Getting U.S. Military Power to the Desert

This Note describes the main dimensions of U.S. deployments to the Gulf area and reviews the performance of the deployment systems. The Note highlights six deployment and execution issues: (1) for the first month of the Phase I deployments, total transportation requirements were hard to pin down, with much of the uncertainty traceable to varying estimates of Army noncombat unit requirements; (2) initial air deployments were hampered by problems of coordination between users and the Military Airlift Command; (3) during Phase II, unit integrity was not preserved in sealift operations; (4) during Phase II, the coordination of passenger and equipment deliveries was abandoned to get personnel into the area before the January 15th deadline; (5) resupply cargoes in air channels came to exceed capacity; and (6) many prewar planning factors proved optimistic. To prepare for future contingencies that may require faster deployments through seaports and airports that are under attack, the Department of Defense needs to consider such issues as how to provide more responsive planning and how to improve the coordination of deployment operations.