An outline of the game-theoretic approach to a number of different competitive situations in economics, including an auction, a duopolistic price war, several larger market models, and a stock-holders' meeting. The discussion is intended to illustrate the scope of the n-person, nonconstant-sum theory, as opposed to the more familiar minimax theory of two-person, constant-sum games.
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