Download Free Electronic Document

FormatFile SizeNotes
PDF file 0.1 MB

Use Adobe Acrobat Reader version 10 or higher for the best experience.

The authors examine the options for a post-Saddam Persian Gulf security system. A fundamentally new Iraqi regime is necessary but, the authors argue, insufficient for lasting Gulf security. The authors analyze the strategic challenges of Gulf security and outline the disadvantages to the United States and to the region of today1s heavy dependence on a forward U.S. military presence and readiness to fight increasingly risky expeditionary wars. They argue that two alternative models for the Gulf, a unilateral U.S. attempt to impose liberal democracy or a return to an old-fashioned balance-of-power approach, will not work. Instead, they suggest that a multilateral U.S.-European effort to build a more robust intra-regional balance of power, underpinned by broad political reform around the Gulf, could lay the basis for long-term stability.

This report is part of the RAND issue paper series. The issue paper was a product of RAND from 1993 to 2003 that contained early data analysis, an informed perspective on a topic, or a discussion of research directions, not necessarily based on published research. The issue paper was meant to be a vehicle for quick dissemination intended to stimulate discussion in a policy community.

This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited; linking directly to this product page is encouraged. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial purposes. For information on reprint and reuse permissions, please visit

RAND is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.