Evaluating Education Programs That Have Lotteried Admission and Selective Attrition

Published in: Journal of Labor Economics, v. 32, no. 1, Jan. 2014, p. 27-63

Posted on RAND.org on December 29, 2015

by John Engberg, Dennis N. Epple, Jason Imbrogno, Holger Sieg, Ron Zimmer

Read More

Access further information on this document at www.jstor.org

This article was published outside of RAND. The full text of the article can be found at the link above.

We study the effectiveness of magnet programs in an urban district that ration excess demand by admission lotteries. Differential attrition arises since students who lose the lottery are more likely to pursue options outside the school district than students who win the lottery. When students leave the district, important outcome variables are often not observed. The treatment effects are not point-identified. We exploit known quantiles of the outcome distribution to construct informative bounds on treatment effects. We find that magnet programs improve behavioral outcomes but have no significant effect on achievement.

This report is part of the RAND Corporation External publication series. Many RAND studies are published in peer-reviewed scholarly journals, as chapters in commercial books, or as documents published by other organizations.

The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.