Explores conceptual issues related to strategic warning of general nuclear war. A "threat/response cycle" is proposed as a conceptual model of warning situations and is used to explore the differences between tactical and strategic warning. Response to strategic warning is discussed, as is the assessment of the utility of strategic warning.
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