Can Vietnam's Military Stand Up to China in the South China Sea?
ResearchPosted on rand.org Feb 22, 2018Published in: Asia Policy, Volume 13, Number 1 (January 2018), Pages 113-134. doi:10.1353/asp.2018.0010
This article examines Vietnam's warfighting capabilities for defending its disputed claims with China in the South China Sea.
ResearchPosted on rand.org Feb 22, 2018Published in: Asia Policy, Volume 13, Number 1 (January 2018), Pages 113-134. doi:10.1353/asp.2018.0010
Vietnam's military modernization is increasingly focused on deterring China from seizing disputed territory in the South China Sea. By developing and fielding select capabilities — including Kilo-class submarines, Su-30MK2 maritime strike fighters, a network of anti-access missiles, and other weapon systems — Hanoi has likely achieved its core objective of convincing Beijing of the hardships it would face in a military conflict against Vietnam in the South China Sea. Nevertheless, if deterrence fails because Beijing believes it can mitigate the substantial but reasonable risks, then Vietnam is probably incapable of sustaining an extended, large-scale, or high-intensity conventional conflict in the region. This conclusion is supported by an analysis of its evolving warfighting doctrine in the air and sea domains, lack of jointness and unrealistic training activities, and shortcomings in the Vietnamese military's maritime domain awareness capabilities and weapon systems interoperability.
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