Social Insurance and the Design of Innovation Incentives

Published in: Economics Letters, v. 85, no. 1, Oct. 2004, p. 57-61

Posted on RAND.org on December 31, 2003

by Darius N. Lakdawalla, Neeraj Sood

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The authors consider the insurance aspects of research policy. Patents or rewards have an advantage over research subsidies when a new invention replaces an existing good at lower cost. Research subsidies have an advantage when inventions spawn an entirely new product.

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