Keeping the Warfighting Edge
An Empirical Analysis of Army Officers' Tactical Expertise
Download
Full Document
| Format | File Size | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| PDF file | 5.7 MB | Use Adobe Acrobat Reader version 10 or higher for the best experience. |
Purchase
Purchase Print Copy
| Format | List Price | Price | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Add to Cart | Paperback132 pages | $35.00 | $28.00 20% Web Discount |
This document explores whether between 1990 and 1998 the tenure of key developmental assignments for infantry and armor officers became shorter; the tactical training during those assignments declined significantly; and earlier shifts in career patterns and training meant that such recent officers arrived in key positions with less experience than earlier generations of officers. The analysis finds that while some assignments did become shorter, especially for platoon leaders, on average the length of most key jobs was about the same across the time period. However, in terms of content, assignments involved less field training (much less for armor officers). Finally, there did not appear to be substantial changes in the overall career patterns of officers, except for lieutenants, who showed arising propensity to serve on staffs at the expense of time as platoon leaders. These findings suggest that the tactical foundation of recent infantry and armor officers is weaker than it had been previously, most seriously at the junior levels. Establishing a mechanism to monitor the content of unit assignments is the most important action the Army can take to improve its officers' tactical development.
Table of Contents
Chapter One
Introduction and Overview
Chapter Two
Length of Key Assignments
Chapter Three
Training Content of Key Assignments
Chapter Four
Levels of Expertise at Entry into Key Assignments
Chapter Five
Conclusions and Policy Options
Appendix A
Data-Collection Form
Appendix B
Sample Design, Structure, and Regression Analysis
Appendix C
Career Histories
Research conducted by
This research was conducted within RAND's Arroyo Center.
This report is part of the RAND Corporation monograph report series. The monograph/report was a product of the RAND Corporation from 1993 to 2003. RAND monograph/reports presented major research findings that addressed the challenges facing the public and private sectors. They included executive summaries, technical documentation, and synthesis pieces.
Permission is given to duplicate this electronic document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Copies may not be duplicated for commercial purposes. Unauthorized posting of RAND PDFs to a non-RAND Web site is prohibited. RAND PDFs are protected under copyright law. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit the RAND Permissions page.
The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.