Cream Skimming, Asymmetric Information, and a Competitive Insurance Market

Published in: Journal of Health Economics, v. 3, no. 1, Apr. 1984, p. 97-100

Posted on RAND.org on January 01, 1984

by Joseph P. Newhouse

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Competition is possible and likely desirable in some parts of medical care. It is still an open question whether the risk of insuring the quantity of inpatient services or long term care can be shifted from the individual without creating partial degrees of market failure.

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