Envisioning Health Care Quality in Hungary

Published in: EuroHealth, v. 6, no. 2, Spring 2000, p. 2-4

Posted on RAND.org on December 31, 1999

by James P. Kahan, Laszlo Gulacsi

The excessive use of health care, driven or facilitated by the physicians and provider units, is a problem in Hungary. The main reasons for this excessive use are a lack of information, inappropriate incentives, and absence of agencies of control. The authors present a tentative outline towards addressing this problem, within which the central and local governments and the medical societies are empowered to act as control agents. The structure of this outline, however, relies upon the determination of some fundamental policy objectives and the establishment of infrastructure to facilitate the agencies of control to carry out these objectives.

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