How to Broker Peace in Ukraine

Since early 2025, the United States has made significant diplomatic efforts to end the war between Russia and Ukraine. Negotiators have met in Abu Dhabi, Berlin, Geneva, Istanbul, Paris, and Riyadh; envoys have shuttled to Moscow and Miami. Those efforts deserve credit. But activity is not strategy—and, as demonstrated by the massive strikes across Ukraine and Russia in recent weeks, it has yet to produce results. To make real progress toward peace, Washington should apply lessons from decades of international mediation experience. Although all conflicts are unique, past negotiations show that getting the process right is essential, and they offer insights about which approaches tend to work and which do not. If talks are well organized and parties have a sense of ownership, agree on the process, and build personal relationships, negotiations are more likely to succeed. Without those conditions, efforts to end the fighting are apt to falter, and the strategic, economic, and human costs will continue to mount. For any process even to begin, the parties must, of course, be willing to engage. Although Kyiv has said it wants a cease-fire and negotiations, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s recent rhetoric—he called Ukraine’s government a “junta” in May—and the intensifying attacks on Ukrainian cities suggest that he is not in a talking mood. Yet Putin is under the most significant economic, military, and political pressure since he launched the full-scale invasion in February 2022. His forces advanced by less than half a square mile per day in June 2026—a reduction of more than 90 percent from their rate of gain in June 2025. Meanwhile, Ukraine’s increasingly effective long-range drone strikes are disrupting Russia’s energy sector and reducing state revenues. Kyiv’s attacks on refineries and logistics infrastructure are affecting everyday life in major cities. With public sentiment showing signs of strain, the Kremlin faces a more difficult task in delivering a strong result for the ruling party in September’s Duma elections. None of this means that Putin will choose negotiations over fighting. But given the pressure he is now under, that possibility should at least be tested.