Social Insurance and the Design of Innovation Incentives

Darius N. Lakdawalla, Neeraj Sood

ResearchPosted on rand.org 2004Published in: Economics Letters, v. 85, no. 1, Oct. 2004, p. 57-61

The authors consider the insurance aspects of research policy. Patents or rewards have an advantage over research subsidies when a new invention replaces an existing good at lower cost. Research subsidies have an advantage when inventions spawn an entirely new product.

Topics

Document Details

  • Availability: Non-RAND
  • Year: 2004
  • Pages: 5
  • Document Number: EP-200410-16

This publication is part of the RAND external publication series. Many RAND studies are published in peer-reviewed scholarly journals, as chapters in commercial books, or as documents published by other organizations.

RAND is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.