Estimating the Effects of No-Pay, No-Play Auto Insurance Plans on the Costs of Auto Insurance

The Effects of Proposition 213

Stephen J. Carroll, Allan Abrahamse

ResearchPosted on rand.org 1999Published in: Automobile Insurance: Road Safety, New Drivers, Risks, Insurance Fraud and Regulation (Huebner International Series on Risk, Insurance and Economic Security) / Edited By Georges Dionne, Claire Laberge-Nadeau. Norwell, Mass.:Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1999), Chapt. 21, p. 309-322

The authors suggest a methodology for estimating the likely effects of plans that restrict compensation to uninsured (or drunk) drivers on the costs of private passenger auto insurance.

Topics

Document Details

  • Availability: Non-RAND
  • Year: 1999
  • Pages: 14
  • Document Number: EP-199900-03

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