Disability Insurance and Health Insurance Reform

Evidence from Massachusetts

Published in: American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings, v. 104, no. 5, May 2014, p. 329-335

Posted on RAND.org on May 01, 2014

by Nicole Maestas, Kathleen J. Mullen, Alexander Strand

Read More

Access further information on this document at www.aeaweb.org

This article was published outside of RAND. The full text of the article can be found at the link above.

As health insurance becomes available outside of the employment relationship as a result of the Affordable Care Act (ACA), the cost of applying for Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI)–potentially going without health insurance coverage during a waiting period totaling 29 months from disability onset–will decline for many people with employer-sponsored health insurance. At the same time, the value of SSDI and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) participation will decline for individuals who otherwise lacked access to health insurance. We study the 2006 Massachusetts health insurance reform to estimate the potential effects of the ACA on SSDI and SSI applications.

This report is part of the RAND Corporation external publication series. Many RAND studies are published in peer-reviewed scholarly journals, as chapters in commercial books, or as documents published by other organizations.

The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.