Process and Problems in Developing NATO Tactical Air Doctrine
Published 1988
Published 1988
Understanding the interests and tactics of our allies is important to improving cooperation with the Tactical Air Working Party of NATO. This Note examines the administrative processes and competing influences involved in negotiating statements of NATO's tactical air doctrine, including the joint process for developing U.S. positions on NATO air doctrine and the combined process by which national proposals eventually emerge as formal NATO doctrine. The Note reviews the air power interests of Great Britain and West Germany and their influence on the development of NATO air doctrine. The authors make tentative suggestions for enhancing the U.S. position in negotiations over allied air power issues.
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