Estimating the Effects of No-Pay, No-Play Auto Insurance Plans on the Costs of Auto Insurance

The Effects of Proposition 213

Published in: Automobile Insurance: Road Safety, New Drivers, Risks, Insurance Fraud and Regulation (Huebner International Series on Risk, Insurance and Economic Security) / Edited By Georges Dionne, Claire Laberge-Nadeau. Norwell, Mass.:Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1999), Chapt. 21, p. 309-322

Posted on RAND.org on December 31, 1998

by Stephen J. Carroll, Allan Abrahamse

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The authors suggest a methodology for estimating the likely effects of plans that restrict compensation to uninsured (or drunk) drivers on the costs of private passenger auto insurance.

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