This Note explores Soviet decisionmaking on behalf of those with a special interest in the long-term directions of Soviet military policy. Consequently, it approaches the topic from a different perspective and introduces a methodology derived from an analysis of cognitive processes. Using this methodology, it then identifies a structured decisionmaking process based on some novel insights about Soviet decisionmaking and the special political-military relationship that accompanies it.
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