Lessons from L.A. on Transfer Taxes

Commentary

Nov 2, 2026

A house with a For Sale sign in front of it

Photo by Feverpitched/Getty Images

This commentary was originally published by San Francisco Chronicle on October 31, 2026.

San Francisco's Proposition I, passed by voters in 2020, doubled the city's real estate transfer tax rates, which were already among the highest in the state. Several other California cities—including Oakland, Los Angeles and Santa Monica—have also moved toward adding taxes to the sale of high-value real estate, often to raise money for affordable housing.

A common feature of these taxes is that they apply to transactions based strictly on the sales price. For example, a new $20 million apartment building that cost $17 million to develop (representing a $3 million profit) and a 30-year-old mansion sold for $20 million after being purchased for $5 million 20 years before (representing a $15 million profit) face the same $1.15 million transfer tax under Prop I.

Based on my research as an economist for the think tank RAND, such a tax is likely to discourage the sale of a new apartment building, which can deter new development. This means construction jobs, impact and development fees, property tax revenue and other positive economic spillovers also won't happen.

Earlier this year, San Francisco leaders considered rolling back the Prop I tax to a lower level—but changed their minds, citing budget pressures.

Now voters have a new Prop I to consider, which would amend the current tax in different and important ways.

First, it would set aside half of future Prop I proceeds for uses related to developing publicly subsidized affordable housing and various kinds of tenant aid. Second, it would add a five-year exemption on the first sale of newly constructed residential multifamily properties. Third, it would remove a provision that allows the Board of Supervisors to amend the transfer tax, making the new earmarked portion's conditions permanent.

Proponents of this initiative suggest that it is an effective way to tax speculative real estate transactions by the wealthy. They also highlight the need to create a permanent source of funding for affordable housing and tenant relief efforts.

These arguments and important aspects of the proposition closely mirror the debate over Los Angeles' Measure ULA, a 2022 ballot initiative that established a quite similar transfer tax and funding program.

I've led two studies on the effects of Los Angeles' Measure ULA transfer tax on public revenues and housing production. Findings from the resulting research hold important lessons for San Francisco.

Measure ULA has raised more than $1.4 billion since taking effect in mid-2023. Although this is a large amount, it is much lower than proponents' estimates of $1.8 billion to $3.5 billion over this same period. Much of this difference is because Measure ULA's backers discounted the disincentive effects that the tax would have on new housing production.

My study compared what transpired within the Los Angeles city limits to what happened in the rest of Los Angeles County before and after Measure ULA took effect. We found that the tax reduced the number of residential multifamily buildings sold by 47%. It also depressed the new construction of large apartment buildings by at least 30%. These drop-offs in sales and development led to a reduction in city, county and state revenue of around $500 million over the past three years—and other research has estimated even steeper reductions.

We found that the tax reduced the number of residential multifamily buildings sold by 47%.

Other research that I co-authored indicated that the decline in new apartment construction likely resulted in an overall decline in new affordable housing units being added in Los Angeles, since nearly all privately financed apartment developments include privately provided affordable units added to projects in order to unlock greater project density.

Our research also highlights the potential consequences of the kind of highly prescriptive earmarking of how affordable housing revenue can or can't be used that is part of Prop I. Measure ULA, for instance, put limits on what kinds of entities are allowed to buy ULA-funded properties that are foreclosed on and restricts the ability to selectively raise below-market rent levels when projects have fallen into financial distress. These rules can cause problems because new affordable-housing projects virtually always draw on multiple sources of public and private capital and debt in assembling the required capital for a project. For this reason, there have been multiple attempts (PDF) at reform over the past year.

Similarly, San Francisco's Prop I would restrict a large portion of its affordable housing funding to “Limited-Equity Housing Cooperative” buildings or settings where “residents shall have the right to participate directly and meaningfully in decision-making concerning the operation and management of the project.” Los Angeles' Measure ULA experience suggests that reducing funding flexibility with requirements like these tends to magnify funding challenges in a system that is already facing pressure from rising production and operating costs.

A key finding from our research on Measure ULA is that exempting the first sale of new multifamily projects can soften a transfer tax's disincentive effects on new housing production. Prop I's five-year exemption would primarily affect decisions made by “merchant builders” who build and sell on the shortest timelines. However, many other business models involve longer holding periods for new projects and, thus, would still be subject to the tax upon a first post-completion sale.

In short, Prop I has a lot of moving parts and, similar to Measure ULA, the potential for unintended consequences; the net effect on housing production and affordability is hard to predict. But given recent artificial intelligence-industry-related spikes in housing costs across the city, the stakes are high for getting housing policy right.