Effective command and control supports situational awareness and military direction, but digitalisation, AI, commercial infrastructure and contested information are increasing complexity and vulnerability. Commissioned by the UK FCDO, this study examines how emerging non-nuclear C2 and counter-C2 systems could affect strategic stability, including risks of miscalculation, pre-emption and escalation, and considers how governance may mitigate them.

Future C2 and Counter-C2 systems

Implications for strategic stability of developments in non-nuclear command and control

Henri van Soest, Maria Chiara Aquilino, Scott Warnier, James Black

ResearchPublished Sep 29, 2026

This research was sponsored by the UK Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO).

Effective command and control (C2) enables armed forces to maintain situational awareness and direct operations across assessment, planning, preparation and execution. However, C2 is becoming more complex as digital, commercial and operational trends interact. Expanding computing and telecommunications infrastructure permits large-scale data collection and analysis, but much of it is civilian-owned and outside Defence’s direct control. Advances in machine learning can rapidly identify patterns and suggest courses of action, while misinformation, disinformation and AI-generated content make reliable information harder to distinguish from noise. Increasingly integrated operational domains and multi-domain operations also challenge command models designed around a single geographic area.

Although individual trends affecting C2 have been studied, their combined implications for strategic stability—and the scope for governance to mitigate associated risks—remain insufficiently understood. Commissioned by the UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO), this study examines how developments in non-nuclear C2 and counter-C2 systems may affect strategic stability. Here, C2 means the processes through which orders, guidance and direction are given to force elements. Strategic stability is understood as a security condition in which no state believes it can gain a decisive advantage through force, including a first strike or conflict escalation.

Key Takeaways

Competition for information and decision advantage is accelerating the digitisation of non-nuclear command and control (C2). New technologies can strengthen resilience, coordination and decision support, but also create dependencies and escalation risks.

  • AI, advanced sensing, synthetic environments and human–machine teaming can increase operational tempo, but connectivity expands cyber and physical attack surfaces, dependence on data and the risk of crisis miscalculation.
  • Technology alone is insufficient: legacy systems, siloed data, procurement and organisational culture require corresponding changes to structures, skills and practices.
  • Commercial cloud, satellite and communications infrastructure supports resilience, yet introduces actors, incentives and vulnerabilities beyond Defence’s control, complicating attribution, accountability and crisis management.
  • Trustworthy information and human judgement remain essential. Manipulation, poor-quality data and over-reliance on automation can erode transparency and professional judgement; personnel must challenge machine outputs and operate through degradation.
  • Distributed C2 can improve deterrence, but commercial dependence, opaque automation and faster decisions may create uncertainty about survivability and incentives for pre-emption or escalation.
  • Counter-C2 tools—including cyber-attacks, jamming, counterspace operations and strikes on key nodes—may favour disruption over control because they are accessible and hard to attribute. Redundancy can limit effects.
  • Divergent C2 cultures—distributed authority and human oversight versus centralised, automated chains—can cause states to misread intentions.
  • Soft governance is the most practical means of reducing risk: shared research, experimentation, interoperability standards, industry engagement and crisis communications can build trust and address vulnerabilities before practices become entrenched.

Recommendations

  • The FCDO and wider UK government should promote international cooperation on emerging C2 technologies through shared research, experimentation, confidence-building measures and reliable crisis communications. With the MOD, NATO and partners, they should advance interoperable data standards and interfaces while preserving national sovereignty.
  • Defence should strengthen cybersecurity, data validation and information assurance; keep human judgement central to AI-enabled decisions; and train personnel for contested and degraded environments.
  • Government and industry should map critical commercial dependencies, build redundancy and joint incident-response arrangements, and improve civilian–military coordination through shared playbooks, routine information exchange and joint planning. These measures should inform procurement and alliance planning.

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van Soest, Henri, Maria Chiara Aquilino, Scott Warnier, and James Black, Future C2 and Counter-C2 systems: Implications for strategic stability of developments in non-nuclear command and control. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2026. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA4734-3.html.
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This work was commissioned by the UK Foreign, Commonwealth, and Development Office (FCDO) and conducted by RAND Europe.

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