Unintended Consequences of Products Liability

Evidence from the Pharmaceutical Market

Published in: The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization (2020). doi: 10.1093/jleo/ewaa017

Posted on RAND.org on December 11, 2020

by Eric Helland, Darius N. Lakdawalla, Anup Malani, Seth A. Seabury

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We explain a surprising effect of tort liability in the market for prescription drugs. Greater punitive damage risk seems to increase prescription drug utilization in states without non-economic damage caps but decrease utilization in states with such caps. We offer an explanation for this puzzle. The vertical production process for drugs involves national upstream producers (drug companies) and local downstream producers (doctors). When a single state reallocates liability from downstream to upstream producers, national drug companies see little reason to alter their nationwide output decisions, but local physicians have incentives to increase their prescriptions in that state. The net result is higher local output. We show how this dynamic can explain our puzzle by demonstrating that punitive damages shift liability upstream from doctors to drug companies, but not when non-economic damages caps limit physician malpractice liability. We provide evidence explaining when, how, and why this type of liability shifting occurs.

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