Randomization of Threats and Promises

Thomas C. Schelling

Expert InsightsPublished 1959

An investigation of randomization in non-zero-sum games. In its role of making indivisible objects divisible, or incommensurate objects homogeneous, randomization is relevant to threats and promises. In the illustrations given, a rationale is found for a "fractional threat." The paper also considers whether the tactic of "unconditional commitment" is one that in certain cases can advantageously be made less than certain.

Document Details

  • Copyright: RAND Corporation
  • Availability: Web Only
  • Year: 1959
  • Pages: 13
  • Document Number: P-1716

Citation

Chicago Manual of Style

Schelling, Thomas C., Randomization of Threats and Promises. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1959. https://www.rand.org/pubs/papers/P1716.html.
BibTeX RIS

Research conducted by

This publication is part of the RAND paper series. The paper series was a product of RAND from 1948 to 2003 that captured speeches, memorials, and derivative research, usually prepared on authors' own time and meant to be the scholarly or scientific contribution of individual authors to their professional fields. Papers were less formal than reports and did not require rigorous peer review.

This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited; linking directly to this product page is encouraged. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial purposes. For information on reprint and reuse permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions.

RAND is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.