A discussion of a "dual capability," defined as a military capability to hit prospective enemies hard with either strategic air bombing or with land armies complemented by supporting air and naval units. The argument that the U. S. cannot afford both of these capabilities and that the second capability should be eliminated is appraised. The military establishment the U.S. can afford is discussed, together with the likely cost of a realistic alternative to a dual capability.
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