Allocation of Two Types of Aircraft in Tactical Air War: A Game-Theoretic Analysis
Jan 1, 1959
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An analysis, as a multimove two-person game, of the problem of allocating two types of resources (bombers and fighters) among three independent tasks (attack, defend, and score). Optimal tactics are derived: (1) during the last moves of the game both players allocate all their resources, regardless of the size of their resources; and (2) during the early moves of the game, both players may need to randomize, or only one player may need to randomize, depending on the size of their resources.
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