The New Soviet Strategy in the Third World
Published 1983
Published 1983
This study sets forth in broad outline several major changes observable in recent Soviet strategy for penetration in the Third World, details the specific instrumentalities of the Soviet quest for leverage, and addresses some of the Soviet Union's strengths and weaknesses. Section II traces the origins and evolution of Soviet Third World policies up to the early 1970s and examines the causal factors and circumstances leading to a reassessment of Soviet policies and the formulation of a new strategy. Section III highlights the international circumstances and Soviet military-political realities providing incentives for the new approach and analyzes its doctrinal-ideological framework. The specific methods and instrumentalities — military, political, and economic — of Soviet penetration of the Third World under the new strategy are addressed in Sec. IV. The main conclusions are presented in Sec. V.
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