Strategic Thought at RAND, 1948-1963
The Ideas, Their Origins, Their Fates
ResearchPublished 1990
The Ideas, Their Origins, Their Fates
ResearchPublished 1990
Drawing on personal recollections, documents, discussions, and interviews, the author presents an account of how a gifted group of scientists and analysts that had gathered at the young RAND Corporation learned about military strategy, with emphasis on the new field of nuclear strategy. Many in this group made important and enduring contributions. With a focus on certain significant ideas developed at RAND, most relating directly to the deterrence and control of war, the author considers their influence and lasting effects on how people think about war and strategy and their validity for the future.
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