Clients and Commitments
Soviet-Vietnamese Relations, 1978-1988
ResearchPublished 1989
Soviet-Vietnamese Relations, 1978-1988
ResearchPublished 1989
This Note examines the evolution of the Soviet-Vietnamese relationship over the past decade in three contexts: (1) Soviet behavior in supporting the Vietnamese troops during the invasion of Cambodia in late 1978 and in defending them during the Chinese incursion of Vietnam in early 1979, (2) the level of Soviet economic and military aid, and (3) the impact of General Secretary Gorbachev's "new thinking" on Soviet-Vietnamese relations. The record shows a Soviet disinclination to take risks in this region of the world, chiefly because of the proximity to China, even in the late 1970s during the height of Brezhnev's interventionism. Under Gorbachev, not only does interventionism appear remote, but tangible results in reducing tensions in Southeast Asia already have been achieved. Specifically, by September of 1989, thousands of Vietnamese troops left Cambodia, thus fulfilling the third "precondition" set by China on the path to improved Sino-Soviet relations.
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