More certain than the outcome of the war is the need for an extensive post-war reconstruction of Ukraine. It is likely to be the largest post-war rebuilding effort since the one in Europe after World War Two. The United States and its allies and partners have an intense interest in the success of reconstruction.
From the 1990s to the 2022 invasion, Russia's manipulation of Ukraine was based on a post-Soviet Russian identity that was hostile to the European project. Meanwhile, Ukraine formed a national identity that was at odds with Russia's, and it grew stronger and more resistant to Russian influence.
These proceedings present insights that experts of Europe, Japan, Taiwan, and U.S. security policies presented at RAND Corporation–hosted virtual conferences that explored relevant issues on the U.S.-Japan alliance regarding strategic competition.
This report summarizes reexamined RAND tabletop exercises involving Russia from the past eight years in a review of wargaming methods and analysis and presents implications for future potential conflicts involving major powers.
Failures in the Russian logistics and maintenance system have been identified as a key factor in Russia's underperformance in Ukraine in 2022. A review of dozens of unclassified documents and articles provides insights into Russia's military problems before and in the early stages of its invasion.
The RAND National Security Research Division hosted a discussion focused on emerging approaches to projecting power against the United States' most capable adversaries and the implications of these new approaches for defense planning.
Features explore the use of psychedelics to address depression, anxiety, posttraumatic stress disorder, and substance use disorders among veterans, and the prevalence of food insecurity among active-duty military families and veterans.
Both Russia and Ukraine have used loitering munitions successfully in the current war, and China is watching closely. Chinese strategists are likely already considering how to refine offensive tactics and improve defensive countermeasures in the context of a Taiwan scenario.
To adapt to changes in warfighting, NATO is developing a multi-domain operations warfighting concept. But for this concept to be successful, it must include a plan to manage military operations' increasing reliance on and interaction with nonmilitary instruments of power.
If the United States hopes to prevail in an asymmetrical world war, it must upgrade its abilities to provide self-defense and resistance support to its allies and partners, and better coordinate its disparate efforts to counter Russia and China across departments and agencies.
Uncrewed surface vessel and uncrewed underwater vessel technologies will continue to mature and be employed for an ever-wider range of missions. Today's struggles in the Black Sea may herald a changing face of naval warfare, in which large warships are increasingly vulnerable even to nations that lack substantial navies.
Many prominent Western news outlets and policymakers have concluded that Ukraine is winning the information war. Are Ukraine's information campaigns, in fact, more persuasive than Russia's? If so, why?
Since the very outset of Russia's war against Ukraine, there have been calls for the United States to negotiate with Russia. As the war has dragged on, the rationale for negotiations has morphed with each phase. Once you scratch below the surface, however, the case for negotiating with Russia quickly falls apart.
The dynamic between Ukrainian momentum and Russia's desperation has raised concerns that the Kremlin might resort to nuclear escalation to turn the tide of the war. How could the United States expand its options to respond to potentially produce better outcomes?
Will F-16s win the war for Ukraine? No. Only ground victories and unacceptable Russian losses will force Putin to negotiate. However, a long-term commitment to supporting a well-equipped, sizable F-16 force will improve the likelihood of Ukrainian success even if an F-16 never shoots a Russian fighter.
A proper understanding of the threat Russia poses must begin with an accurate appraisal of Russian power. Putin might harbor fantasies of world conquest. But his military cannot even fully conquer any of the four Ukrainian provinces he claims to have annexed last year. Ultimately, those are the constraints that should bound the debate about the extent of the threat.
In shaping patterns of future warfare, militaries across the world will be seeking to absorb the key lessons of the Russia-Ukraine War. Chinese strategists are particularly attuned to the major role that landmines have played in the conflict.