how developments in non-nuclear command and control (C2) and counter-C2 systems may affect strategic stability. In the military, ‘command and control’ relates to the processes through which orders, steer, and direction are given to force elements. We understand strategic stability as a security condition in which no state believes it can gain a decisive advantage using force, such as by launching a first strike or escalating a conflict.
What did we find?
Competition for information and decision advantage is accelerating the digitisation of non-nuclear C2. While new technologies can improve resilience, coordination and decision support, they also create new dependencies and escalation risks.
- C2 is becoming faster, more connected and more vulnerable. AI, advanced sensing, synthetic environments and human–machine teaming can improve operational tempo and decision support. However, greater connectivity expands the cyber and physical attack surface, increases dependence on data, and can heighten the risk of miscalculation in a crisis.
- Institutional change matters as much as technology. Legacy systems, siloed data, slow procurement and organisational culture can prevent new capabilities from delivering their intended benefits. Future C2 effectiveness will depend on adapting structures, skills and practices – not simply adopting new technologies.
- Commercial and civilian infrastructure is now central to C2 resilience. Cloud services, satellites, communications networks and subsea cables increasingly support critical functions. These dependencies introduce actors, incentives and vulnerabilities beyond Defence’s direct control, complicating attribution, accountability and crisis management.
- Information integrity and human judgement remain essential. C2 depends on trustworthy, timely information. Misinformation, manipulation and poor-quality data can undermine decision making, while over-reliance on automated tools may reduce transparency, creativity and professional judgement. Personnel must retain the skills and experience to challenge machine-generated outputs and operate effectively when systems degrade.
- The current balance of trends is potentially destabilising. Resilient and distributed C2 can strengthen deterrence by improving defensive responsiveness. However, these benefits may be outweighed by vulnerabilities arising from commercial dependence, opaque automation, and pressure to accelerate decision-making. Uncertainty over whether C2 and retaliatory capacity would survive an attack may create incentives for pre-emption or escalation.
- Counter-C2 capabilities may favour disruption over control. Cyber-attacks, jamming, counterspace operations and strikes on key nodes can be relatively accessible and difficult to attribute. They are particularly likely to disrupt forces that depend on constant coordination across domains, although resilient and redundant systems can reduce their effect.
- Different approaches to C2 may increase the risk of misunderstanding. Democracies often favour distributed authority, accountability and human oversight; more centralised systems may place greater value on tightly controlled and automated decision chains. These differing strategic cultures can lead states to misread each other’s actions and intentions.
- Soft governance offers the most practical route to risk reduction. Early-stage cooperation, shared research, joint experimentation, interoperability standards, industry engagement and crisis-communication channels are more feasible than binding treaties or independent oversight mechanisms. They can build trust, identify vulnerabilities early and reduce misperception before technologies and practices become entrenched.
What can be done?
From our research, we recommend the following actions for relevant stakeholders within FCDO and the wider UK government:
Shape international norms and reduce misperception
- Promote early cooperation on emerging C2 technologies. The FCDO should support shared research, joint experimentation and multilateral forums where these can build transparency, identify risks and encourage responsible technology development. Confidence-building measures and reliable crisis-communication channels should complement this work, helping to clarify intent and reduce escalation risks during incidents.
- Strengthen interoperability among allies. Working with the MOD, NATO and other partners, the UK should promote common data standards, interfaces and application programming interfaces (APIs) for C2 systems. Prioritising interoperability at the data and interface level – rather than mandating common platforms – would support coalition operations while protecting national sovereignty and avoiding vendor lock-in.
- Protect information integrity across C2 systems. The MOD should continue to strengthen cybersecurity, data validation and information-assurance processes to guard against manipulation, misinformation and technical compromise. Personnel at all levels should understand how C2 systems work, where their limitations lie, and how to operate when information is incomplete or contested.
- Keep human judgement at the centre of human–machine teaming. Defence should continue to develop practical skills in AI-enabled decision making, including awareness of bias, explainability, auditability and the appropriate use of automated recommendations. Training and exercises should give personnel experience of operating in complex, data-rich and degraded environments.
Manage commercial and cross-government dependencies
- Create a whole-of-government approach to critical commercial infrastructure. Departments should work with industry to identify C2 dependencies, plan for disruption and build redundancy across providers. This should include continuity expectations, joint incident-response arrangements, dedicated liaison structures and appropriate transparency requirements for commercial providers supporting critical C2 functions.
- Improve civilian–military coordination for crisis response. Shared playbooks, routine information exchange, joint planning teams and common collaboration tools can help government departments coordinate more effectively when crises involve both military and civilian systems. These practical measures are likely to be more achievable than major structural reform, while improving the credibility and resilience of national decision making.
