Cover: The implications of some game-theoretic analyses for war gaming

The implications of some game-theoretic analyses for war gaming

Published 1960

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An examination of the appropriateness of war gaming as a device for determining the major features and significant details of optimal strategies. Several fairly realistic game models of tactical air warfare, which have been solved analytically, are presented. These games involve sequences of simultaneous moves, with a continuum of choices available to each side at each move. The question is then raised whether playing the game--which is essentially the testing of a finite number of alternatives at each move--will be a helpful device for learning about the solutions of the particular games presented. It is shown, in terms of these games, that war gaming, despite its usefulness for other purposes, is not a helpful device in determining optimal strategies.

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