Cover: Methodology for Examining Effects of Arms Control Reduction on Tactical Air Forces

Methodology for Examining Effects of Arms Control Reduction on Tactical Air Forces

An Example from Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty Analysis

Published 1993

by Charles T. Kelley, Jr.


Download eBook for Free

FormatFile SizeNotes
PDF file 1.4 MB

Use Adobe Acrobat Reader version 10 or higher for the best experience.


Purchase Print Copy

 Format Price
Add to Cart Paperback42 pages $23.00

In 1989, NATO and the Warsaw Pact were engaged in the Conventional Forces in Europe arms reduction negotiations. The major advantages to NATO were the large cuts in Warsaw Pact ground forces. However, agreement to these cuts was not expected until both sides had agreed on how tactical air forces should be reduced. Both sides submitted proposals (NATO's involving a 15-percent reduction), but, after negotiation, remained far apart on three categories of aircraft: trainers, medium bombers (including land-based naval attack aircraft), and homeland defense aircraft. This note describes RAND's suggestions on how the tactical air reduction agreement should be structured and how NATO should implement it. The author suggested a compromise that allowed each side to exclude some number of basic trainers and land- based naval attack aircraft, and that granted the Soviets a unilateral exclusion for some number of homeland air defense aircraft. The final treaty incorporated the first two suggestions. NATO was not required to reduce its inventory of combat aircraft. Had the proposed 15-percent reduction been accepted, about 100 aircraft would have had to be transferred from the region or destroyed.

This report is part of the RAND note series. The note was a product of RAND from 1979 to 1993 that reported other outputs of sponsored research for general distribution.

This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited; linking directly to this product page is encouraged. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial purposes. For information on reprint and reuse permissions, please visit

RAND is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.