Dynamics of the Moscow-Peking Axis.
ResearchPublished 1958
ResearchPublished 1958
An examination of the developments in the alliance between the Soviet Union and Communist China. The paper discusses (1) the dependence of Peking upon Moscow during the Stalin period; (2) the increased leverage during the post-Stalin era when Peking intervened in Bloc affairs in 1956; and (3) the abandonment of this formula in November 1957, with a shift by Mao Tse-tung to a harsher line both on Bloc affairs and toward the noncommunist world. The change in Peking policy from 1956 to 1957 may have resulted from a reappraisal of Soviet strength, consequent from ICBM and artificial satellite developments in the latter half of 1957. 29 pp.
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