Operation Just Cause and the U.S. Policy Process

This Note examines the policy process that led the United States to intervene in Panama. It presents a case study of the changing objectives of U.S. policy toward Panama and the decisions leading to Operation Just Cause, the invasion of Panama, and the deposing of Manuel Noriega. The Note focuses on the U.S. policy process, paying special attention to the difficulties encountered in formulating U.S. objectives. In particular, it surveys the historical background of U.S. relations with Panama and documents Noriega's rise to power and the growth of his influence in the early 1980s; discusses the beginning of the crisis from the U.S. point of view, during the years 1985-1987; analyzes the failure of economic and diplomatic sanctions; explores the decisionmaking and planning processes leading to Operation Just Cause; and recaps the main problems with U.S. policy toward Panama in the 1980s, assessing how competing objectives swamped the policy process.