A Rule-Based Policy-Level Model of Nonsuperpower Behavior in Strategic Conflicts
Jan 1, 1982
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Military strategy analysis seldom treats nonsuperpower behavior except in the simplest fashion. This obscures real uncertainty and disagreement about nonsuperpower roles in future armed conflict between superpowers. The study asks if a more dynamic treatment of nonsuperpower behavior in strategic analysis is feasible and desirable. It describes a rule-based nonsuperpower simulation and results of gaming several scenarios. The analysis reveals possible interactions between superpower and nonsuperpower decisionmaking potentially affecting deterrence stability, military performance, and alliance cohesion. It concludes that strategic analysis can and should consider nonsuperpower behavior as important independent variables.
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