This report identifies problems and issues raised by Operation Desert Shield (ODS) that could affect the Army's use of reserves in future contingencies and summarizes issues that deserve further analysis. It argues that ODS departed from past reserve planning because there was little warning and no specific deployment plan for using the reserves in such a contingency. Based on the ODS experience, issues relevant for future operations include reviewing the 200K call-up mechanism, taking measures to reduce assembly and movement time, developing guidelines to specify post-mobilization training activities, examining the role of reserves in sustaining an extended deployment, preparing active and reserve units for a range of scenarios, and conveying the idea that training and unit relationships in peacetime may be changed abruptly in a contingency.
This report is part of the RAND Corporation Monograph report series. The monograph/report was a product of the RAND Corporation from 1993 to 2003. RAND monograph/reports presented major research findings that addressed the challenges facing the public and private sectors. They included executive summaries, technical documentation, and synthesis pieces.
This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited; linking directly to this product page is encouraged. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial purposes. For information on reprint and reuse permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions.
The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.