The Effects of Choice Auto Insurance on Costs and Compensation

Published in: The Economics and Politics of Choice No-Fault Insurance (Huebner International Series on Risk, Insurance and Economic Security) / Edited by Edward L. Jr. Lascher, Michael R. Powers (Norwell, MA.: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001), p. 31-66

Posted on RAND.org on December 31, 2000

by Stephen J. Carroll, Allan Abrahamse

Read More

Access further information on this document at www.springer.com

This article was published outside of RAND. The full text of the article can be found at the link above.

This analysis uses data for a representative sample of auto accident victims whose claims were closed in 1997 to estimate the effects of a choice automobile insurance plan that embodies the basic principles of the plans being considered in Congress. CONCLUSION: Results suggest that the choice plan can offer dramatically less expensive insurance to drivers willing to give up access to compensation for non-economic loss with little actual effect on those who want to retain access to compensation for both economic and non-economic loss.

This report is part of the RAND Corporation external publication series. Many RAND studies are published in peer-reviewed scholarly journals, as chapters in commercial books, or as documents published by other organizations.

The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.