A New Methodology for Assessing Multilayer Missile Defense Options
ResearchPublished 1994
ResearchPublished 1994
Iraqi Scud missile attacks during the Persian Gulf War dramatized U.S. vulnerability to theater ballistic missiles. In this report, the authors describe a methodology for allocating resources among various facets of missile defense. Their model takes into account the number of attacking objects, the requirement that no missiles get through, the number of layers of defense, the probability of kill by the interceptors in each layer, other operational parameters, and cost considerations. In addition, they examine the effects of critical uncertainties. The model indicates the benefits of architectures that rely on multiple layers of defense, the high costs of these defenses, and the high leverage in engaging attacking objects before launch or early in their flight.
This publication is part of the RAND monograph report series. The monograph report was a product of RAND from 1993 to 2003. RAND monograph reports presented major research findings that addressed the challenges facing the public and private sectors. They included executive summaries, technical documentation, and synthesis pieces.
This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited; linking directly to this product page is encouraged. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial purposes. For information on reprint and reuse permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions.
RAND is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.